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Abstract 
This thesis examines the soundness of the claim that counterinsurgency theory is 
no longer valid based on the experiences from Afghanistan. It does so by analysing 
to which degree three members of the coalition adhered to the theories of 
counterinsurgency in their operations between 2006-2010. Initially the thesis 
examines classic counterinsurgency theory. It argues that this theory is mainly 
characterised by a primacy of politics, that the population is the centre of gravity 
and a concerted government effort. I further analyses the efforts of Norway, Great 
Britain and the Netherlands within the framework of classic counterinsurgency 
theory. In sum, this thesis argues the Afghan case demonstrates that classic 
counterinsurgency theory is not outmoded. Of the three states studied in this 
thesis, only the Netherlands can be said to have adhered to counterinsurgency 
theory in the execution of the mission.  
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Introduction 
This is a study of the theory and practice of counterinsurgency. More specifically it 
is a study of the implementation of counterinsurgency theory on the ground by 
three members of the coalition in Afghanistan. It examines to what extent these 
states operated in accordance with the theories of population-centric 
counterinsurgency in their respective provinces, and why their behaviour differed.  
 
The perceived failure of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to debate 
regarding military interventions in general and also severe criticism of 
counterinsurgency as a viable doctrine to solve the challenges of contemporary 
conflicts. These critics largely fall into two categories. The first group are 
opponents to almost any military intervention by Western forces. Their 
disagreement is more with overall policy than counterinsurgency as a doctrine 
specifically.1 The last category does not argue that the West should refrain from 
military interventions. They primarily disagrees with the choice of 
counterinsurgency as a doctrine, or their interpretation of counterinsurgency, 
when Western forces intervene. Gian Gentile, a lecturer at West Point, has been 
among the more vocal critics. Gentile argues that ‘in a sense, population-centric 
counterinsurgency has perverted a better way of American war which has primarily 
been one of improvisation and practicality.’ In conclusion of his article Gentile 
states; ‘The new American way of war counterinsurgency has eclipsed the 
execution of sound strategy, producing never-ending campaigns of nation-building 
and attempts to change entire societies in places like Afghanistan.’2 Several other 
academics also echo this criticism of counterinsurgency as a viable doctrine. Based 
on the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan Douglas Porch argues that ‘we are on 
the downside of COIN.’3 According to Porch the theories and doctrines of 
counterinsurgency rest on dubious historical evidence. He argues further that 
excessive adherence to the core tenets of COIN has served to relegate war to a 
                                         
1 For an example of this see: Barry Posen, Restraint: A new Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Cornell: 
Cornell University Press) 
2 Gian Gentile, "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-Centic Coin and the Army", Parameters, no. Autumn (2009): 
5 and 15 and Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn – America’s deadly embrace of counter-insurgency (New York: The 
New Press, 2013) 
3 Douglas Porch, "The Dangerous Myths and Dubious Promise of Coin", Small Wars & Insurgencies 22, no. 2 
(2011): 253. 
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series of doctrinal truisms. M.L.R. Smith and David Martin Jones also argues not 
only that counterinsurgency theory is ՙan insoluble paradox՚.4 They also argue that 
modern democracies struggle to develop effective strategies and to maintain the 
political will to conduct counterinsurgency campaign. In their conclusion, they 
argue that counterinsurgency can no longer be considered a viable doctrine.5 While 
this is a natural conclusion based on their research, it represents a fundamental 
challenge for practitioners. Especially since they do not present any substantial 
alternative for governments faced with the challenge of an insurgency. David Ucko 
and Robert Egnell point to the difficulties Britain has had in fulfilling its ambitions 
in Iraq and Afghanistan through the use of counterinsurgency. While they are 
critical of decisions and implementations of counterinsurgency doctrine, they do 
not go as far as Porch in arguing the death of counterinsurgency.6  
 
While much of the criticism raised in the works mentioned above is both timely 
and valid, it rests on a central and unspoken premise: that military forces in 
Afghanistan have worked in accordance with counterinsurgency theory. If this is 
not the case, criticism should perhaps be directed more towards the strategy 
which was employed by the coalition and its members, rather than the theories 
and the doctrine itself. Hence this thesis will attempt to explore to what extent 
three member states of the coalition conducted their operations in line with 
counterinsurgency theory, and why their behaviour differed. It will explore the 
dynamics and tensions between military theory, doctrine, strategy and tactics. 
Thereby attempting to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the campaign rather 
than focussing on only one level of warfare.  
 
The US-led coalition’s engagement in Afghanistan 2001 and the challenges 
following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 revived the general interest in 
counterinsurgency in the West. This specific type of conflict had in previous 
decades lost much of its relevance in military doctrines, followed by little interest 
                                         
4 M.L.R. Smith and David Martin Jones, The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency – Strategic 
Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes (New York: Colombia University Press, 2015), 54 
5 Ibid, 179-185 
6 David H Ucko and Robert Egnell, Conterinsurgency in Crisis - Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare 
(New York: Colombia University Press, 2013). 
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in research after the US failure in Vietnam, and the withdrawal from empires by 
the major European powers. A notable exception was the United Kingdom (UK), 
which was forced to maintain a focus on this type of conflict due to the Troubles in 
Northern Ireland. However, the main focus of most NATO doctrines in early 2000 
was concepts such as effects-based operations, intelligence driven operations, and 
network centric warfare. Norwegian Armed Forces doctrine published in the period 
may serve as an example of this.7 It highlights manoeuvre warfare, network centric 
warfare, and effects-based operations as the main tools for the Norwegian armed 
forces. Low-intensity operations hardly warranted a mention, and 
counterinsurgency was not covered. When problems started to arise after the 
initial successes in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the focus for many military forces 
again shifted back to studies of counterinsurgency, its characteristics, and how to 
win such conflicts could.  
 
Counterinsurgency is defined as ‘those military, law enforcement, political, 
economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency, while 
addressing the root causes.’8 Important recent military contributions to the 
development of counterinsurgency include the publication of the US Army and 
Marine Corps doctrine for counterinsurgency, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, in December 
2006, and a revised British Field Manual part 10 in 2007 and again in 2009. Both 
these doctrines stand firmly in one specific tradition within counterinsurgency, 
most often referred to as population-centric or simply classic counterinsurgency. 
Population-centric counterinsurgency prioritises separating the insurgents from the 
population and winning or coercing the population over to the side of the 
government, rather than trying to defeat the insurgents by conventional military 
means.   
 
Many hailed the FM 3-24 as one of the finest doctrines published in years. 
However, it has also been the object of trenchant criticism. This criticism has in 
general largely fallen into two categories: empirical and contextual. The empirical 
                                         
7 Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College, "Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine,"  
(Oslo: The Defense Staff, 2007), 54-57. 
8 British Army, "British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency," ed. Ministry of Defence 
(London: 2009), Ch 1. p, 6. 
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criticism points at the doctrine’s classic approach to counterinsurgency.9 Classic in 
this sense means that it builds on experiences from the wars of decolonisation 
after the Second World War. Writers such as Hoffman and Porch argue that while 
there are lessons to learn from that period, contemporary armies need to ‘revise 
them to reflect the realities of today’s environment.’10 The empirical criticism 
attacks the validity of the lessons used to underpin the doctrine.11 In the preface 
of his latest book, Counterinsurgency – exposing the myths of the new way of war, 
Douglas Porch argues:  
Claims in doctrine for success in small wars, at least at a reasonable 
strategic, financial, and moral cost, have relied on mythologized versions of 
the past too often supported by shoddy research and flawed, selective 
analysis of cases.12  
In other words, there are challenges involved with the application of theories of 
classic counterinsurgency as a foundation for contemporary doctrine. Not just 
because ‘today’s insurgent is not the Maoist of yesterday,’13 but also because 
changes and developments in the strategic context of the conflicts have rendered 
many of the means used in the classic era unavailable today.14 Any suggestion of 
resettling the Pashtun population away from disputed areas in Afghanistan in the 
studied period would not only be politically out of the question but also almost 
certainly unlawful. However, historians seem to agree that the forcible resettling 
of ca. 600,000 Chinese in Malaya was pivotal to the eventual successful outcome of 
that campaign.15 One can argue the same about the role of the highly controversial 
internment camps in Kenya or South Africa.16 Gil Merom also points to fundamental 
challenges faced by democracies when fighting insurgencies. His overall argument 
                                         
9 See: Frank G Hoffman, "Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?", Parameters Summer (2007) and Alex Marshall, 
"Imperial Nostalgia, the Liberal Lie, and the Perils of Postmodern Counterinsurgency", Small Wars & 
Insurgencies 21, no. 2 (2010). 
10 Hoffman, "Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?," 84. 
11 For advocates of this school see: Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency - Exposing the Myths of the New Way of 
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) and David French, "Nasty Not Nice: British Counter-
Insurgency Doctrine and Practice, 1945-1967", Small Wars & Insurgencies 23, no. 4-5 (2012). 
12 Porch, Counterinsurgency - Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War, xii. 
13 Hoffman, "Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?," 71. 
14 Marshall, "Imperial Nostalgia, the Liberal Lie, and the Perils of Postmodern Counterinsurgency," 245-47. 
15 Hew Strachan, "British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq", The RUSI Journal 156, no. 6 (2007): 10 
and Robert W Komer, "The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect - Organization of a Successful 
Counterinsurgency Effort,"  (Santa Monica: RAND, 1972), 53-58. 
16 Peter Mansoor, "Army," in Understanding Counterinsurgency - Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges, ed. 
Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (London: Routledge, 2010), 54-57. 
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is that democracies fail in small wars because they find it extremely difficult to 
escalate the level of violence and brutality which can secure victory.՚17 Public 
opinion in liberal democracies find it, according to Meron, difficult to accept the 
means necessary to win small wars. As conflicts drag on democratic governments 
find it increasingly difficult to maintain a popular support for the campaign. The 
2007 version of the British doctrine argues that the lessons from history should not 
be blindly applied, but adapted to fit each specific case. It states that ‘while 
military planning for counterinsurgency should draw upon the lessons of the past, 
doctrine has to evolve if it is to remain relevant.’18 It is partly this challenge that 
forms the point of departure for the present study. Counterinsurgency doctrines of 
leading NATO nations are still firmly set in a classic counterinsurgency theory 
tradition, even if some critics argue that many of the experiences which shaped 
the doctrines are not relevant today. This thesis will in the theory chapter analyse 
the theories which form the theoretical foundation of contemporary 
counterinsurgency doctrines.  It will then compare to what extent three nations 
involved in Afghanistan have adhered to these theories.  
 
The aim of the thesis is not to establish whether or not the efforts of Norway, 
Great Britain, and the Netherlands have been a success in a strategic sense.  It will 
instead focus on whether they put theories of classic counterinsurgency into 
practice in Afghanistan.  This will provide the crucial basis for addressing the 
question of whether the theories of classic counterinsurgency theory remain valid 
as one of the foundations of contemporary military doctrine.  
Research question 
This thesis will explore this topic by addressing the following research 
questions;  
First, how did Norwegian, British, and Dutch operations in 
Afghanistan between 2006-10 adhere to classic 
counterinsurgency theory?  
Second, why did their approaches differ?  
                                         
17 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15 
18 British Army, "Part 10 Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines) - Revised and 
Updated Version," ed. Ministry of Defence (London: 2007), Part B. Ch 2. p,1. 
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In the thesis the answer to the second research question will follow naturally from 
answering the first. 
 
The theory and doctrine of counterinsurgency thus provide the common term of 
reference for the study. The question will be addressed through three case studies, 
all of which focus on medium to smaller states who were lead nations in their 
provinces: Norway, the Netherlands, and the UK. These states are the variables of 
the thesis. 
 
The aim of the thesis is to help bridge the gap between practice and theory in the 
field of counterinsurgency. A central focus is therefore the tensions between 
theory and the practice and between strategy and tactics in the conduct of war.  
 
Methodology 
There are several reasons for choosing Britain, the Netherlands and Norway in 
Afghanistan as three as the objects for the case studies. Firstly, as a serving 
Norwegian officer, it was natural to include Norway. Secondly, the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands are, from a Norwegian point of view, important allies. They 
are geographically close, have a long history of joint training with the Norwegian 
armed forces, and are thus both nations with strong bi-lateral as well as multi-
lateral bonds with Norway. 
Furthermore, they have all been lead nations in different provinces in Afghanistan: 
Britain in Helmand, the Netherlands in Uruzgan, and Norway in Faryab.19 Thirdly, 
they have all been studied less intensively (especially Norway and the Netherlands) 
than the US, which has been the dominant troop contributor to the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Fourthly, both Britain and the Netherlands were 
more easily accessible to me as a Norwegian officer. The Norwegian Army has 
liaison officers posted in both countries on a permanent basis. In tracking down 
serving officers for interviews and getting access to archives, these liaison officers 
proved invaluable. They were also accessible from a language point of view. The 
                                         
19 Lead nation is a NATO term for a member of the coalition which bears the main responsibility in a given part 
of the area of operations. 
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Dutch Army is very proficient in English and adheres to the principle of English as 
the command language of NATO. Because I have a good working knowledge of both 
English and German, it was also possible for me to read Dutch when the sources 
were not available in English. Lastly, this research focus dovetails with other work 
done at the Norwegian Military Academy on the development of strategy 
concerning the same three nations for the conflict in Afghanistan.20  
 
Sources 
This structure of the thesis moves from the general to the specific and from theory 
to practice. It will first analyse classic counterinsurgency theory in order to 
establish core characteristics of this particular approach. These characteristics will 
provide a framework of analysis for the case studies. The theories of Sir Robert 
Thompson and David Galula will receive special attention. Thompson and Galula 
was by no means the fathers of population-centric counterinsurgency. As pointed 
out by Beatrice Heuser, ideas along the same lines was advocated by Spanish 
officers back centuries back among others.21 However, this thesis attempts to view 
the theory and practice of counterinsurgency as conducted in contemporary 
operations. In this regard, the works of Thompson and Galula, in particular, are 
central. Their recent resurgence into fashion was closely tied to the publication of 
the much hailed US counterinsurgency doctrine in 2006. Doctrines generally does 
not cite sources, but FM 3-24 cites Galula and Thompson as the only two 
mentioned sources in the introduction.22 Because of the dominating position the US 
holds in NATO and also had in the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan the works of 
Galula and Thompson quickly gained popularity.23 It can thus be argued that Galula 
and Thompson are central to understanding contemporary counterinsurgency 
doctrine.  
 
                                         
20 Tor-Erik Hanssen, "Coalition Strategy in Complex Conflicts: The Strategic Behaviour of Three Nato-States in 
Afghanistan 2003-2008" (King's College London, 2013). 
21 Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy – Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 428-431. 
22 US Army & Marine Corps, Fm 3-24 Counterinsurgency (Boulder: Paladin Press, 2006), viii. 
23 For an excellent review of modern COIN theory and contemporary doctrine see: Beatrice Heuser, "The 
Cultural Revolution in Counterinsurgency", Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 1 (2007)  
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The works of Galula and Thompson falls into the category of military theory. As 
this thesis deals with the relationship between theory and practice it is neccesary 
to brifefly clarify how I see the relationship between theory and doctrine. Military 
theory is the theoretical foundation for the application of military force. It can be 
defined as ‘comprehensive analysis of all the aspects of warfare, its patterns and 
inner structure, and the mutual relationships of its various 
components/elements.’24 It is the systematic knowledge on how wars can be 
understood, studied, and ultimately won. Military theory spans all forms of 
conflicts and aspects of military activity and represents the sum of military 
thought from antiquity until present time. Military doctrine is defined by NATO as 
‘fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of 
objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.’25 While 
military theory occupies itself with war in all aspects doctrine is more practical. It 
serves as a bridge between theory and practice. The Dutch army pragmatically 
defines doctrine as ‘the formal expression of military thought valid for a certain 
period of time.’26 Thus military doctrine represents a conscious choice. Not all 
military theories remain valid or in fashion and doctrines formalises parts of 
military theory which the armed forces believe gives them the best chance of 
success. However, doctrines are not only a vital tool for the military forces to 
convey core ideas on how to fight. Doctrines are influenced by other factors than 
military theory alone. As pointed out by Barry Posen in his work on the source of 
military doctrine they also represent an opportunity for a government to influence 
how their military forces operate. Posen argues that ‘military doctrine is a key 
component of grand strategy.’27 Posen’s work is mainly focus on overall national 
military doctrine for high intensity warfare. The logic of his argument, however, 
remains valid also for low-intensity conflict. National doctrines, or the software for 
the armed forces, tells the armed forces how to use their forces for different types 
of conflicts. This relates to the overall methodology of this thesis. An alternative 
to analysing the theory of counterinsurgency, such as this thesis will do, would 
                                         
24 Milan Vego, "On Military Theory", Joint Forces Quarterly 63, no. 3rd quarter (2011): 60. 
25 NATO, "AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine," ed. NATO Standadization Office (Bruxells: 2017), 1-1. 
26 Royal Netherlands Army, Military Doctrine (The Hague: Doctrine committee of the Royal Netherlands 
Army, 1996), 11. 
27 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine – France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 33 
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have been to use the doctrines of leading NATO members, such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom, and apply the principles in the doctrines as a tool 
for analysis in the case studies. But doctrines are not purely military theory. 
National doctrines should be selections of military theory made to fit a specific 
security policy context. They should not only be informed by military theory alone, 
but also the specific strategies and policies of their government.28 Hence, US 
doctrines should have a specific US flavour, UK doctrines a UK flavour, and so on. 
Because of this, I will utilise classic theory to build the theoretical framework for 
the thesis, and use the different national doctrines in the case studies to clarify 
each nation’s specific stance on counterinsurgency.  
 
The main challenge regarding sources for the case studies is the closeness in time 
to the events. Most relevant documents are not yet available because they have 
not yet been de-classified. However, I was able to obtain full access to both Dutch 
and Norwegian Army archives concerning operations in Afghanistan.29 To my 
knowledge, this is the first research access granted by the Dutch and the 
Norwegians to the still classified archives concerning operations in Afghanistan. 
This was partly because I am a serving officer with a sufficient security clearance. 
Furthermore, I agreed to refrain from using any materiel that would be considered 
sensitive or still classified.  This included: Counter-Improvised Explosive Device 
(IED) measures, raw intelligence data, specific capacities of weapons systems and 
details concerning injuries and fatalities. Lastly, I agreed that the respective 
Ministries of Defence could check that my thesis did not include classified materiel 
before I eventually published it. I was allowed to study anything classified up to 
and including ISAF secret. This included most operational orders (OPORDER), 
fragmentary orders (FRAGO), post-operation evaluations, reports, and 
communications logs.30 As these documents are still classified, they are not filed in 
archives as such. Both in the Netherlands and in Norway they are still kept on the 
hard drives brought back by the different units from Afghanistan. On these drives, 
                                         
28 Ibid, 221 
29 In The Netherlands I worked with the Army Archives in Rikjswik and in Norway with the Permanent Joint 
Headquarters in Bodø. 
30 An OPORDER is a complete set of orders for a military mission. FRAGOs are issued to correct or amend 
orders given in an OPORDER as the situation develops.  
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each department of a staff typically has its folder with numerous sub-folders. As 
an example, each operation usually has a planning folder in the S or G5 (planning) 
department. A battle log at the S or G3 (operations) department, and after action 
review or evaluations in an own folder. It was challenging and time-consuming to 
get the bigger picture of the whole period of this study. In the Netherlands, the 
files were kept in 22 two-terabyte hard drives. Three of these proved to be 
corrupted, while the rest worked as they should. In Norway, the information was 
kept on six three-terabyte hard drives. 
 
It proved impossible to get the same level of access in Britain as in the Netherlands 
and Norway. I was granted access on three occasions, but this was then revoked 
before my research trips. This is compensated for by doing more interviews in 
Britain than in The Netherlands and Norway. Also, the tradition of open parliament 
and committee hearings in Britain also proved a valuable source, in particular 
concerning the more strategic matters. I have also utilised the numerous 
autobiographies and first-hand accounts written by British officers based on their 
experiences in Helmand Province.  
 
In addition to written sources, I have carried out numerous interviews with officers 
involved in the operations in the studied period. Due to the different organisation 
of forces between the studied nations, the personnel interviewed fall into diverse 
categories. For the Netherlands, the main focus has been task force commanders 
and their respective battalion commanders. As far as the British case was 
concerned, I focused on battle-group commanders and their respective company 
commanders. For Norway, I interviewed Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 
commanders and Task Force commanders.31 While all these have different titles 
and ranks, they performed similar tasks, though with sometimes different 
resources in their respective missions. In accordance with the ethical approval 
obtained for this thesis, all interviewees are anonymised when cited in the thesis. 
When referenced they are simply referred to as Norwegian, Dutch or British officer 
                                         
31 PRTs is a US concept used by NATO forces in Afghanistan in order to facilitate security, reconstruction and 
development within the same military organisation. Each province had one PRT. While the Dutch and British 
task force had a PRT embedded in their main task-force the Norwegians used the PRT as the main unit in 
Faryab province with other forces attached to the PRT. 
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followed by a random letter. Removal of even rank and position was done to 
maximise anonymity for the interviewees. If only the name of the interviewees was 
left out of the footnote, it would have been easy for a reader with intimate 
knowledge of the different armies to identify them. 
 
All interviews were semi-structured with the same questions guide as a point of 
departure. They varied in duration between 40 and 120 minutes and were in most 
cases done in the office of the interviewees, or in a meeting room at their 
workplace. In most cases, I gained initial access to the different interviewees by 
email. Email addresses were in most cases provided by the Norwegian Army liaison 
officers in The Netherlands and Britain. On some occasions officers already 
interviewed provided contact information to other members of the unit.   
 
The use of interviews posed several methodical challenges but also offered 
significant rewards. Interviews provided an opportunity to discuss events with the 
people who were on the ground and helped make the judgements and decisions, 
which in many ways make up this thesis. They provide valuable insight into the 
processes and ideas behind strategies and operations which otherwise would not be 
clear. On the other hand, the interviews were in most cases done several years 
after the officers re-deployed from their missions. It is therefore hard to 
distinguish what were their thoughts at the time and what might be a post-hoc 
rationalisation of actions or judgements. Furthermore, most of these officers are 
still serving members of their armed forces, and in many cases have reached a high 
rank since returning from Afghanistan. Even though they are anonymised in the 
thesis, they may have considered it to be in their best interest to “toe the party 
line” when discussing controversial issues connected to their deployment. I have 
dealt with this in the thesis by not using interviews as the only source of evidence 
when discussing the more controversial aspects covered. Wherever possible, I have 
cross-checked interview accounts either with other interviews or with written 
sources. Where this has not been possible the evidence was either not used, or 
used with the clearly-expressed caveat that it is based on a single source. 
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Scope 
The scope of this work is limited by focusing on the years from 2006-2010. Reasons 
for this are simply that ISAF assumed responsibility for all of Afghanistan from 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2006, and that the Netherlands terminated 
its contribution in July 2010. 
 
I had no ambition of studying every aspect of the involved nations’ participation in 
ISAF. For Great Britain, the study focuses on the efforts in Helmand by the PRT and 
the involved battle groups. For the Dutch, it focuses on the operations of Task 
Force Uruzgan. As far as Norway is concerned, it only deals with PRT Meymaneh 
and to some extent the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in Faryab 
province.  Due to formal rules concerning classification and the sensitive nature of 
the subject, the intelligence efforts of all nations will not be discussed directly or 
in any detail. The same applies to the use of Special Forces. 
Outline 
The thesis divides into four main chapters. Chapter one will explore, analyse and 
discuss population-centric counterinsurgency theory. It aims to provide an 
analytical framework to analyse the different nation’s strategy and operations 
within. The theory chapter is followed by three chapters of one case study each 
focusing on Norway, Great Britain, and the Netherlands respectively. The case 
studies adhere to the framework developed in the theory chapter.  The first part 
of each discusses the different nations’ strategic and tactical approach to the 
conflict within the framework of counterinsurgency theory. The second part 
focuses on the manner in which each nation approached the conflict in a 
population-centric manner on both the strategic and tactical level. Finally, part 
three of each case study will analyse the different models of civil-military 
cooperation employed by the different nations and the extent to which these 
models were in line with population-centric counterinsurgency theory. While all 
three case studies follow the same overall structure, they still differ somewhat. In 
particular, the British case focuses more on one operation when analysing the 
tactical approach. Lastly, I summarise and discuss the main findings of the thesis in 
a conclusion. 
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Definitions 
As many concepts such as guerrilla warfare, small wars, operations other than war 
(OOTW), low intensity conflict, revolutionary war, and people’s war lack a 
common definition, it is necessary to outline how I relate to these in the context 
of this thesis. Guerrilla warfare is in this thesis viewed as a means to an end. It 
refers to a specific set of tactics that can be used by both state and non-state 
actors, but are most commonly deployed by insurgents. Small wars are ‘all 
campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular 
troops.’32 Charles Callwell included campaigns to supress rebellions and guerrillas 
in his classic definition. Modern counterinsurgency theory stems from the early 
writings on small wars. In this thesis, the term counterinsurgency covers both 
these. Revolutionary war is a specific theory for how to conduct insurgencies for 
communist movements codified by Mao Tse-Tung, General Giap, Ho Chi-Mihn, and 
other communist leaders. Revolutionary war is further elaborated on in the first 
part of this chapter. I also distinguish between revolutionary war and 
contemporary insurgencies. While the latter was influenced by the theories of Mao 
and others, they are still not identical. 
 
Other central concepts in this thesis are military theory, doctrine and strategy. I 
will just briefly clarify how these are understood here. Military theory is the 
theoretical foundation for the application of military force. It can be defined as 
‘comprehensive analysis of all the aspects of warfare, its patterns and inner 
structure, and the mutual relationships of its various components/elements.’33 It is 
the systematic knowledge of how wars can be understood, studied, and ultimately 
won. Military theory spans all forms of conflicts and aspects of military activity and 
represents the sum of military thought from antiquity until the present. Military 
doctrine is defined by NATO as ‘fundamental principles by which military forces 
guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires 
judgment in application.’34 While military theory is occupied with war in all 
aspects doctrine is more practical. It serves as a bridge between theory and 
                                         
32 Charles Callwell, Small Wars, a Tactical Texbook for Imperial Soldiers, 3rd ed. (London: Greenhill Books, 
1990), 21. 
33 Milan Vego, "On Military Theory", Joint Forces Quarterly 63, no. 3rd quarter (2011): 60. 
34 NATO, "Ajp-01 Allied Joint Doctrine," ed. NATO Standadization Office (Bruxells: 2017), 1-1. 
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practice. The Dutch army pragmatically defines doctrine as ‘the formal expression 
of military thought valid for a certain period of time.’35 Thus military doctrine 
represents a conscious choice. Not all military theories remain valid or in fashion 
and doctrines formalises parts of military theory which the armed forces believe 
gives them the best chance of success. In this manner, one could say that doctrines 
constitute the software for the armed forces. When I refer to the strategic level I 
do this in a hierarchical levels of command sense. The strategic level, 
encompassing both the political leadership and top military command, is defined 
as: ‘the coordinated, systematic development and application of a nation’s or 
alliance’s economic, diplomatic, psychological, military and other political means 
to secure national or allied interests.’36 When referring to strategy as a term an 
what this should entail in practical terms, I take a Clausewitizian approach. 
Strategy is viewed a process, aimed to match ends, means, and ways to gain an 
advantage over an opponent. Moreover, there is no clear line of demarcation 
between the different levels of warfare. While it is the responsibility of the 
strategic level to formulate strategy, this should not happen without inputs from 
the levels below. 
 
Levels of analysis 
Most books or studies of counterinsurgency tend to focus on the overall, or 
strategic, aspects of the conflict. There are notable exceptions to the rule, Emilie 
Simpson's brilliant War From the Ground Up is one.37 Nevertheless, most work on 
counterinsurgency is focussed on the overall conduct of the conflict, or the 
strategic level of the conduct of war. Works which focus on the tactical level of 
the conflict tend to be first-hand accounts rather than academic works which try 
to analyse the actions of the involved in a theoretical framework. The focus on the 
strategic or operational levels is in many ways understandable. Military 
organisations are complex and do not lend themselves to easy comparative 
analysis. Orders and reports are filled with three letter abbreviations, military 
lingo and standardized terms which are hard to understand for outsiders. 
                                         
35 Royal Netherlands Army, Military Doctrine (The Hague: Doctrine committee of the Royal Netherlands 
Army, 1996), 11. 
36 Ibid.,  12. 
37 Emile Simpson, War From the Ground Up (London: Hurst and company, 2012) 
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Furthermore, most military archives remain closed for 20 to 30 years due to formal 
acts of secrecy which military organisations are littered with.  
 
The main weakness of works that focus mainly on either the strategic or tactical 
level is that these perspectives become too narrow. As argued by Clausewitz war is 
‘an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.’38  Acts of force, or threats 
thereof, is executed on the tactical level. The will, or aim, of the war, is set by 
the strategic level. The key to success in warfare is the interaction between the 
two. In studies of counterinsurgency this is particularly important. Insurgency and 
counterinsurgency are highly politicised forms of warfare. The government and 
insurgents fight over the right to govern the whole or certain parts of a territory. 
Thus the actions on the tactical level are more directly connected to overall 
strategic goals than is the case in conventional wars. This effect is often referred 
to as a ‘compression of levels’.39 Actions on the tactical level can have direct 
consequences at the strategic. The abuse of prisoners of war in the Abu Graib 
prison by their American guards during the war in Iraq is one example of this. The 
numerous incidents where coalition forces inflict collateral damage on a tactical 
level is another. In conventional war, one can to some extent compensate for a 
lack of strategy by being tactically brilliant. However, the same dynamic does not 
exist in counterinsurgency. The US Army won the vast majority of skirmishes and 
battles during the Vietnam War, but still end up on the losing side. In order to 
thoroughly examine counterinsurgency campaigns, one should hence attempt to 
analyse strategy and tactics in relation, not just one of the parts.  
 
Based on the evidence examined in this thesis the theories of classic 
counterinsurgency cannot be dismissed based on the experiences in Afghanistan. 
Only one of the three states studied can be said to have adhered substantively to 
counterinsurgency theory in their approach to the mission in Afghanistan during 
the period under study. Partly by conscious choice, Norway never attempted to 
employ counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. The strategic level in Norway failed to 
                                         
38 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (London: 
Everyman's Library, 1993), 83. 
39 Christopher Dandeker, "From Victory to Success - the Changing Mission of Western Armed Forces," in 
Modern War and the Utility of Force, ed. Isabelle 
Angstrom Duyvesteyen, Jan, Cass Military Studies (New York: Routledge, 2010), 29. 
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develop a coherent and fitting strategy for Faryab province which matched ends 
and means for their mission. Furthermore, they opted for a clear separation of 
civil and military efforts. This was mainly done to facilitate the work of NGOs in 
the area better. This choice also partly undermined any population-centric 
approach as it made coordinated security and development missions very difficult. 
Due to poor force-ratios, lack of clear strategic guidance and long term military 
planning the Norwegian operations in Faryab province was overall more 
characterised by an enemy-centric than a population-centric approach. While the 
UK officially conducted a counterinsurgency approach in Helmand, they diverged 
from counterinsurgency theory in the conduct of operations. The initial strategic 
guidance, including a clear counter-narcotics focus, was not well suited to the 
situation on the tactical level. Furthermore, because of the decision to expand 
operations out of the Helmand Triangle in 2006 British troops became 
overstretched. This again made any population-centric approach difficult as local 
force-ratios were poor.  
 
The British in Helmand were also never able to coordinate civil and military actions 
effectively at the tactical level. This was partly caused by a lack of integrated 
planning. Different force-protection standards between the military and civilian 
personnel also aggravated the problem. After 2008 the British adapted their 
approach to one more in line with counterinsurgency theory. There are examples 
of more population-centric operations and efforts were made to reduce the 
problems with local force-ratios.   
Only the Netherlands largely adhered to the theories and doctrines of population-
centric counterinsurgency, albeit in an indirect fashion. Officially the Dutch 
pursued a 3D (defence, development and diplomacy) approach on the strategic 
level. Due to parliamentary procedures, they produced a coherent and fitting 
strategy for the mission. Furthermore, the first Dutch forces deployed to Uruzgan 
produced a comprehensive and long term campaign plan for the province. In 
summary, any claims that population-centric counterinsurgency is no longer a valid 
theory for low-intensity conflicts is not accurate.  
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In sum, two of the three states studied in this thesis did not adhere to 
counterinsurgency theory or failed to develop a strategy which made the conduct 
of counterinsurgency operations viable. The evidence examined suggest the 
problem is not with classic counterinsurgency theory. The Dutch case indicates on 
the contrary that it remains potentially very useful.  
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CHAPTER ONE: THE THEORY OF CLASSIC 
COUNTERINSURGENCY 
This part of the thesis will examine the intellectual and historical foundations of 
contemporary counterinsurgency theory. It will have a relativily broad scope as it 
serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it will examine the theories and debates concerning 
population-centric counterinsurgency. It emphasises how classic, or population-
centric, counterinsurgency in certain aspects differs from conventional war and 
other traditions of counterinsurgency. These characteristics will again form the 
framework of analysis in the following case studies. Secondly, it will also serve as 
the historiography and literature review of the thesis. The latter requires a wide 
perspective, but the main focus will remain on population-centric 
counterinsurgency theory. The principal sources for the first part of this thesis will 
be classic counterinsurgency theory. The works of David Galula and Sir Robert 
Thompson will receive particular attention.  
 
Thompson served as a civil servant during the Malayan emergency and later as 
head of the British advisory mission in Vietnam. Based on his experiences he wrote 
Defeating Communist Insurgency, an influential book that has been in print ever 
since its publication in 1966. Thompson’s work is not a history of how the 
insurgency in Malaya was defeated, but a generalisation of his experiences into a 
theory for how to defeating insurgencies. David Galula was a French officer that 
served in China, Indo-China and Algeria. After the Algerian campaign, Galula left 
the French Army and started working as a researcher at RAND. Partly for this 
reason, he has been much more influential in the US than in France. His most 
widely used work, Counterinsurgency Warfare, first published in 1964, got 
renewed attention due to its influence on the new US counterinsurgency doctrine 
in 2006.40  
 
Galula’s work, just like Thompson’s, is an attempt to generalise experience into 
theory, but Galula focuses somewhat more on the tactical level of the campaign. 
                                         
40 Conrad Crane, "United States," in Understanding Counterinsurgency - Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges, 
ed. Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (London: Routledge, 2010), 61. 
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More contemporary debates and theories will also be used in the first sections of 
the text to contrast or elaborate on parts of the theory. 
 
Theories concerning how to fight low-intensity conflicts, or assymetric warfare, 
can be traced far back in military history. Beatrice Heuser points out that such 
ideas were present in the writings of Sun Zu and that Spanish officers wrote 
theories similar to the ideas of a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency 
as far back as in the 16th and 17th century.41 Heuser furthermore points out that 
most larger states in this period practiced “small wars”. Either during conquest of 
new territories, in the periphery of their empires, or to quell unrest within their 
own states.42 Modern theory of counterinsurgency in many ways began with the 
conquests of colonies for western states. Regular warfare then became the domain 
of the domestic armies, while the colonial armies handled imperial policing, small 
wars, suppression of rebellions, and counterinsurgency. Practitioners reflecting on 
their experiences often published early theories of counterinsurgency. Gallieni, 
Lyautey, Bugeaud, and Callwell all came from this background. Some of their 
theories, for example Lyautey’s oil spot theory and Callwell’s definition of small 
wars, remain valid and influential today. Most of their approach to the conduct of 
operations, however, has been made obsolete by advances in technology or 
developments in human rights and international law. When reading of early 
French, and to some extent British, campaigns against rebellions in their colonies, 
one sometimes get associations to a sort of Carthaginian peace. As Porch argued: 
‘The “Lyautey method” boiled down in practice to a series of reprisal raids for 
damage inflicted.’43  
 
The writings of this period nevertheless represent the starting point of modern 
counterinsurgency writing and thinking. Its emphasis on counterinsurgency as a 
distinct, albeit debated, form of warfare, it remains a central part of 
                                         
41 Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy – Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 390-391 
42 Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy – Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 391-394 
43 Douglas Porch, "Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in Makers of 
Modern Strategy - from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1986), 393. 
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counterinsurgency theory today.44 The focus on the political nature of these 
conflicts, the importance of avoiding having to counter irregular challenges with 
regular means, and accepting zones with different levels of government control – 
all these come out of these early theories of counterinsurgency. 
 
After the Second World War several developments coincided. Many colonies found 
a national identity and insurgencies became the main means in their fight for 
independence.45 The cold war further ensured that any insurgent movement with a 
communist outlook received outside support from China or the Soviet Union. These 
developments prompted a change and development in counterinsurgency practice 
and then theory. Firstly, the theories of revolutionary war published by Mao proved 
themselves to be an effective doctrine for insurgents. The Cold War and the East-
West deadlock also ensured that most communist-inspired insurgents would get 
outside support from the Soviet Union. In the same manner, due to the domino 
theory, most states fighting a communist insurgency would get support from the 
West. Secondly, the growth of liberalism followed by a strengthening of 
international law, combined with the increased influence of the media, partly 
forced counterinsurgents to operate differently than before. Finally, and equally 
importantly, these were the busiest days of counterinsurgency in modern history. 
Unrest was common in most former colonies, and major nations were involved in 
the struggles. This again led to increased study and research into the phenomena 
of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and again to new doctrine.  
 
Population-centric counterinsurgency is characterised by the presence of three 
traits: 
 
1. The primacy of politics  
2. The population as the centre of gravity 
3. A concerted government effort 
 
                                         
44 See: Porch, "The Dangerous Myths and Dubious Promise of Coin." 
45 Martin Thomas, Fight or Flight – Britain, France and their Roads from Empire (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 56-66 and Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 249 
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There are obviously other characteristics of classic counterinsurgency, listed as 
classic principles in theory and doctrine.46 While these others, such as intelligence 
driven operations, preparing for a long term commitment, and understanding the 
local environment, are obviously important, they are so in many forms of conflicts 
and not only when conducting population-centric counterinsurgency. Hence this 
thesis focuses mainly on the characteristics which set this specific theory of 
counterinsurgency apart from others. 
The chapter will progress by expanding and discussing each of the factors listed 
above. 
 
The primacy of politics 
If we apply a Clausewitzian view of conflict, all wars are political, their purpose is 
to compel an enemy to do our will through the use of force. Our will is the political 
purpose or the aim of the war, the means are armed force, or violence as 
Clausewitz calls it.47 This relationship between aims and means creates the 
specific character of each conflict. In theory, the laws of escalation would draw 
the belligerents towards an absolute war with no constraints and strategy would be 
simple; the enemy army must be destroyed, his country occupied, and his will to 
resist must be broken.48 However, limitations both in war, in politics itself, and in 
human nature limit most wars well short of their absolute theoretical limits. 
Clausewitz underlined that all wars have different characters. The aims of the war 
influence the means and grant each specific war its unique character: ‘The 
political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never 
be considered in isolation from their purpose.’49 While most associate the works of 
Clausewitz with conventional and total war, new research also show the utility of 
his theories for small wars. Sibylle Scheipers, in particular, has contributed to this. 
Scheipers does not only show that Paret and Howards translation partly shaped a 
rational and state-centric impression of Clausewitz’ work, and at the same time 
                                         
46 US Army & Marine Corps, Fm 3-24 Counterinsurgency (Boulder: Paladin Press, 2006), Ch 1. p, 1-26 and 
Crane, "United States," 62 and British Army, "British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering 
Insurgency," Part A. Ch 3. p, 1-22. 
47 Clausewitz, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 83. 
48 Ibid.,  102. 
49 Ibid.,  99. 
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downplaying the role passion and peoples war.50 Scheipers also argues convincingly 
that Clausewitz’ theoretical construct was inherently flexible and thus 
encompassed all types of war, and not distinguishing between specific forms of 
war.51  
 
Small wars and counterinsurgencies are different from conventional wars because 
they have a different character and are, to some extent, driven by a different 
logic. In conventional or high-intensity wars, states settle political differences by 
means of battles and campaigns. The main contenders are most often seen as the 
armies in the field.  Insurgents, on the other hand, attempt to change a state from 
within through the use of violence. As further explored below this again makes the 
primacy of politics even more prominent in these conflicts than in conventional 
war. 
 
One of the paradoxes that arise from the above argument is that it in many ways is 
easier to conduct wars that tend more towards the Clausewitzian absolute, than 
small wars. In absolute wars, ends are total and hence the means are more total. 
In such wars the difficult part is to actually execute them, to gather enough 
resources in the right place at the right time, to bolster public will, and to point 
the armed force of the nation in the right direction. Even though Clausewitz did 
not make this argument outright, he came close when arguing ‘that the political 
view should wholly cease to count on the outbreak of war is hardly conceivable 
unless pure hatred made all wars a struggle for life and death.’52 If wars escalated 
to their absolute form and everyone fought to the end, then the political object of 
war could simply be replaced with a military one. However, most wars are not like 
that at all. Most wars are small, fought for limited ends with limited means. These 
wars are potentially more difficult to control and conduct strategically, based on 
the fact that they are small. The decisions that need to be made are smaller and 
seem somehow less important. It is harder for participating governments to 
                                         
50 Sibylle Scheipers, On Small War: Carl von Clausewitz and People’s War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2018), 7-8 
51 Ibid, 1. See also: Sibylle Scheipers, "”The Most Beuatiful of Wars”: Carl von Clausewitz and small wars", 
European Journal of International Security 2, no. 1 (2017) 
52 Clausewitz, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 733. 
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maintain focus over time since small wars do not force themselves to the top of 
the agenda of every state leader. While the major strategic decisions in the 
Second World War boiled down to Europe first, strategic bombing, and an eventual 
invasion of France, the major strategic decisions in small wars are less spectacular. 
It may seem that it sometimes is easier to wield a broadsword than a scalpel. 
 
Furthermore, insurgency and counterinsurgency were, and remain, a highly 
politicised form of conflict in themselves. Conventional wars were often fought for 
reasons of realpolitik. Wars were fought to maintain or change a balance of power, 
or over control of border regions. In two cases in the 20th century war came close 
to a Clausewitzian absolute form and many of the participants fought for the 
survival of their state, but most conventional wars never reach that scale. A well-
conducted communist insurgency, on the other hand, presented the state with a 
different challenge. It did not want a border province or increased influence in an 
area, it represented a fundamental threat towards the state from within. ‘What is 
at stake is the country’s political regime, to defend it is a political affair.’53 Built 
on the experiences of the Chinese communist's struggle against both Chiang Kai-
shek and Japan, Mao codified a formula for how to conduct and insurgency. David 
Galula, one of the most influential writers of the period, defined a communist 
insurgency as ‘protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order 
to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the 
existing order.’54 Mao’s concept of protracted war had three distinct phases:  
 
1. The creation of a united party (strategic defensive) 
2.  Guerrilla warfare (preparation for a counter-offensive) 
3. Movement warfare (strategic counter-offensive) 
 
In order not to be wiped out when the intentions of the insurgents became clear 
the first step was to create a solid political foundation in the shape of a party. This 
would serve several purposes. First, it would educate the masses and unite them 
on the insurgent’s side of the struggle. Once there, it would prepare them for the 
new state that was to emerge once the government was overthrown. Secondly, it 
                                         
53 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare - Theory and Practice (Westport: Praeger, 1964; reprint, 2008), 
62-63. 
54 Ibid.,  2. 
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would provide the active fighters with recruits, shelter, and supplies once the 
guerrilla warfare began. Lastly, it provided the leadership of the insurgency with 
an organisation to control the masses once the insurgency gained momentum and 
eventually replaced the government.55 Central to the whole concept was the cause 
of the insurgency. Ideally, the cause was of such a nature that it put the 
government in an unsolvable dilemma. At the same time, it should attract as many 
supporters as possible while rejecting as few as possible.56 The ideas of Mao and 
his revolutionary war are of importance because the ideas of counterinsurgency at 
time came as a direct response to the threat caused by revolutionary wars. 
 
To defeat a communist insurgency, the counterinsurgents not only had to defeat 
the military threat posed by the insurgents. They were also, more importantly, 
forced to defeat the political threat their government. Both Galula and Thompson 
underlined this point in their writings. One of Thompson’s main principles of 
defeating a communist insurgency is that ‘the government must give priority to 
defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas.’57 Especially as long as the 
insurgency was still in the guerrilla warfare phase the military threat posed by the 
insurgency was manageable for the government. The political threat of subversion 
is more dangerous as it shifted the support of the population over to the 
insurgents.  
 
Frank Kitson, another prominent British practitioner-become-theorist, argues the 
same view:  
 
The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action 
which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no 
such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a 
military activity.58  
 
                                         
55 Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1968), 208-
19. 
56 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare - Theory and Practice, 2 and 11-16 and Robert Thompson, Defeating 
Communist Insurgency (St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, 1966; reprint, 2005), 21-24. 
57 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 55. 
58 Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1977), 283. 
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This is further supported by General Slim, the chief of the Imperial General Staff 
at the outset of the Malayan uprising. In his report after a tour of the country he 
concluded that ‘until it is recognised that the problem is by no means a military 
one, and that any military effort can only be subsidiary to and in support of a civil 
effort, we shall make no progress.’59 This should not be interpreted as an attempt 
by Slim to shy away from army responsibilities in Malaya. He had come to realise 
that the core of the problem was that ‘very considerable parts of Malaya have not 
since the war, and in some cases before it, been under effective administration.’60 
What was lacking in Malaya was not sufficient troops and ammunition to solve the 
military side of the problem, it lacked governance to solve the political side of it.  
 
A primacy of politics does not only have consequences for the theory of 
counterinsurgency. It also has very practical implications if we accept the premise 
introduced above concerning the political nature of these conflicts. One 
consequence is that the politics of war are pushed further down the chain of 
command in counterinsurgency campaigns compared to conventional wars.61 This is 
again reinforced because the army tends to be spread out in smaller units in 
counterinsurgency. If a company commander on the Western front in the Second 
World War did not have a clear grasp of the overall strategy, it was not very likely 
to affect the outcome of the war, neither on a tactical nor a strategic level. As 
long as he was competent to solve the mission ahead, he would most likely do 
well. Realities for a company commander in counterinsurgency, however, might be 
very different. His company would most likely be given the responsibility of a local 
district. This could involve meetings with village elders, coordination with police, 
initiation of basic needs improvements, arranging local elections, and manning and 
training local security forces. All these tasks should be managed in addition to the 
regular tasks of fighting insurgents and keeping the local population as safe as 
possible.62 In this context the company commander needs not only a clear grasp of 
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the overall doctrine and strategy for the war, but he also needs a clear grasp of 
the politics of the war as he is the one that directly engages with the local 
population on a day-to-day basis in his area. In this type of warfare, levels are 
compressed compared to conventional wars. Counterinsurgency warfare is very 
much the ‘captains’ wars’ as former US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates put it.63 
 
Not everyone shares the view that classic counterinsurgency theory dictated a 
primacy of politics. Douglas Porch, in an article in Small Wars & Insurgencies, 
states that ‘COIN offers a strategy, not to win wars abroad, but to pre-empt 
civilian control by cloaking an adventurous, not to say reckless, interventionist 
policy in the uplifting guise of the “civilizing mission.”’64 A strategy to pre-empt 
civilian control represents the exact opposite of the primacy of politics that this 
thesis has so far argued. Porch’s article is both well-argued and full of historical 
evidence that supports his claim. On the one hand, Porch makes good use of the 
works of the theories of Luyatey and Gallieni, two of Galula’s predecessors in the 
French Army.65 They definitely did not favour political control over the operations 
they conducted, and in many cases, they applied so much indiscriminate force, 
including torture of captured insurgents, that it proved strategically 
counterproductive. On the other hand, Porch fails to make much use of the 
theories of Thompson and Galula, who argued quite the opposite and who are also 
far more influential in contemporary doctrine. Galula in particular underlined the 
importance of political control when fighting insurgents.  
 
“A revolutionary war is 20 per cent military action and 80 per cent political” 
is a formula that reflects the truth. Giving the soldier authority over the 
civilian would thus contradict one of the major characteristics of this type 
of war.66 
 
Galula saw revolutionary war as a predominantly political activity. Hence it should 
be directed and controlled by civilians at every level. Thompson also stressed the 
need for political control over the army in his writings, and warned the reader of 
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the dangers of a too big and influential army in counterinsurgency operations. He 
concluded that what is needed is an army that ‘can fulfil its proper military role in 
support of the civil government.’67 The critique voiced by Porch, however, 
provides a good balance to the counterinsurgency ‘priesthood’, as he calls them, 
and provides a good reminder that counterinsurgent theory and practice are often 
two very different things. However, when Porch argues that ‘COIN offers a 
strategy, not to win wars abroad, but to pre-empt civilian control’ he shoots well 
off the mark.68 He does not only confuse strategy with theory and doctrine, he also 
fails to make use of the theories which has influenced contemporary 
counterinsurgency doctrine. While the likes of Gallieni and Luyatey might have 
skirted political control Galula and Thompson advocates in favour of this. 
 
Small wars and insurgencies are highly politicised forms of conflicts. Their 
character requires a constant political involvement and also compresses the 
traditional levels of war in a way that places a higher demand on the strategic 
understanding of tactical commanders. It also demands a clear and coherent logic 
from the political-strategic level down to the tactical level. This presupposes a 
highly functioning civil-military relationship where both parts understand not only 
their roles, but also the possibilities and limitations of counterinsurgency as a 
doctrine.  
The population as centre of gravity 
As indicated by its name, the focus on securing and controlling the population is 
perhaps the most defining characteristic of population-centric counterinsurgency 
compared to theories of conventional war and other schools of counterinsurgency. 
This part of the chapter will initially analyse and discuss the theories that continue 
to influence doctrine on this aspect of counterinsurgency today. Furthermore, it 
will examine and weigh the implications of this focus in contemporary operations, 
utilising both current works in the field and valid doctrine. Lastly, it will address 
the idea of the minimum use of force and its role in population-centric 
counterinsurgency, as this is one of the more contentious parts of the theory. 
 
                                         
67 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 62. 
68 Porch, "The Dangerous Myths and Dubious Promise of Coin," 241. 
 34 
Since the whole concept of a centre of gravity has been much debated in relation 
to operational theory in the last decades, I will briefly clarify what is meant by it 
in this thesis. Clausewitz defined the term by arguing that when a state made its 
war plans it ‘must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. 
Out of these characteristics, a certain centre of gravity develops, the hub of all 
power and movement, on which everything depends.’69 In a traditional sense, 
especially on a tactical level, the centre of gravity was often interpreted as the 
enemy army in any conventional conflict. ‘Consequently if you are to force the 
enemy, by making war on him, to do your bidding, you must either make him 
literally defenceless or at least put him in a position that makes this danger 
probable.’70 This approach was normally codified in military doctrine either 
through a method of attrition, wearing down the enemy’s capability to fight, or 
through a method of manoeuvre that aimed at rendering the enemy’s position 
hopeless and hence broke his will to continue the fight. However, going back to 
the original concept as proposed by Clausewitz, the idea of a centre of gravity is 
not the mechanical view often taken by contemporary doctrine.71 His original 
conception underlines that one must ‘keep the dominant characteristics of both 
belligerents in mind.’72 In this manner, the centre of gravity becomes relational 
and dynamic. It also becomes strongly dependant on what the enemy and you 
yourself want. By employing this view of what a centre of gravity is it becomes a 
useful concept to apply to low-intensity conflicts. 
 
To understand why counterinsurgency places such emphasis on the population we 
must briefly revisit the theories of Mao and revolutionary war. Communist 
insurgencies drew their strength in terms of recruitment, logistics, protection, and 
other support from the population. ‘The political aim of the insurgency is to gain 
control over the population.’73 Since the insurgents in most cases were militarily 
too weak to defeat the government forces in an outright battle, they settled for a 
long war, depleting the government's will and ability through guerrilla warfare, 
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while at the same time undermining the government’s control area by area and 
replacing it with their political system. Bernhard Fall provided a precise 
description of this process; ‘When a country is being subverted it is not being 
outfought; it is being out-administrated.’74 Since an insurgency ultimately is a fight 
for the governance of a state, the armed violence is merely a symptom, the 
political struggle is the cause of the disease, to use a medical analogy.  
 
It is the aforementioned logic that created the premise of the population as the 
main objective for classic counterinsurgency theories. According to classic 
counterinsurgency theory, trying to fight an insurgency conventionally would fail.  
 
American generals are quick to claim, just because American forces can be 
lifted into any jungle valley and win a battle there if the Vietcong want to 
take them on, that they have the military initiative. This is certainly not the 
initiative required in counterinsurgency.75  
 
Hence the counterinsurgent had to change his ways of operating and shift his 
attention from the insurgent armed forces to the population. According to these 
theories, the centre of gravity, the hub of all power and movement for an 
insurgent group, was and is the population. 
  
Logic forces him the insurgent instead to carry the fight to a different 
ground where he has a better chance to balance the force against him. The 
population represents this new ground. If the insurgent manages to 
dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, 
to get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, 
the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of 
the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.76  
 
The active support which Galula here refers to is also often referred to as “popular 
support” in counterinsrugency theory.The idea that the most effective way of 
fighting an insurgency goes through the poupulation represents the basic premise, 
and one of the most characteristic traits of population-centric counterinsurgency. 
The most important mission for the counterinsurgent is to engage in the fight for 
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the support, or control of, the population. Jacqueline Hazelton has recently 
challenged the view that popular support is vital for the counterinsurgent. In an 
article published in International Security she argues: 
 
In contrast to the good governance approach [population-centric 
counterinsurgency], counterinsurgency success is the result of a violent 
state-building process in which elites engage in a contest for power, popular 
interests matter little to the outcome, and the government benefits from 
the use of force against civilians.77 
 
Hazelton creates a dichotomy in her article between a governance approach, 
exemplified with the population-centric approach of the allied forces in 
Afghanistan, and coercion theory.78 The latter approach relies more on the use of 
force instead of winning the support of the population. Hazelton further shows 
throughout her article that successful past counterinsurgency campaigns, among 
these Malaya and Dhofar, relied heavily on coercion, empowerment of some 
factions over others, and also liberal use of force at times. In her conclusion she 
argues that ‘according to coercion theory [as opposed to population-centric], 
counterinsurgent governments must use force to control civilians, and thus cut the 
flow of resources to the insurgents.’ Hazelton’s article spurred a new debate on 
the topic. In a review article David Ucko and Jason Fritz gives credit to part of 
Hazelton’s research, but also argues that ՙthe entire argumentation rests on an 
unconvincing dichotomy between Hazelton’s “good governance” and “coercive” 
theories.՚79 While this dichotomy, as argued by Hew Bennett, is by no means an 
example of poor scholarship.80 What it does highlight is a valid criticism of modern 
counterinsurgency doctrine. If we examine the quotes from Galula and Hazelton on 
the previous page their view regarding the role of the population in winning over 
an insurgency is almost identical. Galula’s view on population-control, as examined 
more closely below, was by no means a popularity contest. The obvious paradox is 
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that the theories of David Galula was also one of the main influences of the 
counterinsurgency school Hazelton refers to as “the good governance approach”.81  
While Hazelton’s distinction between the different schools of counterinsurgency 
could be debated, her basic findings are sound. Neither Galula nor Thompson were 
particular squeamish about the use of coercion of force in order to gain control 
over the population for the government. Their main concern was to avoid an 
enemy-centric approach which they deemed ineffective when fighting an 
insurgency. Instead of criticizing Hazelton for creating artificial dichotomies, one 
could just as easily criticize contemporary counterinsurgency advocates for 
glossing over the more coercive parts in Galula and Thompsons works.82 In the 
following part the rationale for a population-centric approach in counterinsurgency 
theory will be further analysed.  
 
According to theory, the above premise that control or support from the 
population is the main aim of the operations should have direct implications for 
military operations in counterinsurgency. Since the population represented the 
new vital ground, it was important to prioritise operations to the areas that were 
most densely populated instead of areas with the most enemy presence. Thompson 
called this to secure the government's bases first. This did not refer to bases like 
Camp Bastion, but the most developed areas of the country which ‘contain the 
greatest number of population.’83 The basic idea was that if the counterinsurgent 
were able to separate the population from the insurgents, by controlling the 
population, the insurgents would be forced to attack the counterinsurgent on less 
favourable ground. Hence the job of tracking down the insurgents was made easier 
for the counterinsurgent. This does of course not mean that population-centric 
counterinsurgency theory argued that it is not necessary to fight and kill 
insurgents. The distinction lies in the difference between operational concepts 
focused mainly on chasing insurgents, or on taking the fight if the insurgents 
happened to cross your path while government forces were securing the 
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population. To become the active party, the counterinsurgent must first be 
reactive. 
 
Even if one accepts that controlling the population is an important aspect when 
fighting an insurgency, the question remains how to achieve this. An insurgency 
must have a certain popular support from the start to get any traction, and how is 
a government going to turn this around? For now, we will dwell on the military 
component’s contribution to this. 
 
A central contribution to this question was Galula’s theory of the active minority: 
 
In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for 
the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause. The 
technique of power consists in relying on the favourable minority in order to 
rally the neutral majority and to neutralize or eliminate the hostile 
minority.84 
 
This idea was copied directly into the current US counterinsurgency manual and 
remains highly influential today.85 Galula further described, in quite detailed form, 
how counterinsurgency forces should proceed to defeat an insurgency in area after 
area. Firstly, the government should deploy strong enough forces to expel overt 
insurgent presence and gain access to the population. When this was achieved, the 
security forces should leave static forces in the area to keep the population under 
control and avoid that the insurgents simply trickled back and regained control. 
Once in place, the hard part of uprooting the political organisation for the 
insurgents in the area started. This required both propaganda and tedious 
intelligence work, preferably done by the police. In the last phases, local elections 
should be held, and local security forces trained. Once the area was deemed safe 
from insurgent influence, government forces could continue to the next area.86 
Thompson’s program of strategic hamlets was very similar in overall approach, but 
Thompson’s work was of a more strategic nature and did not go into the same level 
of detail concerning the tactical execution of the operations.87 Alex Marshall 
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argues that:   
Such a system Galula’s is intellectually exemplary, and probably the single 
most organised and effective method for countering an insurgency ever 
designed; its significant short-term operational level success in Iraq is 
therefore less than surprising.88 
As pointed out by Marshall the main limitations and challenges related to Galula’s 
theories is its tactical approach. Without a sound strategy will produce only short-
term results. As Douglas Porch points out:  
 
In fact, nothing in Galula’s recommendations, ... in keeping with COIN 
traditions, would have led the to a French victory in Algeria because Paris 
put forward no viable policy to convince Muslims to remain part of la 
métropole.89  
 
Despite all other differences from conventional war one thing seems to remain 
true for both types of conflict: if the ends and means do not correlate, defeat is 
highly likely.  
 
Another challenge is to actually control and influence the population once the 
overt insurgent presence is cleared. When discussing this, we need to keep in mind 
the premise that all revolutionary war, or insurgencies, is seen by classic theory as 
competitions for government. Since there is no certain way of telling who 
sympathises with the insurgents and not, theory emphasised the need to control 
the population after the initial clear operation. Classic theory described various 
techniques for achieving control, including a census of the population, curfews, 
restrictions on travel and movement, restrictions on carrying food out from 
villages, and detention of suspects.90 In the more extreme cases the parts of the 
population most supportive of, or vulnerable to, insurgent influence could be 
resettled.  
 
While Galula and Thompson are both clear on the need to coerce parts of the 
population, it should also be added that these measures were coupled with a 
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physical protection of the population. ‘The counterinsurgent cannot achieve much 
if the population is not, and does not feel, protected against the insurgent.’91 In 
addition, both Galula and Thompson warned that the use of the harshest methods 
described in their theories, such as resettlement and detention without trial, 
should be employed with great care and only as a last resort.92 These measures 
were also part of a carrot and stick policy. Once a cleared area was deemed strong 
enough to withstand insurgent influence the area was declared ‘white’ and 
restrictions removed.  
 
The concept of population control is perhaps most challenging when it comes to 
the practice of population-centric counterinsurgency today on an operational and 
tactical level. There is no getting around that coercion, and the concept of 
population control is a keystone in operationalizing the theory on a tactical level. 
However, many of the means suggested by theory are either illegal under 
international law or for other reasons unacceptable today. Today, western forces 
are trying to implement strategies that are in large parts based on experiences 
from classic counterinsurgency campaigns, but they are doing so in the strategic 
context of liberal peace theory, not as colonial powers trying to maintain order 
and control in their empire.93 How then can the theories of classic 
counterinsurgency be of relevance to current operations carried out in a different 
strategic context?  
One contemporary and influential thinker and practitioner tries to bridge this gap 
at least partly. David Kilcullen is a former Australian officer who has also served as 
a special counterinsurgency advisor for US troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In 
Counterinsurgency, Kilcullen outlines a theory very similar to Fall, Galula, and 
Thompson, which he terms ‘the theory of competitive control.’ He defines the 
concept as follows: 
  
In irregular conflicts ..., the local armed actor that a given population 
perceives as most able to establish a normative system for resilient, full-
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spectrum control over violence, economic activity, and human security is 
most likely to prevail within that population’s residential area. 94 
 
By full spectrum, Kilcullen refers to insurgent, or government, organisations that 
are able to run complete shadow governments controlling all the above aspects of 
the population’s life. One of the best examples of this is perhaps the Hezbollah in 
Lebanon. At the other end of the scale are insurgent movements like Al Qaeda in 
Iraq, who mostly relied on intimidation and brute force to maintain its control over 
the population. The full-spectrum insurgent movements represent the greatest 
challenge to the counterinsurgent.95 Since this is obviously a two-way street the 
answer for the counterinsurgent is to engage in this competition for governance, 
and a premise for governance is control.  
This part of Kilcullens’s work is influenced by Stathis Kalyvas, a professor of 
political science at Yale, who in 2006 published a book called The Logic of 
Violence In Civil War. The book, as the title suggests, contains a comprehensive 
body of research on how violence affects civil populations during internal wars. 
One of his findings that has great relevance for the theory of population control in 
counterinsurgency is that people affected by civil wars seem to develop a high 
sense of pragmatism. To survive, the lion’s share of the population tends to 
support the side they perceive most likely to win. This is shaped by whoever is in 
control of the population at any given time. ‘The anecdotal empirical record 
provides substantial evidence that control spawns collaboration independently of 
prewar patterns of support.’ Furthermore, ‘there is substantial evidence that 
collaboration follows the temporal variation in control.’96 According to this 
research, people’s most fundamental need during a conflict is security and 
predictability. These factors seem to be more influential than emotional 
convictions of which side is ‘right or wrong’. Kilcullen suggests that ‘this finding 
has huge implications for traditional “hearts-and-minds” and “battle-of-ideas” 
approaches in which you try to make people like you in order to gain their 
support.’97 In many ways, this simplifies the problem of how to get the support of 
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the population. If the counterinsurgent can provide security and order, then 
support from the population will follow. Hew Strachan also supports this view. In 
an article on British counterinsurgency traditions, he argues; ‘When we speak 
about “hearts and minds”, we are not talking about being nice to the natives, but 
about giving them the firm smack of government. “Hearts and minds” denoted 
authority, not appeasement.’98 If insurgencies represent a competition for 
governance in a state, the incumbent must show the population that he is able to 
govern and that he has the ability and resolve to win. According to these theories, 
this is best shown, at least locally and on a tactical level, by providing security and 
law and order. 
Limited use of force in relation to the political objective 
One of the more contentious points in contemporary counterinsurgency theory is 
whether there is such a thing as a minimum use of force tradition in classic 
counterinsurgency. Most often minimum use of force is understood as a practice 
where ‘no more force must be used than is absolutely necessary and reasonable to 
achieve the immediate military aim.’99 This is a somewhat ambiguous concept in 
itself and one that does not easily lend itself to academic analysis and scrutiny. It 
is also useful in this debate to distinguish between different types of force. Kinetic 
force, ranging from baton hits to gunfire and artillery fire, is probably the type of 
force most commonly associated with armed conflicts, but another form of force is 
also important in counterinsurgency. Coercion is in this thesis used to describe a 
use of force that is not necessarily deadly or demands physical interaction at all. 
Examples of this could be everything from routine checkpoints to resettlement 
operations. Nevertheless, coercion still constitutes to make someone do something 
they voluntarily would not do. 
   
This part of the chapter will examine origins of the concept of minimum use of 
force in theory and then engage with the debate on its importance. I will argue 
that there is a practice of limited use of force that characterises population-
centric counterinsurgency. This stems from the specific nature of the conflict that 
demands use of force to be instrumental to the main object of the conflict, which 
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is the population and is thus closely related to the idea of the population as the 
centre of gravity in such conflicts. However, many historians have overplayed the 
idea of a tradition of minimum use of force. It does not imply that force is not 
used in population-centric counterinsurgency or that this is a particular “nice” way 
of defeating insurgencies, quite the opposite: force must be used for the right 
reasons. As this is a debate mainly related to the British Army’s conduct of 
counterinsurgency my main focus will be on this.  
 
David Galula’s formative experience was arguably his service as company 
commander in Algeria, a campaign more known for the heavy handed handling of 
the Battle of Algiers than for a minimum-use-of-force approach.100 Perhaps not 
surprisingly, Galula did not emphasise the concept of minimum use of force 
extensively in his most widely cited book, Counterinsurgency warfare – theory and 
practice. It is for example not listed as one of his laws of counterinsurgency 
warfare. However, he did stress the importance that the government and its forces 
operated within the law. But at the same time he stressed the need for passing 
new laws such as banning the insurgent’s political organisation.101 An altered and 
more permissive legal framework not only made it easier for security forces to stay 
on the right side of civil legislation, but was also in many cases a necessity in order 
to defeat the political side of the insurgency. Furthermore, Galula’s entire theory 
rests on the premise that the main objective for both insurgent and 
counterinsurgent is to obtain the active support of the population. In order to 
achieve this the government’s forces should focus their operations on securing the 
population and separating them from the insurgents, not defeating the insurgents 
in a conventional manner.102 When addressing the need for changes in the armed 
forces if these are to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations, Galula is 
specific on the need to adopt a minimum use of force approach. According to 
Galula an adaptation of the soldier’s mind for counterinsurgency is just as 
important as its equipment and structure.  
Reflections and decisions that would be considered appropriate for the 
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soldier in conventional warfare ... are not necessarily the right ones in 
counterinsurgency situations. A soldier fired upon in conventional war who 
does not fire back with every available weapon would be guilty of 
dereliction of his duty; the reverse would be the case in counterinsurgency 
warfare, where the rule is to apply the minimum of fire.103 
Galula’s main reason for underlining a minimum use of force approach seems to be 
rather pragmatic. It was as much about avoiding a shift towards a conventional 
approach, which he deemed inefficient in dealing with an insurgency, as it was 
about a general distaste for the use of force. Neither did he shy away from 
advocating the use force when needed, both kinetic force in order to defeat 
insurgents and coercion in order to control the population. Any use of force, 
however, should be instrumental to the political objective of the conflict.104 Hence 
Galula was concerned less with the amount of force the counterinsurgent uses, 
than with the force being instrumental in order to secure and control the 
population.  
Sir Robert Thompson, arguably the most influential British counterinsurgency 
theoretician of his generation, follows much the same line as Galula. Though he 
makes no specific mention of minimum use of force as a principle, he repeatedly 
warns about the use of excessive force when conducting counterinsurgency 
operations. Again his logic seems to stem from the same line of reasoning as 
Galula. The main objective for the counterinsurgent is to secure the population 
and separate them from the insurgents, and excessive use of force would simply 
alienate the population from the government and play into the hands of the 
insurgents who could utilise such incidents in their propaganda. When describing 
how government forces should clear contested populated areas of overt insurgent 
presence Thompson argued:  
The government forces do not want to have large firefights, employing 
heavy weapons and even aircraft, in the villages where they are attempting 
to regain control. ... ,that type of action is liable to create more 
communists than it kills and makes the problem of pacification that much 
harder.105 
Thompson’s main concern, just like Galula, does not seem to come from a general 
                                         
103 Ibid.,  66. 
104 Ibid.,  61-64. 
105 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 106. 
 45 
reluctance towards the use of force, or a concern with the level of force used. It 
appears to have more to do with the fact that massive use of force was the normal 
modus operandi for armies in conventional war. Both Thompson and Galula tried to 
avoid this as they saw it as both counterproductive and not in accordance with 
their theories of how to conduct population-centric counterinsurgency. Thompson 
made this point very clear when commenting on early American operations in 
Vietnam: ‘the gathering of processable data body count should no longer be the 
object of an operation. The Vietcong casualty graphs can be forgotten. Protect and 
regain the peasants, and the graphs will look after themselves.’106 His criticism was 
not directed towards the general use of force, but the object the force was used 
for. Simply killing insurgents would not win the conflict in the long run. At the 
same time, Thompson also argued that counterinsurgent forces must rely on non-
kinetic coercion in order to control the population once the insurgent presence had 
been cleared.107  
Limitations on the use of force in classic counterinsurgency theory seem to have 
more to do with an acceptance of the specific character of the conflict than a 
general reluctance to use force. The major concern of classic theory is to avoid a 
situation where the army conducts operations with the aim of defeating the enemy 
on the battlefield just as in conventional operations. Clausewitz argued that the 
political objective of warfare influences its character so much that ‘its the war’s 
grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.’108 If we accept the above 
logic of theory on counterinsurgency one might ask if these types of conflict even 
have their own grammar. The political object in these wars influences events on 
the tactical level, making the use of force counterproductive unless in direct 
relation to the political object of the war. 
In the more contemporary debate on the subject a number of authors on 
counterinsurgency theory seem to argue that there was, especially in the British 
Army, a tradition for a minimum use of force in their conduct of 
counterinsurgency. Perhaps the most prominent proponent of this view is Rod 
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Thornton who argues that a mix of Victorian values promoted by public schools, 
protestant ethics, judicial accountability, and public outcry after incidents such as 
Amritsar ensured that ‘The British Army is still subject ... to a minimum force 
philosophy.’109 Furthermore, Thornton uses Callwell to back up his argument of a 
longstanding tradition of minimum use of force in the British Army. He claims that 
the Army did not like weapons that did not discriminate and made logistics more 
demanding. ‘Thus the use of the machine-gun […] had been largely disavowed by 
the British as a weighty encumbrance as early as 1896’110 The main problem with 
this argument is not the weighty encumbrance of the machine gun, but the overall 
context of using Callwell’s doubt of machineguns in a minimum use of force 
debate. Callwell did warn about placing too much trust in machineguns; however, 
not because they did not discriminate, but because they tended to malfunction at 
critical moments.111 Thomas Mockaitis, though somewhat more balanced than 
Thornton, argues much along the same lines when he says that ‘... force plays a 
vital but extremely limited role in internal conflict. Minimum force remains a 
cardinal principle in British counterinsurgency.’112 
Several scholars have challenged the idea of a long-standing tradition of minimum 
use of force in counterinsurgency in recent years. Alex Marshall claims that: 
In practice, British methods remained above all reliant upon the threat of 
the maximum use of force, and included such techniques as crowd control 
via the use of indiscriminate volley fire, ethnic displacement, mass floggings 
and torture, the poisoning of wells and burning of villages, the napalm area 
bombing of Malayan forests, and the creation of ‘free fire’ zones – all 
conducted under extremely permissive legal constraints.113 
This argument is also supported by Douglas Porch who argues that the British Army 
had:  
A mindset that contributed to the institutionalization of collective 
punishment, torture, ‘resettlement’, internment, ‘special night squads’ / 
ferret forces’ / ‘counter-gangs’, and RAF terror bombing for imperial 
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policing.114 
Bruno Reis further argues that it was not only when studying the practice of 
counterinsurgency where one struggles to find evidence of a minimum use of force 
policy, but also in studies of doctrine. Reis claims that there is no evidence for a 
minimum use of force attitude in the guiding documents from the period.115 
David French, who has utilized newly released archival material concerning British 
counterinsurgency after the Second World War, largely supports this view. He 
argued that British counterinsurgency practice between 1945 and 1967 relied 
heavily on coercion and that historians have overplayed ideas such as ‘hearts and 
minds‘ and minimum use of force’.116 He also concludes that while British security 
forces ‘most of the time, did operate within the law’, but that this was made 
easier by legislative changes allowing for coercion of the population.117  
On the other hand, it is also possible to overcompensate when revising history in 
the manner French does. French argues in an article in Small Wars and 
Insurgencies that the British resettled a larger proportion of the population in 
Malaya and Kenya than the French in Algeria and the Portuguese in Angola.118 
However, when making the comparison, French neglects to account for the fact 
that neither the Chinese in Malaya nor the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru make up the 
whole populations of their respective states – if he had, the calculations would 
look different. There is also a distinction between relying on the threat of 
maximum force and the actual use of it. 
Huw Bennett further underpins this argument in a debate on the minimum use of 
force with Rod Thornton in Small Wars and Insurgencies. Bennett argues that the 
tradition of the minimum use of force in the British Armed Forces is largely a myth 
kept alive by what he refers to as ‘regimental historians.’ He further argues that 
too many historians rely on ‘a methodology for analysing conflicts based on 
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doctrine alone, and lacking detailed empirical examination, which is worthless in 
understanding battlefield realities.’119 Bennett does, however, balance his view by 
arguing that British forces on many occasions seem to learn from early mistakes 
and are generally able to operate with a minimum use of force approach.120 
While there are definitely cases of British and other forces showing restraint while 
conducting counterinsurgency operations, as argued by Thornton, it is also easy to 
find cases of massive use force such as argued by Marshall. What does seem to be 
clear is that most new research agrees that there was not a tradition of a minimum 
use of force policy from classic days of counterinsurgency.  If there is so little 
merit to the idea of a minimum use of force tradition in the British Army, then why 
has it been able to have such a hold on both doctrine and writing on 
counterinsurgency? Is it simply a constructed narrative, while in reality ‘the key to 
success was to rebrand these kinetic methods as “hearts and minds” and prosecute 
it out of the public view.’?121 
First of all, it is probably fair to argue that even if the British approach to 
counterinsurgency in the de-colonialization period definitely falls short of a 
contemporary idea of minimum use of force, it was still rather humane compared 
to the draconian measures other non-liberal states used at the time. This seems to 
hold true even later on as argued by Geraint Hughes: 
Furthermore, while conducted for less than enlightened reasons, the ‘hearts 
and minds’ dimension of British COIN doctrine differs starkly from purely 
coercive approaches to fighting insurgents, such as those practiced by the 
Soviets in Afghanistan (1979-89), the Iraqis against the Kurds (1987-91) and 
the Sudanese government currently in Darfur.122 
Also, as pointed out by Max Boot, the British counterinsurgency campaigns fought 
in the aftermath of the Second World War never came close in intensity and scale 
to those fought by their French and American allies.123 The problem in Malaya and 
Kenya was often to locate the guerrillas. A theory of limited use of force was 
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probably more likely to take hold there than in Algeria or Vietnam where 
government forces on many occasions were in danger of facing a serious problem if 
the insurgents found them. 
Another factor to consider in the academic debate on the subject is that with some 
exceptions, it seems mainly concerned with the existence, or non-existence, of a 
minimum use of force tradition in the British Armed Forces. While this is obviously 
important and provides greater insight and understanding of the culture and 
history of the British Army, the debate seems more concerned with the perceived 
level of force employed by the armed forces in different conflicts than with 
whether the use of force was consistent with the theory of counterinsurgency. As 
shown above, theory of counterinsurgency seems not so concerned with the overall 
level of force, but more with the objective for which the force is used. 
Whether or not classic counterinsurgency has a tradition of a minimum use of force 
approach to counterinsurgency remains debated. However, there is much that 
indicates that scholars have overplayed this side of the concept. Classic 
counterinsurgency theory emphasizes a limited use of force to avoid the lure of 
conventional war that seems ingrained in all armies. It seems more concerned with 
the objective of the force than the sheer level of force being used. It is in many 
ways unapologetically amoral in its view on the use of force. According to theory 
the objective of counterinsurgency, if one is to succeed, is to secure and control 
the population, not to defeat the insurgents by military force. However, if the 
opportunity arises to inflict losses on the insurgent’s military component without 
fear of collateral damage, theory places no limits on the force applied. In addition, 
theory advocates widespread use of coercion in order to control a population and 
to keep it separated from the insurgents.  
 
 
To sum up, an insurgency represents a competition for government. The insurgents 
rely on the support from the population for both political and military strength. 
Since the government in most cases cannot defeat the insurgents outright in 
battle, classic counterinsurgency theory advocates that the government must 
engage in a fight for the population. This should, according to theory, be achieved 
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through controlling the population and denying the insurgents access to it, by 
regaining a monopoly of violence. Once the government controls and secures the 
population, logic dictates that the insurgents need to attack the government 
forces in order to again gain access to the population. Government forces can then 
defeat the insurgents from their prepared positions. This focus on the population 
as the main objective of the struggle sets population-centric counterinsurgency 
apart from theories on conventional war and more enemy-centric theories of 
counterinsurgency. 
 
A concerted government effort 
The need for a coordinated and joint government effort follows logically from the 
political nature of small wars and insurgencies. The focus on the population stems 
from the theories on how to conduct revolutionary war as postulated by Mao. The 
highly political focus of these wars is again a result of the focus on the population 
and their role in the conflict. Since the problem presented by an insurgency was 
not solely a military one it could not be solved by military force alone, but only 
through a closely coordinated civil-military effort that again underlines the 
political nature of these conflicts. The classic works of Galula, Thompson, and 
their adherents normally just referred to this as an ‘overall plan’, or a ‘full 
utilization of the counterinsurgent’s assets.’124 Today, issues concerning civil-
military coordination and cooperation are most often debated under the umbrella 
term of “comprehensive approach”. This final part of this chapter will initially 
analyse classic theory within the framework of civil-military cooperation and then 
account for and analyse the contemporary debate on comprehensive approach. 
 
Sir Robert Thompson’s principle that  ‘the government must have an overall plan’ 
might at first glance seem superficial and almost superfluous.125 However, 
Thompson’s argument went beyond the simple fact that any government involved 
in a counterinsurgency must have a plan. The civilian effort in conventional war 
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normally focused on facilitating the army’s fighting. Since an insurgency is not an 
outside attack on a state’s sovereignty, but a competition for governance within a 
state, the military and civilian effort need to be closely coordinated in both 
planning and execution. Operations to clear areas of insurgents without 
government resources to hold and build governance in the area is strongly advised 
against in classic theory. The same goes for civilian efforts without sufficient 
security forces in areas with insurgents.126 In order to achieve desired effects, the 
effort has to be balanced between the civilian and military resources. As also 
mentioned earlier in the chapter both Galula and Thompson underlines the 
importance of not allowing the campaign to become militarised. Counterinsurgency 
is a political struggle and hence manning, training, and deploying elements of 
government officials are just as important as the security forces. Thompson even 
argued that the creation of a large and conventional army, at the expense of 
effective administrative and judicial systems, was one of the primary mistakes 
made by the Americans in Vietnam. ‘The inevitable effect if creating such a large 
army was that political power in the country rested entirely with control of the 
army.’127 A large army also had the undesired side effects of forcing high public 
spending on the army and attracting the most talented members of public to the 
army. These talented individuals would be better used manning posts in the civil 
administration than fighting insurgents in the jungle. 
 
In order to succeed, efforts have to be coordinated and jointly commanded. Thus 
the organisation of the effort is in many ways just as important as the military 
operations. Thompson, perhaps unsurprisingly given his background, argued for a 
committee system in order to coordinate the effort. The overall direction of the 
effort should be led by a national war council, led by the prime minister and also 
including the ministers from relevant departments and senior military, police and 
intelligence officers. This organisation should be duplicated on a smaller scale for 
the other administrative levels of government. 
 
“War by Committee” is frequently derided, but the system works if it is 
understood that the committees do not override the normal chains of 
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command, but are there to ensure greater coordination in the execution of 
policy ...128 
 
Coordination concerned the execution of policies and strategies decided by the 
national war council. Thompson argued strongly that each department had to 
remain responsible for their sector of government, and those areas that 
overlapped with other departments should be coordinated and resolved.129  
 
Galula did not go into the same degree of detail as Thompson concerning the 
organisation of the effort. He nevertheless discussed the pros and cons of different 
forms of organisation in his theories. His two different alternatives for organising 
the effort are the same committee system as advocated by Thompson and an 
integrated civilian-military staff ‘where the soldier is directly subordinated to the 
local civil authority.’130 Galula summed up strengths and weaknesses of the two 
models by arguing: 
 
A committee is flexible, affords more freedom to its members, and can be 
kept small, but it is slow. Integrated staffs allowed a more direct line of 
command and were speedier, but it was also more rigid and prone to 
bureaucratism.131 
 
On the question of overall organisation, Galula concludes that a mix of the two 
models was most likely the best option: a committee system for the top levels of 
command which deal with long-term strategic decisions, and an integrated staff 
approach at the lower levels where the requirement for speedy decisions was 
greater.  
 
A last point to note on organisation, as far as classic theory is concerned, is that all 
theory seems to agree that any military organisation should be adapted to fit the 
administrative structure already in place in the state. Even Trinquier, a 
controversial figure in counterinsurgency history, who placed less emphasis on civil 
control in general, argues that it was important that ‘the military organisation 
                                         
128 Ibid.,  83. 
129 Ibid.,  82-83. 
130 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare - Theory and Practice, 64. 
131 Ibid. 
 53 
follows the lines of the civil administration to ... permit the administration to 
function insofar as possible.’132 Concidering Trinquiers background his emphasis on 
civilian control is worth to consider. Trinquier belonged to the generation of 
French officers who fought both in Indo-China and Algeria. He served as an 
intelligence officer during the Battle of Algers where French forces employed 
widespread torture of prisoners to break the FLN organisation. When the French 
forces in Algerie mutinied he had been transferred and was thus not directly 
implicated in the attempted coup. In his book, which also defends the torture of 
captured guerrillas, he nevertheless agues for at least a degree of civilian control. 
Given the political nature of counterinsurgency the functioning of civil 
administration is more important than perfectly aligned military sectors. Victory, 
in the long run, is be won by the civil administration and the police rather than the 
army as in other conflicts. 
  
As shown earlier, the theories of Galula and Thompson, in particular, remain 
influential in current doctrines for counterinsurgency. Perhaps the key challenge of 
utilising their theories for current doctrine is the greater complexity of conflicts 
now compared to then. Galula and Thompson formulated theory from experiences 
of countering insurgency in states that had been colonized. Both France and Britain 
had colonial administrations, which included local security forces and judicial 
institutions. Being colonial powers, they had either direct control or considerable 
influence over domestic politics and strategy in the states faced by the insurgency. 
While this might often be a thin layer of governance, they had through their years 
of colonial control gained intimate knowledge of local culture, language, 
topography, power structures, and politics.133 Most contemporary 
counterinsurgency campaigns for Western states are fought as expeditionary 
warfare. A challenge that arises from this is that at the outset of a conflict the 
only ready and deployable asset most states have is their armed forces. The 
problem is by no means new, Galula makes the same argument in his writings; 
‘However developed the civil administration may be in peacetime, it is never up to 
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the personnel requirements of a counterinsurgency.’134 Galula stated this from the 
context of a colonial power or a state facing an insurgency within its borders. The 
challenge is even bigger given the expeditionary nature of counterinsurgency 
today. The obvious solution of giving broader powers to the armed forces is not 
advisable, according to classic theory. Hence the problem remains of filling 
government posts in both central areas and districts in contemporary conflicts.135 
 
Coordination of civilian and military efforts in contemporary counterinsurgency 
does not just limit itself to inter-departmental coordination. In the current 
context, numerous Non-Governmental-Organisations (NGO) are also usually 
operating in the theatre. These vary in size and expertise, but are often engaged 
in long term projects and have good local knowledge of the area. NGOs rely on 
their impartiality for protection in conflict zones. The concept of comprehensive 
approach seeks to coordinate both governmental and non-governmental efforts in 
conflict areas.  The concept lacks a commonly accepted definition but is more an 
umbrella term for all efforts made ‘to achieve greater harmonisation and 
synchronisation among the activities of the various international and local actors, 
across the analysis, planning, implementation, management and evaluation 
aspects.’136 Others commonly used names for this concept are ‘defense, 
diplomacy, and development’ (3D approach) or a ‘whole of government’ 
approach.137  
The main challenge in coordinating development efforts and military efforts in 
conflict areas is not just down to different organisational cultures and competition 
for resources.138 These factors definitely play a role, larger or smaller, depending 
on which organisation one is dealing with. Another and perhaps more important 
factor that makes coordination difficult between development communities and 
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the armed forces in counterinsurgency is their different outlook on how conflicts 
should be resolved. Counterinsurgency theory, as this chapter has shown, sees 
insurgencies as a competition for governance and hence strives to regain 
governmental control in disputed areas. To do so, theory dictates that use of force 
is necessary to clear insurgent presence and to secure and control the local 
population. Development efforts must hence be prioritized to areas where the 
government perceives the chances of success to be the greatest and then expand 
from there. Development efforts, in accordance with this logic, ‘must be designed 
to help the population to choose between the government and the insurgent, and 
enforce that choice once made.’139 It is not a question of development effort 
dovetailing with the military effort, or the other way around. It is rather that 
‘counterinsurgents must synchronize all these activities security, development, 
and governance to support the overall political strategy.140 
In practice, classic counterinsurgency logic collides with the logic of the 
development community. While the business of counterinsurgency is super-
political, most NGOs concider themselves as non-political actors. Most NGOs 
conform to the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and 
independence as decided by the Red Cross.141 In order to gain access with 
humanitarian aid during armed conflict NGOs rely on all partners to view them as 
impartial and neutral. In highly politicized conflicts, as counterinsurgency, this is 
challenging in several aspects. For governments, such as Norway, which relies 
heavily on NGOs to do the development side of the mission this creates obvious 
difficulties. Norway, as an allied to the Afghan government, is in no way a neutral 
part in the conflict, while many NGOs attempt to do so. As Friis and Jarmyr points 
out ‘the tension derives from the fact that the operating principles of 
humanitarian agencies require them to demonstrate their neutrality toward all 
parties perceived to be in dispute.’142 The idea that it is at all possible to operate 
as a neutral, or non-political, party in complex conflicts has also been challenged. 
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In his book Development, Security and Unending War Mark Duffield points out that 
the UN strategic development plan for Afghanistan was politicised from the outset. 
ՙThe political use of aid is embodied in the founding principles of the SFA [UN’s 
Strategic Framework for Afghanistan].՚143 Much of the wanted development, such 
as schools for girls, was founded on Western liberal values. When opposed by a 
cultural and religious conservative opponent such as the Taliban these actions 
would most likely be perceived as partial regardless of NGOs claims to the 
contrary. As this thesis will show this tension took different forms for the studied 
states. In Norway, where NGOs hold considerable influence over politics, it was 
one of the major factors leading to a clear separation of development and security 
actions. The Netherlands, on the other hand, was more successful in incorporating 
NGOs into their overall plan and to create a unity of effort between development 
and security. To summarise, there seems to be a potential tension between 
counterinsurgency theories and development theories, which could cause 
challenges when fighting an insurgency. While counterinsurgency theory demands 
that development recourses are used as a political tool to win the population over 
to their side, the development community fears that this might undermine their 
neutrality and further diminish the humanitarian space in modern conflicts.  
From theory to practice 
Thus far I have outlined the core elements of counterinsurgency theory. Since this 
thesis will analyse and discuss operations, within the framework of 
counterinsurgency theory, it is also necessary to identify how I will go about when 
utilising the theories in the different case studies. 
I am not suggesting that this will be a clear-cut positivistic approach to the 
research. Warfare and its conduct are fluid and uncertain.144 Thus it does not 
readily lend itself to a rigid approach. Nevertheless, I find it useful to establish a 
framework for analysis, not to function as a straitjacket, but to make the 
comparison of the different case studies more accountable.  
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Implementing a primacy of politics 
Military operations cannot be analysed in a vacuum. In an ideal world, politics 
would set aims and shape strategy, while strategy and doctrine should shape 
operations and campaigns.145 Due to the political nature of counterinsurgency, this 
relationship between strategy and operations is arguably of even more importance 
in these operations. When addressing the factor of a primacy of politics this thesis 
will commence by analysing each nation’s strategy for their participation in 
Afghanistan, how it adheres to overall counterinsurgency doctrine and whether it 
has an inherent strategic logic. Furthermore, it will examine whether the political 
aspect of the conflict is addressed and to what extent it includes the host nation 
of Afghanistan and the overall strategy of the coalition.  
Implementing the population as the centre of gravity 
Special emphasis will be put on the initial deployment of forces and any planned 
expansions of their sphere of influence. What do forces prioritise in these phases; 
force-protection, offensive operations against insurgents, or securing populated 
areas? 
Secondly, it will analyse the operations conducted by the deployed forces. It will 
attempt an overall analysis, which focuses on the balance of operations, and 
whether these are enemy or population-centric in their design. Furthermore, it 
will do a more in-depth analysis of selected operations. In this process, I will 
utilize operational orders and post-operational reviews. These orders all follow 
NATO’s standard five-paragraph format. Central aspects of these are the overall 
mission statement, called a restated mission. This is again underpinned by several 
key tasks seen as vital for the unit to accomplish if it is to solve its overall mission. 
Lastly, the thesis will explore the attitude shown by the forces concerning the use 
of force. This is closely related to the above factors, but will also be singled out 
for the sake of clarity.  
Implementing a concerted government effort 
The overall question when analysing this factor in the case study is to analyse how 
the different nations integrated their civilian and military efforts. It will to some 
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extent analyse which form of logic that seems to have driven the development of 
the strategy, an NGO logic or counterinsurgency logic. As discussed above, 
development and NGO logic on conflict resolution differs markedly from that of 
counterinsurgency theory. It is hence very difficult for a nation to encompass both 
these views when formulating a strategy. Furthermore, I will analyse the 
organisation of the effort and whether the more civilian sides of the efforts, such 
as governance and development, are well integrated into the setup. The same 
approach will be followed on a more tactical level. Each province in Afghanistan 
published a Provincial Development Plan (PDP) between 2004-2006. These will be 
used both to analyse whether the host nation is well integrated into the effort, 
and to see whether there is a link between development plans and operational 
plans on the military side. As far as it is possible, I will also discuss the funding of 
the operations and whether there was an overall balance between military and 
development spending by the nations studied. Classic counterinsurgency theory 
advocates a joint government effort that emphasizes the political logic of the 
conflict. Development efforts should be closely coordinated and executed in 
tandem with security efforts. This approach, however, creates a tension in relation 
to the development communities in contemporary conflicts. How this has been 
resolved will be elaborated on in the different case studies in this thesis. 
 
Summary of counterinsurgency theory 
The ideas from classic counterinsurgency continue to influence contemporary 
doctrine. Classic counterinsurgency views this type of conflict as a competition for 
governance within a state. It is state focused from the very outset and puts more 
emphasis on the need for governance than it does on the need for a military defeat 
of the insurgents. In order to win, theory advocates that the government must 
engage in a fight to win the support of the population. This should be achieved, 
area by area, by dispelling insurgent presence and the securing and controlling the 
population. In order to do so classic theory relies on the widespread use of 
coercion through while at the same time arguing against the massive use of kinetic 
force. This insistence on the limited use of force seems to rest on two different 
arguments. Firstly, the insurgents are merely the symptom of the problems, while 
the political cause of the insurgency is the real problem and hence demands 
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priority. Secondly, classic theory seems to focus on avoiding a shift towards 
conventional warfare that dictates closing with and engaging the armed part of 
your enemy. Many historians have chosen to see classic counterinsurgency as a 
“kind” theory of warfare focusing on “hearts and minds” and a minimum-use-of-
force tradition. This view has probably rightly been corrected through recent 
research that points out that even British campaigns after the Second World War 
relied heavily on coercion and use of force. The latter view is also more in 
agreement with what classic theory actually argues. Both Galula and Thompson 
were more concerned with making sure that any use of force was instrumental to 
the political objective of the conflict rather than the amount of force being used. 
Lastly, given the complex environment of an insurgency, any government strategy 
and effort needs to encompass all measures needed to quell an insurgency. 
Counterinsurgency theory argues that these not only need to be coordinated in 
planning, but also jointly executed. In order to avoid a shift towards conventional 
war and to ensure the primacy of politics, the effort should be led by civil 
authorities at all levels. The effective organisation of this effort is just as crucial 
as a clever tactical execution. The more complex environment of contemporary 
conflicts makes this even more demanding today. Different government 
departments and NGOs compete for the same resources and often have different 
priorities on how to resolve conflicts. Classic counterinsurgency theory and 
principles for humanitarian development and aid are often at odds, which makes 
efforts to achieve a comprehensive approach challenging. 
 
While the actual execution of classic counterinsurgency has definitely varied from 
case to case, its theory is actually quite consistent. If it were to be summarised in 
one sentence the idea of “an iron first in a velvet glove” is perhaps the most 
fitting description given to the concept.  
 
This theory chapter has analysed counterinsurgency theory. The main factors of 
the theory chapter will now be utilized as a framework in the following case 
studies to establish to what extent Norway, Britain and the Netherlands have 
adhered to counterinsurgency theory. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE CASE OF NORWAY 
This part of the thesis will examine Norway’s contribution to the international 
operation in Afghanistan. Norway failed to achieve a unity of effort with respect to 
the three main lines of operation in Afghanistan: security, development, and good 
governance. This was partly due to an under-developed and ill-fitting strategy, but 
also deliberate choices such as a clear separation between development and 
security efforts. This again led to military operations conducted by the Norwegian 
forces being characterised by enemy-centric rather than population-centric 
operations. In other areas, the Norwegian effort in Faryab was more aligned with 
counterinsurgency theory. Norway spent an equal amount of money on 
development as its military component. Further, it engaged in political dialogue 
with Afghan officials and the Taliban from an early stage, however, these efforts 
were isolated and failed to amount to a cohesive plan. 
 
 
Background 
Norway’s involvement in Afghanistan was challenging.  First, it represented a 
major shift to a more forceful type of operation than that to which Norwegian 
forces had historically been deployed. Norwegian forces had up until Afghanistan 
primarily contributed to UN peacekeeping operations involving low risks to its 
forces. Its longest involvement had been as part of the UNIFIL force in Lebanon 
where it was present for 20 years between 1978 and 1998. It further contributed 
forces to the various UN and NATO operations in the Balkans during the 1990s. In 
the UN mandated enforcement operations (Korea and Iraq 1991) Norway 
participated with non-combat troops such as field hospitals and a costal guard 
ship. Arguably, the profile of these missions were well suited for the Norwegian 
image of itself as a peace-enabling nation. Second, as in the case of the 
Netherlands, the Afghanistan mission spurred a debate of whether this was a 
combat or reconstruction mission. Whilst the Dutch took a more pragmatic view on 
this issue, this was more challenging in Norway. Norway found it difficult to adhere 
to the close cooperation between civil and military efforts prescribed by 
counterinsurgency theory and ISAF strategy.  From 2008 and onwards this led to a 
disjointed effort in the Faryab province. Third, Afghanistan was the Norwegian 
Army’s first encounter with counterinsurgency. With no previous experience and 
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no national doctrine for this form of conflict, it struggled both to provide 
professional advice to political decision makers, and adapt its operations on the 
ground.  
 
Norway’s first deployment of forces to Afghanistan commenced with the US led 
operation Enduring Freedom that toppled the Taliban government and targeted Al-
Qaeda and Taliban leadership in Afghanistan. Initially, the Norwegian contribution 
was limited to Special Forces, an F-16 fighter detachment for a limited period, and 
engineers who conducted mine-clearing operations primarily at Bagram Airfield.  
When ISAF was established and assumed responsibility for Kabul, Norway deployed 
a company-sized battle group which served under ISAF command.  This detachment 
was later increased to battalion strength supported by other NATO members.146 In 
2005 Norway assumed command of PRT Meymaneh in Faryab province and thus 
facilitated British forces to concentrate on Helmand.  
 
Other research on Norway in Afghanistan 
A limited amount of research has been published concerning the Norwegian 
involvement in Afghanistan even so that which has been published focuses on the 
issues of civil-military cooperation. The Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (NORAD) published its report in 2012. The purpose of this report, as 
an official government agency, was ‘to assess the contribution of Norwegian 
development cooperation with Afghanistan from 2001 to 2011’147. In addition, the 
Norwegian Institute for International Affairs has also released other reports on the 
same topic.148  The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment provided 
operational analysts to the PRT in Faryab and published one of the few reports 
focusing on goal-attainment on the tactical level in 2013.149 The commander of the 
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last PRT in Faryab requested the report by asking the operational analysts ‘what 
did we achieve in Faryab?’150 Whilst the report in itself is well researched, it 
suffers from a major methodical drawback. In order to answer this question, the 
report utilizes key tasks as set by the PRT in their operational orders. Key tasks are 
a vital product from a military decision making process (MDMP). These are deduced 
after analyzing the mission, terrain, own forces, opposing forces and the civilian 
population within the area of operation. Key tasks are the most vital tasks a unit 
should accomplish in order to solve its mission. Furthermore, the report uses a 
series of surveys done by a local company in Faryab to assess the local population’s 
response to the operations. This narrow dataset excludes several important factors 
for such a study, and the main weakness of the study lies in the overall methodical 
design. Whilst an analysis using the PRTs own key tasks will be well suited to 
answer whether the PRT achieved what it set about to do, it will not be well suited 
to answer the critical question of whether it set about to do the right tasks in the 
first place. This becomes especially misleading when the report argues that the 
military side of the mission has been a success.  
Moreover, two edited books on Norwegian international operations have been 
published in recent years. Whilst several of the chapters in the two books on 
Norwegian operations abroad cover Afghanistan, none of these deal with 
operations in any detail.151 When it comes to analysing Norwegian strategy in 
relation to international operations these books have created several useful 
explanations. 
The independent Norwegian commission on Afghanistan published its official report 
in 2016 on the Norwegian effort in Afghanistan.152 The commission's task was to 
evaluate and extract lessons from Norway's civilian and military involvement in 
Afghanistan during the period 2001–2014.’153 The commission had access to all 
archival information relating to the mission in Afghanistan and carried out over 330 
interviews during its work. The report covered all parts of the Norwegian 
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engagement and is thorough and balanced in its conclusions. This report will serve 
as a valuable source for Norwegian operations in Afghanistan, in particular 
concerning the civilian efforts of the mission. 
 
Counterinsurgency doctrine and education 
Norway, unlike the Netherlands and Great Britain, did not have a national 
counterinsurgency doctrine when they deployed to Afghanistan. Research on 
counterinsurgency was with the exception of the Military Academy, extremely 
limited. Furthermore, there was no initiative during the Afghanistan conflict, to 
write a Norwegian counterinsurgency doctrine. Apart from the allied nations’ 
doctrines, Norwegian and Senior Staff College officers relied solely on their formal 
training and education.   
The Norwegian Military Academy has conducted a program on counterinsurgency 
since 1997. In the first years, this was done as part of the senior course with 
instructors hired from RMAS Sandhurst before Norwegian staff had been trained. 
Since the restructuring of officer education in 2005, the program has remained 
relatively unchanged. Counterinsurgency is taught as a part of a one semester long 
low-intensity conflicts module.154 Ten weeks of this semester is spent studying 
peacekeeping whilst a further ten weeks is dedicated to insurgency and 
counterinsurgency. According to the course handout, the main focus of the course 
is to create an understanding that low-intensity conflicts fundamentally different 
from conventional war.155 In addition, the students should acquire a familiarity 
with the theories of insurgency and counterinsurgency. At the end of the course, 
the cadets should be able to independently plan and execute company-level 
counterinsurgency operations.156 The course on counterinsurgency has population-
centric counterinsurgency as its main focus which is founded from a Maoist 
doctrine for insurgencies. It continues with studying classic texts such as Galula 
and Thompson before utilizing theory to shed light on different case studies. The 
case studies have varied but have previously included Malaya, Algeria, Dhofar, 
Kenya, Northern-Ireland, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Towards the end of the semester, 
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the course arranges two map exercises whereby the cadets are expected to show 
an understanding of theory and doctrine in order to solve the missions. As 
compared to the courses run at the Dutch Military Academy and at Sandhurst, the 
course at the Norwegian Military Academy is more comprehensive and of a longer 
duration. Academically and practically speaking, it provides the students with a 
more than sufficient knowledge of counterinsurgency at the tactical level. 
 
Staff College is the next level of formal education once officers graduate from the 
Military Academy. The average age of a course at the Military Academy is around 
25 as compared to 35 at Staff College. Consequently, this would mean that only 
the more senior staff of the PRT would have attended Staff College before 
deploying to Afghanistan. Whilst cadets spend three years at the Military Academy, 
most students only spend one year at Staff College.157 The main focus of this 
education is to make the officers proficient in joint operations and NATO planning 
procedures. Thus, time for other studies is rather limited. The first introduction to 
counterinsurgency as a topic at the Norwegian Staff College was done in 2008 and 
consisted of only one briefing.158 This was increased to a two-day seminar in 
2010.159 Nevertheless, there was still a substantial gap between the education in 
counterinsurgency given at Military Academy and Staff College. As a result in part 
to this, a generation gap in the Norwegian Army existed during the Afghanistan 
campaign. Younger officers who filled the ranks as platoon commanders and 
younger staff officers had a relative solid education in counterinsurgency. On the 
other hand, commanders and senior staff officers had a more rudimentary 
knowledge of counterinsurgency. 
The Primacy of Politics 
A primacy of politics seems rather self-evident when Sir Robert Thompson in his 
seminal work Defeating Communist Insurgency argues that the first principle of 
counterinsurgency is that ‘the government must have a clear political aim.’160 
Without a clear aim ‘there will be a tendency to adopt short-term ad-hoc measures 
merely as reactions to insurgent activities or with the limited aim of attempting to 
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defeat the insurgents militarily....’161 Since counterinsurgency involves several 
sectors of the government, the aims or the strategy must provide a clear 
framework in order to ensure a unity of effort. The relevance of this truism has not 
been diminished since Thompson’s time in Malaya. Contemporary operations are 
multi-faceted, coalition based, and expeditionary. If one adds NGOs, with at times 
diverging interests, the advice of having a clear aim for the operation remains 
valid.  
 
The structure of this part of the thesis in the other two case studies has been to 
account for and analyse each nations strategy and their approach to the political 
side to the conflict followed by a two-step analysis. First, it has addressed whether 
the strategy has, in light of counterinsurgency theory, been fit for purpose. 
Second, it has analysed whether or not the Dutch or British armed forces has 
adhered to the strategy. In the case of Norway, this structure proved to be 
challenging. The main issue was that Norwegian strategy was so vague and 
unspecific that an analysis on whether Norwegian forces adhered to this was 
extremely challenging. Therefore, the structure of this part of the case study will 
deviate somewhat from the two other. It will account for and analyse Norwegian 
strategy in relation to its effort in Faryab province and thereafter attempt to 
present different explanations and arguments as to why this evolved in the manner 
it did, and how this related to the idea of a primacy of politics in 
counterinsurgency. 
 
Strategic view 
With respect to primacy of politics, the Norwegian effort in Afghanistan was almost 
schizophrenic. On the one hand, Norway failed to develop a coherent strategy 
designed to achieve political goals by the use of military force in conjuncture with 
other means for its mission in Faryab. Norwegian forces participated in Afghanistan 
from 2001, and assumed responsibility as lead nation in Faryab province from late 
                                         
161 Ibid.,  52. 
 67 
2005. Nevertheless the first official strategy was published as late as 2009.162 
However, on the other hand, Norway clearly understood the need for a political 
solution to the conflict and promoted and engaged from early on in political talks 
with representatives of the insurgents. This effort was rather isolated from the 
rest of the activities pursued by Norway in Faryab, and could be more 
characterised as an attempt to broker a peace-agreement than an effort to defeat 
an insurgency. 
 
During the period between 2001-2005, Norway contributed forces to ISAF and OEF, 
but was not lead nation in a province. OEF as an operation was dominated by SOF 
and mainly led from multinational headquarters with the US as the leading nation. 
ISAF was only responsible for Kabul province in this period and the contributing 
nations were responsible for either a sector of the effort, or one or several police 
districts in Kabul. Henceforth, the need for stringent and robust national strategies 
to underpin ISAFs effort as a whole can be argued as less pressing in this period 
compared to after the expansion of ISAF. Norwegian strategy in this period focused 
on creating a political purpose and a validation for their participation. This was 
normally presented through three main points; firstly, the mission had a clear UN 
mandate; secondly it served Norway’s interest to support our NATO allies; and 
thirdly to participate in the fight against international terrorism. These three 
points were clearly present in the speech given in Parliament by the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Jan Petersen, as early as December 2001.163 The first two purposes 
remained constant as strategic purposes throughout the period covered by this 
thesis even with the change of government in 2005 while the fight against 
terrorism became less visible in the labour coalition government from 2006 and 
onwards.  
 
In order to fully understand why Norway struggled to come to terms with a 
counterinsurgency campaign at a strategic level, it is necessary to examine 
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Norwegian security and defence politics. The overall strategic goals, or purposes, 
are not surprising because they represent the two traditional cornerstones of 
Norwegian security and defence policy and serve in many ways the same purpose. 
It also illustrates the sometimes-paradoxical duality of Norwegian politics in this 
field. First, it stems from a liberal argument that a UN led world order whereby 
states adhere to agreed principles and abide by the UN charter, is in Norway’s 
interests. ‘UN plays a key role in Norwegian security politics. Norwegian security is 
closely attached to the existence of well-functioning global security cooperation 
arrangements.’164 Thus, a clear UN mandate for the operation in Afghanistan was 
not just a prerequisite for participation, but in some ways also a justification. 
Nevertheless, this does not fully explain different Norwegian governments’ 
commitment to participate in Afghanistan. At that time, there were numerous 
other UN mandated operations with little or no Norwegian participation, many of 
these with a clearer UN profile than the mission in Afghanistan.  
 
The second main strand of Norwegian security and defence politics can be 
examined through its relationship with NATO. As a small nation with a common 
border with Russia, Norway is dependent upon NATO as a guarantee for their 
security. In many ways, this functions as an insurance policy in the event that 
other states do not adhere to the rules set by the UN. This relationship is clearly 
stated in the 03/04 defence white paper: ‘Within the overall UN frame, NATO 
remains the cornerstone of Norwegian security politics.’165 Norway’s traditionally 
two biggest parties, Labour and the Conservative party, despite all their other 
differences, have generally remained in agreement concerning defence and 
security. As a result of the dual priority, the UN and NATO have remained rather 
constant since the 1950s.  
 
Thus, the strategic purpose of the deployment remained quite constant throughout 
the period. The change of government in late 2005 did not alter this, but it 
nevertheless provided a slight shift of emphasis towards the UN. The Labour led 
coalition outlined the main points of their defence and security politics in its 
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accession declaration. Whilst stating that the main foundations of defence and 
security policy remain unchanged, it also explicitly stated that ‘It is in Norwegian 
interests that we have a UN led world-order ... The Government will work for a 
substantially strengthened UN.’166  
 
The focus on NATO in the same declaration was somewhat toned down and it was 
made clear that all support to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) would be 
terminated.167 This somewhat artificial division between the UN and NATO manner 
of conflict resolution, did not alter the strategic purpose in Afghanistan. However, 
it partly served as the back-curtain for why Norwegian forces were deployed to the 
northern parts of Afghanistan. It is also plays an important role in the development 
of the so-called ‘Norwegian model for civil-military cooperation’.  
 
 
Norwegian Faryab strategy 
Norway relieved Britain as lead nation in Faryab province as a part of ISAF gradual 
expansion out of Kabul. This move coincided with a change of government in 
Norway following the parliament elections where Labour, the Socialist left party, 
and the Norwegian Centre party formed a coalition. Even though Norway assumed 
the role of lead nation in Faryab in 2005, it did not publish an official strategy until 
2009. This does not necessarily imply that Norway did not have a strategy earlier; 
simply that it was not official. Thus, arguably it is challenging to analyse 
Norwegian strategy prior to 2009. Whilst official strategies are available to be 
examined, it is impossible to discern what is discussed in offices behind closed 
doors. Moreover, there are no indications that the 2009 strategy represented any 
major shift in strategic direction. The strategy did not create attention or debate 
when published. Thus, presumably it simply officially stated what was already 
known. 
 
The strategy itself was published as a joint venture between the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Justice and the Police. If one accepts that strategy 
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should state ends and apply means to reach these set ends, or as Hew Strachan 
argues: ‘strategy is designed to make war useable by the state, so that it can, if 
need be, use force to fulfill its political objectives,’ the Norwegian strategy for 
Faryab fell well short of this mark.168 As a strategy it suffered from four main 
weaknesses.  First, it did not present a plan for how aims should be achieved. 
Second, it did not prioritize resources in time and space. Third, it did not convey 
an understanding that Norwegian forces faced an armed opponent in Faryab with 
its own free will. Fourth, where it did provide clear guidance concerning civil-
military cooperation, it broke with both counterinsurgency theory and ISAF 
strategy.  
 
Hew Strachan’s article ‘The Lost meaning of strategy’ was published three years 
prior to the Norwegian Faryab strategy, and addresses many of the points 
illustrated by the case of Norway.   Strachan states that:  ‘the word “strategy” has 
acquired a universality which has robbed it of meaning, and left it only with 
banalities.’169 A strategy should provide something more than overall goals for an 
effort; it should entail principle decisions and a framework for the commanders on 
the ground to operate within.170 The Faryab strategy stated that ‘the main aim of 
the Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan is to support the Afghan authorities in 
their responsibility to ensure stability, security, and development.’171 As 
demonstrated in the cases of Great Britain and The Netherlands, these goals 
reflected the overall mission statement of ISAF. These overall goals were, 
however, in no manner operationalized in the Norwegian strategy. Moreover, there 
was no resemblance of a plan describing how these goals should be accomplished 
in the strategy. In this regard, the strategy was more akin to a policy document. 
 
Prioritizing resources in a counterinsurgency campaign is, as demonstrated in the 
theory chapter, vital and a central component of any counterinsurgency strategy. 
Counterinsurgents typically never have enough resources to cover whole areas. 
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Hence resources must be prioritized in time and space. That these priorities are 
reflected in the overall strategy is perhaps of even greater importance during 
counterinsurgency operations because these involve several sectors of the 
government and not just the armed forces. At the most Norway had about 500 
personnel deployed in Faryab. Of these about 100 counted as ‘boots on the ground’ 
while the rest manned various staff, logistics, and other functions.172 At the same 
time Faryab province is populated by about 950,000 people and is exactly the size 
of Wales.173 In the introduction of the strategy it is stated that: 
The main thrust of our efforts in Faryab will be based on UNAMAs integrated 
approach for implementation of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy 
(ANDS) and the Provincial Development Plan (PDP), as well as the fact that 
Norwegian military contribution in the province is part of the UN mandated ISAF.174 
This arguably could serve as prioritizing of Norwegian effort. One way of 
understanding this paragraph is that Norwegian strategy should take three main 
considerations into account. First, it should be conducted in accordance with the 
UN’s integrated approach. Second, it should follow the direction set forth in the 
Provincial Development Plan, and third in accordance with ISAF strategy. The 
challenge was that any force commander would have to reconcile directions from 
three different actors; The UN, the local Afghan government, and ISAF.  
 
But Norwegian strategy does not provide any guidance as to what should be done if 
these different partners disagree on where the efforts should be focussed. In 
addition, it presupposes that these different actors all have developed more 
detailed strategies that provide guidance for the force commander to adhere to. In 
this manner, the Provincial Development Plan is key. If it can be said that this was 
the foundation of the clear priorities of where Afghan authorities wanted forces to 
focus on, then it follows that it would be sensible for Norwegian strategy to 
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underpin this and hence strengthen Afghan rule instead of pursuing a strategy 
designed in Oslo. Unfortunately, this was not the case. 
 
Unlike in Helmand and especially in Uruzgan, the concept of Afghan Development 
Zones was not endorsed and utilised in the same manner in Faryab province. The 
idea behind the development zones was to provide focal points for both civilian 
and military efforts in areas where it was deemed most necessary and hence ease 
coordination between different agencies. As shown in the case of The Netherlands 
this proved to be a useful tool and it was also utilised to coordinate the efforts of 
NGOs to some extent in Uruzgan province. The Faryab Provincial Development Plan 
did not compensate for the lack of development zones. The plan covered in all 
eight different areas of development: social safety, education, human rights and 
law enforcement, rural agriculture development, health and nutrition, security, 
infrastructure and natural resources, and economic and private sector.175 Whilst all 
are important, the plan did not prioritise between different sectors. Instead each 
sector put forward key goals that resulted in ten specific projects.176 Since the 
needs were different for the various sectors, this led to a rather disjointed whole, 
whereby projects was listed in very different parts of the province without an 
overall logic.  
 
The goals listed concerning the different sectors are so ambitious, and sometimes 
so vague, that they are very difficult to operationalize. As an example, the main 
goal stated concerning security was to ‘... establish security in provincial level 
peace and stability in the region, professional police needs to be haired sic so 
security would be in placed sic in the province thus people can lead their secure 
lives in the regions.’177 Undoubtedly, establishing security is one of the key tasks in 
a counterinsurgency campaigns, but this does provide any guidance when 
prioritizing resources. Furthermore, there were serious problems with the quality 
and feasibility of the entire Provincial Development Plan. This is clear when the 
specific projects it decides on for the security sector are scrutinized. The first 
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major necessity concerning security listed in the plan was an awareness project 
aimed at creating unity between police forces and the people.178 Whilst it is clear 
this was necessary, it is difficult to see that it was the most pressing need when 
faced with an insurgency. In addition, the plan lists construction of a police 
academy in Helmand for women as one of ten specific projects.179 The overall 
purpose of this seemed to be national and aimed at increasing the number of 
women serving in the police forces. Notwithstanding that the police academy was 
to be constructed as far away from Faryab as one can get, it is also a very long-
term goal and does not address the challenges at hand in 2006. The aim of 
Norwegian strategy to underpin local Afghan plans had in theory some merit. The 
main challenge was that it placed Norwegian strategy in many ways at the mercy 
of Afghan planning. Whilst this eventually is a necessary risk to take when 
conducting counterinsurgency, this was arguably in this case done prematurely.  
The Faryab Provincial Development Plan did not provide a framework for 
commanders to prioritize in accordance with, and it is also questionable whether 
the plan itself was feasible to such a degree that on must ask whether those who 
formulated Norwegian strategy had at all studied it in any detail.  
 
Another challenge concerning Norwegian strategy was the understanding of the 
environment and the conflict Norwegian forces are deployed to, and how this is 
presented in the strategy. Specifically, there was an apparent lack of 
understanding that there were forces in Faryab with opposing strategies, willing to 
use force in order to resist Norwegian efforts in the area. Whilst it is not expected 
that a strategy presents an enemy course of action analysis, it needs to match the 
conflict at hand. As demonstrated in the British case, commanders on the ground 
that perceive the strategy as not fit for purpose, could become prone to operating 
outside constraints formulated in the strategy. Prior to the deployment of troops 
to Helmand it was debated whether the mission was peacekeeping or 
counterinsurgency. One difference between the two is the level of resistance one 
should expect, but both concepts acknowledge that there will be opposition to the 
mission on the ground. Norwegian strategy does not seem to admit that there was 
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any opposition at all. When addressing perceived challenges for the strategy it 
states that ‘the Ghowrmach district ... constitutes a particular challenge.’180 
Ghowrmach district, formally a part of the neighboring eastern province Bagdhis, 
was after Norwegian pressure administratively included into Faryab early in 2009. 
Whilst the strategy mentions Ghowrmach as a particular challenge, the PRT’s 
evaluation was and had been for some time, more or less totally under Taliban 
control and played a key role in fueling the insurgency in Faryab province.181  
 
Whether or not Ghowrmach district played a central role in destabilizing the rest 
of the province is debatable.  What is clear, however, is that the province was well 
outside government control. Norwegian forces had prior to 2009 led three major 
operations into Ghowrmach district: Operations Harekate Yolo I and Harekate Yolo 
II in 2007, and Operation Karez in 2008. All these operations resulted in serious 
skirmishes with opposing forces and were widely covered and debated in 
Norwegian media. It was a well-known fact by 2009 (for anyone with any 
knowledge about Afghanistan) that there were forces opposing Norwegian and ISAF 
presence in the region. However, this nevertheless seemed to be completely 
overlooked in Norwegian strategy. Instead of presenting a strategy, which had a 
realistic outlook on the situation, it seemed to deal with the Faryab province as 
any other area that has fallen victim to an earthquake or another natural disaster.  
 
The Faryab strategy did provide clear guidance in one regard. Much of the 
emphasis in the strategy was put on civil-military cooperation as indicated by its 
title. In a counterinsurgency all efforts of the government need to be well 
coordinated and the role of the military forces should be to create security so 
other agencies of the government can do their jobs.182 The need for better civil-
military coordination had also been a priority for ISAF between 2006-2009. This 
was further stressed in General McChrystal’s initial assessment when he assumed 
command of ISAF in 2009.183 The Norwegian strategy presented its directions on 
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the topic under the headline ‘strengthened coordination between civilian and 
military actors’ it stated:  
 
The respective roles of the Norwegian civilian and military actors shall be 
clearly distinguished, and the coordination between all actors shall be 
strengthened and their efforts made coherent. The civilian component shall 
therefore be drawn out of the PRT and linked more closely to the local 
authorities and to the UN (UNAMA) as soon as the security situation 
permits.184 
 
In this sense, the Norwegian solution for civil-military cooperation differed 
markedly from both counterinsurgency theory and ISAF strategy. Instead of a closer 
cooperation and coordination between civilian and military actors, the Norwegian 
civilian component was to be detached from the PRT and cooperate closer with the 
UN and Afghan partners. Exactly how this was meant to ‘strengthen coordination 
between all actors’ was somewhat unclear. UNAMA’s presence in the area was 
negligible, and the weaknesses in local Afghan planning have been discussed 
above.185 What clearly distinguished roles between military and civilian actors 
entailed was also made more explicitly clear in guidance provided to PRT 
commanders. Several of the officers interviewed were told that there should be 
daylight between military and civilian presence in the same area and that this 
constraint was in effect even before the Faryab strategy was published in 2009.186 
This effectively ordered Norwegian forces to not directly cooperate with civilian 
actors and hence constituted a clear breach with not only counterinsurgency 
theory, but also with ISAF strategy. This clear separation between civilian and 
military actors became known as the ‘Norwegian model’. An explanation of this 
constraint will be further explored later in this chapter. 
 
Norway, at least at first glance, adhered to counterinsurgency theory in one area. 
As discussed previously in the theory chapter, a counterinsurgency campaign is a 
highly politicized war. Military force should only be used in support of a political 
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effort against the insurgents. A political dialogue with the insurgents needs to be 
instigated in order to find a political solution to the conflict at some point during 
the conflict. The Norwegian peace initiatives in Afghanistan were not publically 
known until the Norwegian Afghanistan Commission published its report in 2016.187 
According to the official report of the commission, the peace talks had two 
strategic purposes for Norway. First, Norway has a long-standing tradition as a 
peace broker and work towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan 
could serve to reinforce this image. Second, and more influenced by realpolitik 
Norwegian diplomats and politicians had experienced that facilitating peace talks 
gave them more access to important allies, particularly the US.188 Promoting peace 
could thus give Norway closer bi-lateral connections to our most important ally. 
During the period studied in this thesis, the peace talks focused on the ‘Quetta 
track.’189 The initiative stated late in 2007 and was kept alive until late 2010. The 
aim was to facilitate talks between the leadership of the Taliban movement, the 
Quetta Shura, and the Afghan government. Norway’s role was solely to facilitate 
the meetings and not to act as a mediator due to the Norwegian involvement with 
combat troops in Afghanistan.190 Even though the attempt eventually failed in its 
aim to facilitate meetings between the Taliban and Afghan authorities, it can be 
seen as an attempt to broker a political solution.  
 
The relevant question for this thesis is, how the Norwegian effort looks from a 
counterinsurgency point of view? First, it was an effort isolated from the other 
efforts done by Norway in Afghanistan. It was not in any way connected to the 
combat operations or development work done by Norway in Faryab province. 
Norway’s involvement in the ISAF operation was seen more as a hindrance to the 
peace initiative than as a natural part of the whole.191 Second, the timing of the 
peace talks ran against what is advised by counterinsurgency theory. Though most 
counterinsurgency campaigns, such as the British in Northern-Ireland and in 
Malaya, ends with a political settlement, the timing of negotiations is important. 
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David Galula points out that: ‘The counterinsurgent cannot safely enter into 
negotiations except from a position of strength, or his potential supporters will 
flock to the insurgent side.’192 The need for secrecy was not lost on the Norwegian 
government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs worried how NATO allies and regional 
powers in the area would react if it became public knowledge that Norway tried to 
arrange negotiations with an organization deemed as a terrorist organization.193 
 
In terms of timing, the Norwegian initiative was arguably somewhat premature. By 
2007 ISAF and the Afghan government was at the best at a stalemate with the 
Taliban. Whilst ISAF controlled most of the largest cities, the Taliban grew 
stronger in many of the provinces and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
struggled with both recruitment and training standards. While the Norwegian 
initiative was isolated from the rest of Norwegian efforts, and was arguably 
somewhat premature it still represents an initiative where Norway sought a 
political solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. However, Norway’s reasons for 
doings so seemed to rest more on domestic politics interests than a conscious 
effort to end the insurgency in Afghanistan. 
 
A primacy of politics? 
It has proven difficult to assess whether Norway adhered to a primacy of politics 
concerning their Afghanistan contribution. Norwegian participation in Afghanistan 
was primarily a result of both security and defense political considerations 
whereby a clear UN mandate underpinned the UN line, and a NATO led operation 
supported the NATO line in Norwegian politics. Whilst it was unproblematic to ride 
both these horses into Afghanistan, it proved more difficult to do the same when in 
Afghanistan. ISAF strategy, in particular from 2009 and onwards, demanded a 
tightly coordinated civil-military cooperation in line with counterinsurgency theory 
and doctrine. Norway, on the other hand, opted for a Norwegian model with a 
clear separation between military and civilian effort. This was more in line with 
the UN’s integrated missions model and also a concession to a strong NGO lobby in 
Norwegian domestic politics.  
                                         
192 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare - Theory and Practice, 55. 
193 "A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001-2014," 162-63. 
 78 
 
To give organizations which are non-political by nature a central role in such a 
politicized conflict as counterinsurgency is itself a questionable approach. 
Counterinsurgency theory advocates that security operations, governance and 
development must be done in accordance with a clear political aim. It is hard to 
envision how organization which are impartial can do the main bulk of the 
development work in such a context. Norwegian strategy took more form of a 
policy and provided no clear direction or priorities on how political goals should be 
achieved through the use of military force. In this manner, as long as the 
Norwegian PRT in Faryab ensured daylight between their operations and their 
civilian counterparts, they were arguably more or less left free to decide for 
themselves what to do. Moreover, the Norwegian approach was to work closely 
with Afghan authorities and thereby ensure an Afghan solution to Afghan problems. 
However upon further scrutiny, Afghan plans in the area had many of the same 
weaknesses as Norwegian strategy and did not provide a framework for operations.  
 
Norway’s efforts to get peace talks commenced in Afghanistan was also more a 
result of domestic interests rather than part of the greater effort in Afghanistan. 
Within the framework of population-centric counterinsurgency there is little 
evidence to support that Norway at all pursued a counterinsurgency strategy in 
Afghanistan. Therefore, it is arguable in particular with regards to the separation 
of civil and military efforts that Norway consciously chose not to pursue a 
counterinsurgency strategy.  
 
The population as the center of gravity 
Overall, Norway did not pursue a population centric approach to their mission in 
Afghanistan. Due to a general mistrust of counterinsurgency as a viable solution to 
the conflict in Afghanistan, it pursued a more compartmentalized approach that 
deliberately distanced them from counterinsurgency on the strategic level. At the 
tactical level, the Norwegian troops had insufficient troop numbers to dominate 
much of Faryab province with a population-centric approach. Several operations on 
the tactical level were planned in a population-centric fashion. However, they 
tended to be over-reliant on the performance of the ANSF and the time allotted 
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for the hold and build phases were not sufficient. Consequently, the operations on 
a tactical level were more characterized by an enemy-centric rather than a 
population-centric approach. 
 
Strategic view 
Much of the reason why Norway never pursued a population centric approach in 
Afghanistan can be found in the Stoltenberg II governments view on conflict and 
development in general. Parts of the Norwegian Labour and the Socialist Left 
parties are in general more skeptical towards a US led world order than the more 
conservative parties in Norway. The Socialist Left party, as an example, broke 
away from the Labour because they wished for Norway to leave NATO. Many of the 
senior members of these parties were highly critical towards US politics after 9/11 
and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 in particular. Counterinsurgency as a doctrine was 
associated with imperialism, dirty wars in the colonies, and the war on terror.  
 
In 2017 Norwegian journalist Kristoffer Egeberg, one of Norway’s most informed 
journalists on defense and security matters, published his book Fredsnasjonen 
Norge [The peace nation Norway] where he analyses Norway’s engagement in 
international conflicts. He argues that work on a new approach to participation in 
international conflicts had begun even before the Stoltenberg II government won 
the elections in late 2005. Several researchers and high-level politicians from the 
Norwegian Labour and Socialist Left parties had regular informal meetings to 
discuss policy. One of these meetings specifically discussed ‘the importance of 
separating military operations and development in conflict zones.’194 Among the 
participants in this meeting were Jonas Gahr-Støre and Espen Barth Eide, minister 
of foreign affairs and defense respectively in the Stoltenberg II government. Many 
of the participants in these meetings had previously worked for NGOs in conflict 
areas. Jonas Gahr-Støre was the head of the International Red Cross in Norway at 
the time. When the negotiations between the parties forming the Stoltenberg II 
coalition government were completed it was decided that the basic guidelines of a 
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clear separation between military operations and development work would 
become part of the government’s official policy.195  
 
Even though ISAF had worked from the basis of a counterinsurgency approach for 
several years, it was not until October 2009 and the NATO defense secretary 
meeting that counterinsurgency as a formal basis for the strategy in Afghanistan 
was discussed at this level in NATO. According to the official Norwegian report, 
this issue took the Norwegian delegation by surprise, and it was approved without 
a formal Norwegian objection.196 This led to a paradox, as also pointed out in the 
official report. On the one hand, Norway approved counterinsurgency as the 
foundation for ISAF strategy in Afghanistan at the highest political level in NATO. 
On the other hand, the ‘Norwegian Model’ with a clear separation of military and 
civilian efforts, was given as a clear instruction to the PRT in Faryab.197  
 
The choice of separating civilian and military efforts made it difficult for the 
Norwegians to conduct the population centric approach in Faryab. By effectively 
forcing a separation between security and development it is difficult to conduct 
comprehensive population-centric operations. In practical terms, it would entail 
that the security forces cleared an area and generated enough security for the 
development and governance side of the mission to work without the presence of 
security forces. This approach is the exact opposite to counterinsurgency theory. 
As David Galula argues: ‘Military and political actions cannot be separated.’198 
What Galula refers to here as political action, is the development and governance 
which were the two other lines of operation in Afghanistan.  
 
The separation of the civilian and military effort made a population centric 
approach difficult to achieve in practical terms. However, there is no evidence 
that the military forces were restrained from pursuing a population centric 
approach despite the limitations on cooperation with the civilian effort. Whilst, 
this limitation was explicit and clear from 2006 and onwards, there was no other 
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clear national guidance on how Norwegian forces should operate in Faryab. On the 
contrary, the PRT commanders enjoyed a great deal of freedom of action. In 
practical terms, the PRT commanders could decide on any course of action as long 
as the separation between civilian and military efforts were upheld. A senior staff 
officer in the 2006 PRT points this out during his interview. He explained that they 
were given no national guidance on how to operate whatsoever before their 
deployment. Upon direct request, they got a meeting with representatives from 
the MoD, which, according to him, provided nothing but overall ambitions for the 
mission.199 The idea in the MoD and defense staff was that the Norwegian forces 
were detached to ISAF, hence operational guidelines for what the forces should do 
in Faryab should come from Regional Command North (RC-N). The report from the 
Afghanistan Commission describes the state of affairs of military operations in the 
2006-2008 period in the following manner: 
 
Neither ISAF nor the Norwegian authorities provided any prepared strategy 
or detailed guidelines for what the PRT was to do in Faryab. Many from the 
military had expected ISAF Regional Command North to issue clear 
guidelines for the PRT’s work. When Norwegian Joint Headquarters (FOH) 
did not issue clear guidelines either, Norwegian PRT commanders were left 
with considerable discretionary power within the framework of NATO 
operational plans. This freedom to act was meant to give the PRT 
commanders flexibility. The Norwegian Chief of Defence stressed that it was 
the individual unit head and PRT commanders who would be best placed for 
formulating missions for their units.200 
 
It was in other words very much up to the different PRT commanders how the PRT 
operated. Apart from the restraint on daylight between military and civilian 
efforts, there were few other guidelines, both from the coalition and national. 
Norwegian commanders had more freedom of action than most lieutenant colonels 
could ever dream of having. 
 
 
Tactical view 
Norwegian operations in Faryab were characterized more by an enemy-centric 
approach rather than a population-centric approach. This was mainly caused by 
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poor force ratios, a lack of long term planning, and a tendency to treat the 
conflict in Faryab in conventional terms rather than as an insurgency. 
 
When Norway assumed command over the PRT in Faryab from the British forces in 
2005 it also assumed responsibility for all of Faryab province. Initially, the PRT was 
rather small with a PRT staff and three Military Observer Teams (MOT). Norwegian 
presence in northern Afghanistan was further strengthened in mid-2006 when a 
company sized quick reaction force (QRF) was deployed to Mazar-e Sharif.201 This 
QRF was not under the command of the Norwegian PRT, but was meant to serve as 
a QRF for all of ISAF. Nevertheless, the Norwegian PRT used this force to support 
operations on several occasions in Faryab province. In mid-2008 Norway terminated 
the QRF. In order to provide the PRT with more boots on the ground and an organic 
manoeuvre force, it deployed a task-unit (TU) as a part of the PRT. While this task-
unit underwent several changes it normally consisted of a small-mechanised rifle 
company202 with support elements.203 Military staff also dominated the Norwegian 
PRT in terms of numbers. Only three members of the staff were civilians. In 
theory, these three individuals should be responsible for political, development 
and civil-military coordination.204  
Initially, the Norwegian forces had no realistic opportunity to conduct any 
operations where they controlled even small populated areas. The only forces 
available to the PRT were three to four MOTs. These were normally eight men 
strong reconnaissance teams. Their main task was to gather information and 
intelligence on the state of affairs in Faryab province.205 These teams normally 
came from the Army Intelligence Battalion or similar units. Therefore, the tasks 
normally associated with securing the population in a counterinsurgency is not 
what they are equipped and trained to complete. Moreover, with only three to 
four of these teams available, it was extremely limited what they could actually 
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have secured. The lack of an own manoeuvre force for the PRT led to a pressure 
for the Norwegian QRF, which belonged to RC-N as a whole to be integrated into 
the Norwegian PRT.206 Whilst this provided the PRT with a separate manoeuvre 
unit, it still did not boost the numbers to anywhere near what would have been 
required for long-term population-centric operations. Even with the inclusion of 
the QRF, the PRT could never field more than 120 boots on the ground for 
sustained operations.207 The British counterinsurgency doctrine suggests a ratio of 
one counterinsurgent per 50 inhabitants as a planning guide for population-centric 
counterinsurgency operations.208 Thus, in a province the size of Wales with 950,000 
inhabitants, it was clear from the outset that Norway never had enough troops to 
control Faryab province as a whole.  
 
As discussed previously in both of the other case studies as well as the theory 
chapter, it is very common for the counterinsurgent to never have enough 
resources. Hence counterinsurgency theory advice to prioritise forces to vital areas 
in the beginning, and then gradually expand the government control out from 
these.209 Unlike the case of Britain and The Netherlands, Norway made no strategic 
priorities in regards to which areas in Faryab the effort should be concentrated. As 
demonstrated previously, the Norwegian PRT commanders enjoyed a great deal of 
freedom to choose where they wished to focus the effort. Unlike their Dutch 
colleagues, the Norwegian PRT did not produce a long-term plan for their 
operations when deployed into Faryab. Instead, each 6-month deployment made 
their overall framework orders within the wide parameters received through the 
ISAF chain of command. Especially early on in the mission, this led to operations 
being run in different areas for the different deployments and it is difficult to find 
a pattern.  Later in the period both the Norwegian PRT and RC-N became 
somewhat more systematic in their approach, particularly from 2009 and onwards 
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because the main focus from this point and onwards was to support ANSF in their 
operations.210  
 
Despite few national strategic guidelines, the Norwegian PRT still conducted 
several large operations in Faryab province. According to the official commissions 
report, the transfer of the QRF from RC-N to the PRT as a manoeuvre unit made 
these operations possible. Up until 2008, the PRT had to be given support on a 
case-by-case basis when they wanted to conduct deliberate operations. The 
reinforcement of the PRT meant that their capacity for both defensive and 
offensive operations increased. Upon the permanent arrival of the QRF, it was 
discussed how this could best be utilised. Three different concepts were discussed. 
It could still be used as a QRF and react to actions by the insurgents. It could be 
used in an offensive capacity and pre-empt actions by the insurgent, or a 
combination of the two. ‘The PRT chose the preventative/pre-emptive option in 
order to influence a situation rather than reacting to situations that arose.’211 
Among the largest and more publicised operations were Harekate Yolo II in 
November 2007, Karez in May 2008, and Joint Vanguard Viper in April 2009. All 
these three operations took place in the contested Ghowrmach212 area south-west 
of the Faryab province. All of these three operations had the aim of clearing the 
Ghowrmach valley, disrupting insurgents in the area, and leaving a permanent 
presence of security forces. However, due to different explanations, the ambition 
of pacifying the Ghowrmach Valley, and thereby securing the vital ring road which 
runs through it, failed on all three occasions for different reasons. One testament 
of this is that three operations were carried out with almost the same objectives 
over an 18-month period.  
 
Operation Harekate Yolo II was carried out in conjunction with RC-N since the QRF 
was still under RC-N command at this time. It was mounted because it became 
clear that a growing Taliban presence in the Ghowrmach area threatened the ring 
road in the north of the district. The ring road is the main road in the country, as 
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the name depicts in runs around the central mountains and through all the major 
cities in Afghanistan. One of the main national projects was to improve the ring 
road. Insurgent activities in the Ghowrmach area were seen as a threat to this. The 
stated objective of Harekate Yolo was to ‘facilitate a permanent deployment of 
ANSF in that area, coordinated with a solid reconstruction and governance 
effect.’213 The initial purpose was very much in line with counterinsurgency 
theory. It aimed at a comprehensive approach, and the deployment of a static 
security force after the clear phase was concluded. However, already in the 
planning phase of the operation, it became clear that the development and 
reconstruction phases of the operation had received less attention than the clear 
phase in the RC planning staff. The commander of the Norwegian QRF voiced his 
concerns reading the matter in a letter to RC-N on November 7:  
 
I wish to see BGW’s [Brigade commander] plan for who/ when/ how 
“humanitarian assistance” will take place in G [Ghowrmach] after we have 
established security. […] If it is not possible to cover the gap between 
milops and “long term projects” INS [insurgents] will take advantage of this 
when we pull our forces out. They will return and entrench their position.214                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
The QRF commander’s reservations proved to be well founded. The Norwegian QRF 
and Afghan National Army (ANA) forces were able to fight its way into the 
Ghowrmach valley, but the development effort never materialised and the Afghan 
National Police (ANP) were not able to keep the insurgents away by themselves 
after the ISAF forces vacated the area.  
 
Operation Karez was conducted in the same area a little over six months later. The 
task-unit from the Norwegian PRT was tasked to ‘conduct area security operations 
by interdicting OF [opposing forces] in KOR-I KAREZ and BPT [be prepared to] 
interdict in JAR-I-SIAH.’215 Again the purpose of the operation was to generate a 
permanent presence by ANSF in the area. This time a permanent Forward 
Operating Base (FOB) would be constructed. Additionally, German forces would 
contribute with development assets after the insurgents were cleared from the 
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area. Operation Karez, just like Operation Harekate Yolo, was planned in 
accordance with counterinsurgency theory. One can question whether the force 
was large enough to clear and subsequently hold that much terrain, but there was 
an idea of a permanent presence after the clear operation. However, just like in 
the previous operation, things did not go according to plan. About 48 hours before 
the operation was to commence, the Germans pulled all their forces out of the 
operation due to political constraints. It also became clear that the ANSF would 
not be able to independently hold the area after the ISAF forces had redeployed. 
The operation went ahead anyway, but despite the Taliban suffering heavy losses 
in the area on the 16th and 17th May, the operation failed to reach several of its 
objectives.  
The last attempt to gain control in the Ghowrmach area in the period covered in 
this thesis was Operation Joint Vanguard Viper. The background for the operation 
was that previous operations in the area proved unsuccessful.  Additionally, the 
Qeysar and Ghowrmach areas were still under insurgent control.216 The purpose of 
the operation was: 
  
To put further pressure on ins [insurgents], and thus threaten their core 
areas, block their preferred avenues of approach and operate in force in key 
areas will expand the perceived dominance of ANSF and ISAF and 
marginalize INS ability to claim control over the population.217 
 
This time the operation was coordinated with the Spanish forces west of 
Ghowrmach.  They would advance out of Herat and block any attempts from the 
Taliban to retreat out of the area. When ISAF forces had linked up along the ring 
road, permanent posts manned by the ANP would ensure a lasting government 
foothold.218 However, just like the two previous operations, it quickly became 
clear that the plan was overly optimistic and not well coordinated. When the 
Norwegian forces reached the province border along the ring road, the Spanish 
force west of them had not even left Herat. Furthermore, the Afghan police force 
which was to man the police posts in the area were not yet available as they had 
not finished their training.219 Once again, the ISAF force had to leave the area 
                                         
216 PRT Meymaneh (NOR), "09-032 Joint OP Vanguard Viper,"  (Meymaneh: 2009). 
217 Ibid.,  1. 
218 Ibid.,  3 and NO officer C, "Personal Interview." 
219 NO officer C, "Personal Interview." 
 87 
after the clear phase was conducted. 
 
With respect to whether the Norwegian PRT conducted population centric 
operations in accordance with counterinsurgency theory, the above descriptions 
provide several insights into the challenges of contemporary conflicts. First, there 
seems to have been an overreliance on Afghan security forces’ ability to secure 
areas after they were cleared. Arguably, all three operations in the planning stage 
were population centric. They all included plans for a static force to be left in the 
area after the clear phase had been conducted. In order to compensate for their 
lack of ISAF forces in the area, it was in all cases planned to leave ANSF as the 
main provider of security in the cleared areas. However, arguably the Norwegian 
PRT in all of the cases overestimated the ability of the ANSF to solve this mission. 
The assumption that the local forces would be able to hold the area once the PRT 
redeployed its own forces turned out to be wrong on each occasion.  
 
When Sir Robert Thompson described the use of local forces as static security 
units, he seemed to work out from a concept where the government forces in the 
area train their own indigenous forces.220 Modern counterinsurgencies are more 
complex. In the case of Faryab, the Norwegian forces who planned and conducted 
the operations were not in direct control of the Afghan security forces which were 
supposed to do the back-fill. In addition, it does not appear that RC-N assumed this 
responsibility. Moreover, it can be questioned whether it was at all prudent, from 
a counterinsurgency point of view, to pursue these operations in the Ghowrmach 
district. As demonstrated above, the Norwegian PRT never had enough forces to 
hold the areas, particularly when it became clear that the efficiency of the ANSF 
was lower than expected. In the case of Operation Karez, the PRT knew that the 
supposed development and governance parts of the mission would not take place 
before the operation was launched. The clear-return to base approach which these 
Norwegian operations eventually developed into risked the danger of quickly 
becoming counterproductive. Sir Robert Thompson argues when discussing basic 
operational concepts that: ‘Clear operations will, however, be a waste of time 
unless the government is ready to follow the up immediately with hold 
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operations.’221 The main objective for both insurgents and counterinsurgents is to 
control the population. If security forces do not remain in the area and take 
control of the population, the insurgents will normally trickle back and regain 
control despite losing the skirmish in a purely military sense. This dynamic was also 
visible during Operation Karez. One of the objectives was to arrest some of the 
suspected Taliban leaders in the village of Arzanak. The post-operational report 
described this part of the mission in the following manner: ‘These operations did 
not lead to the desired results because the main parts of the population and INS 
[insurgents] of ARZANAK had escaped towards the mountains.’222 The strength of 
the insurgents is that they are fluid. Without permanent presence, and control 
over the population which the insurgent depend upon, it is very difficult for the 
counterinsurgent to progress. 
 
On the strategic level the Norwegians never directly engaged with the question of 
which approach the operations should have. However, the strategy of civil-military 
segregation did not promote a population-centric approach. On the contrary this 
led to a division of labour where the military seems to have taken the task of 
engaging the enemy forces in the area. Furthermore, the Norwegian task force had 
few troops in the province. This made long-term population-centric operations 
difficult. While operations were often planned with a clear-hold-build framework 
the hold phase was never sufficiently prioritised. Overall this led to an operational 
pattern which was more characterise by an enemy-centric than a population-
centric approach.   
 
A concerted government effort 
 
With respect to a concerted government effort, the Norwegians eventually chose 
to pursue a very different model from what is advocated by counterinsurgency 
theory. Worried that a close cooperation between development and security 
efforts would undermine the impartiality of NGOs and other development workers, 
the Norwegian government pursued a policy of clear division between military and 
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civilian action. On the tactical level, the guidance given to the troops was that 
there should be daylight between military operations and development projects. 
This again made it very difficult to secure areas where development was meant to 
take place. 
 
Strategic view, the “Norwegian model” 
A core characteristic of population-centric counterinsurgency is the importance of 
a concerted government effort, or comprehensive approach. Many of these aspects 
have, from a strategy point of view, been discussed above. This part of the case 
study will explore how the ‘Norwegian model’ functioned in the operational 
theatre, and what the consequences of this approach meant from a 
counterinsurgency standpoint. Sir Robert Thompson argued that a comprehensive 
approach to operations were key in several regards. 
 
It is essential ... that there should be a proper balance between the 
military and civilian effort, with complete coordination in all fields. 
Otherwise, a situation will arise in which military operations produce no 
lasting results because they are unsupported by civil follow-up action.223 
 
In the same manner, Thompson warned that civil action in areas with insurgent 
presence without a simultaneous government military presence was a ‘waste of 
time and money.’224 Civilian efforts made to improve the standard of living or 
governance ‘are inoperative when offered when the insurgent still controls the 
population.’225 In order to win or persuade a population to support the government 
rather than the insurgent’s, counterinsurgency theory and doctrine argues that 
these efforts must work in tandem. The dynamics implied in this was one of the 
reasons why Norwegian NGOs adamantly opposed this. The primary criteria for 
distribution are based on need and sustainability in humanitarian aid and 
development work. The work of these organisations is apolitical and their security 
is based on an impartial approach to the parties to the conflict. Counterinsurgency 
theory, on the other hand, is a highly political affair and does not shy away from 
using development aid as a tool to win the population on their side. David Kilcullen 
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argues that development efforts ‘must be designed to help the population to 
choose between the government and the insurgent, and enforce that choice once 
made.’226 Such an approach to humanitarian aid and development could seriously 
undermine NGOs impartiality and hence their security.  
 
The impartiality of NGOs and securing a humanitarian space in conflict zones were, 
however, not the only reason for Norway to adopt a clear separation between 
military and civilian efforts. It was also argued that this model worked better and 
was more efficient. Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre claimed that 
‘Both long-term experience and new research shows us that a good civil-military 
work distribution produces the best results in the long run.’227 Much of this 
experience was based on the early days in Iraq and Afghanistan where the US Army 
in particular gave commanders large sums of cash to implement so-called quick-
impact projects (QIP).228 Evidence also exists in the Faryab province to support this 
view. In the first contingents, the PRT had its own Civil-military Co-operation 
(CIMIC) group who worked on the development side of the mission. This group was 
tasked with implementing development projects. One of the most prestigious 
undertakings of the PRT was to refurbish and improve the local hospital in the 
provincial capitol of Meymaneh. This was then fitted with state of the art 
equipment brought in from Norway. This equipment then proved too sensitive for 
local power fluctuations, local staff could not operate it, and it created a need for 
spare parts that the local hospital could not afford.229 These type of projects 
provided support for those in favor of a clear separation between civilian and 
military efforts. 
 
What were the underlying reasons for Norway’s different approach to a concerted 
government effort compared to Great Britain and The Netherlands? In her analysis 
of the ‘Norwegian model’ Lene Ekehaugen points out three main influences. First, 
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NGOs enjoy a considerable influence upon Norwegian politics. Especially the left 
side of Norwegian politics has had close connection with NGOs for years. Tor-Erik 
Hanssen points out in his thesis that 17 members of Stoltenberg’s two cabinets 
either came directly from positions with an NGO, or went from cabinet and into a 
position in an NGO.230 Second, Norway’s primary experience in international 
operations has been alongside the UN.  Third, Norway is a big player in 
humanitarian aid and development on a global stage. Ekehaugen argues that of 
these three, it was the influence that NGOs had on Norwegian politics that were 
the most influential.231 Whilst Norway is by no means a military superpower, it 
does hold superpower ambitions concerning humanitarian aid and development. 
Norway was the ranked seventh in gross spending with 5,58 billion USD with 
respect to official development assistance for 2013. In addition, in terms of 
percentage of gross national income, Norway ranked first with 1,07% spent.232 This 
does not only make aid and development big business in Norway, but it is an 
important part of a national self-image.233 The close cooperation between civilian 
and military efforts advocated by counterinsurgency theory had prior to the 
publication of the Faryab strategy, been heavily criticized by NGOs. NGOs security 
in conflict zones is assured only as long as the parties to the conflict perceive them 
as impartial. Both a close affiliation with military forces and military forces 
venturing into what traditionally had been perceived as the NGOs domain could 
undermine this. Colin Archer, an Air Force general who after retirement became 
secretary general of Norwegian Refugee Council, argued that ‘... it is imperative 
to maintain a crystal clear distinction between humanitarian aid and military 
operations.’234 Archer was by no means alone in voicing this sentiment. A research 
report ordered by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs prior to the Faryab 
strategy argued along the same lines.  
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The PRT needs to ensure that in practice there is a clear separation 
between the security and humanitarian mandates. This separation should 
include provisions that diplomatic/development staff, the police and 
possibly the Norwegian Mission of Legal Advisers to Afghanistan 
‘Styrkebrønnen’ operate independently of the military forces, are not co-
located, use separate interpreters and do not depend on armed military 
escort when travelling in Maymane or in the province.235  
 
In order for such opinions to find their way into Norwegian strategy they also 
needed to convince the right authorities to adhere to this view. Both Hanssen and 
Ekehaugen show that there were close links between the NGO environment and 
central figures in the Norwegian government.236 Most prominent among these were 
Jonas Gahr Støre who went directly from the position as chairman of the 
Norwegian Red Cross before he became the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
in 2005. Whilst one cannot argue that NGOs dictated parts of Norwegian strategy in 
Afghanistan it undoubtedly had a substantial influence on it. When asked by the 
Norwegian Liberal Party to present the rationale for a clear distinction between 
civilian and military effort the Minister of Foreign Affairs Støre argued;  
We have seen that humanitarian actors are today more and more the victims of 
attacks in Afghanistan and other parts of the world. Military forces often view 
short-term civilian efforts as a part of their work to win the trust of the 
population. This is problematic because a mix-up of the roles of armed soldier in 
one second and humanitarian actor in the next creates insecurity. Such efforts can 
resemble humanitarian efforts, but is given with other motives and can in extremis 
endanger the humanitarian organizations. We are talking about an important, 
principal distinction.237 
Støre also argued that a clear distinction where military forces could focus on their 
tasks and civilian actors on theirs was more fit for purpose and efficient than the 
mix-up done by most other nations in ISAF.238 However, Støre’s main argument for 
the ‘Norwegian model’ rested on the need to retain a humanitarian space in 
                                         
235 Bauck et al., "Afghanistan: An Assessment of Conflict and Actors in Faryab Probinde to Establish a Basis for 
Increased Norwegian Civilian Involvement - How Can Norwegian Involvement Be Best Targeted and 
Organised," 3. 
236 Ekhaugen, "Coordination of Efforts "the Norwegian Model" (Samordning Av Virkemidler: "Den Norske 
Modellen")," 107 and Tor-Erik Hanssen, "Coalition Stragey in Complex Conflicts: The Strategic Behaviour of 
Three Nato-States in Afghanistan 2003-2008" (King's College London, 2013). 
237 Støre, "Norwegian Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan (Norsk Helhetlig Innsats I Afghanistan)."(My 
translation) 
238 Ibid. 
 93 
conflicts. He does not once in the letter refer to what was ISAF strategy and 
guidance considering civil-military cooperation. Thus, for Norway, as a major 
player in humanitarian aid and development, it was more important to be able to 
continue to play this role than what was expected from the alliance in 
Afghanistan. If there was a primacy of politics when it came to civil-military 
cooperation, it was more a case of a primary of domestic politics than what 
doctrine and theory describes as necessary to defeat an insurgency. 
 
Another factor that can explain the ‘Norwegian model’ for civil-military 
cooperation is the lack of substantial military advice in the matter. As illustrated 
above, NGOs had a clear, and legitimate, interest in a clear distinction between 
military and civilian efforts. One might expect that the higher echelons of the 
Norwegian armed forces in the same manner proposed an approach in line with 
military theory and doctrine for Norwegian strategy. The Chief of the Norwegian 
Defense Forces tasked General Lilland with heading a committee who should 
answer ‘how Norwegian coordination could be strengthened from an armed forces 
point of view’ and ‘what the armed forces could contribute with in this regard.’239 
In the mandate for the committee it was pointed out that the report should:  
 
Give special consideration to the difference in civilian and military role-
interpretation, at the same time as the national effort shall appear 
coordinated and comprehensive. The political guidance for the “Norwegian 
model” is therefore to be given special emphasis.240  
 
Considering this mandate, the committee was placed in somewhat of a dilemma. 
The role of the armed forces is to provide professional advice on strategy from 
their perspective. Thus, this should be based on military theory and coalition 
strategy. In this case it was asked to do so, but within political constraints that 
clearly went against both military theory and ISAF strategy. From a military point 
of view, it is very difficult to see how one could achieve a comprehensive approach 
in a counterinsurgency operation, and at the same time operate under the 
constraint of a clear separation between military and civilian effort. The principle 
of a coordinated government action, or comprehensive approach, was one of the 
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core foundations of both counterinsurgency doctrine and ISAF strategy at this time. 
The report goes some way to describe this challenge. After a short description of 
ISAF strategy and their approach to counterinsurgency operations it states: 
 
The method counterinsurgency puts Norwegian forces in a dilemma. On 
the one hand a tight integration of civilian and military means is implied. On 
the other hand this integration could lead to a mix-up of roles that run 
contrary to the Norwegian PRT model.241  
 
Instead of reaching the conclusion that from a military point of view Norway could 
not uphold the principle of civil-military separation and at the same time adhere 
to ISAF strategy it argued:  
 
A dynamic and interactive cooperation between civilian and military actors 
on the tactical level – with integrated planning at the same time as the 
execution happens closely coordinated, but separate – is the best way the 
armed forces can operate.242  
 
Exactly how this should happen, and how this was meant to create a 
comprehensive approach was not specified. In this manner, the ‘NGO view’ on how 
civil-military cooperation in Faryab should be conducted was allowed to stand 
more or less unopposed in the development of Norwegian strategy.  
 
One of the more problematic aspects of this clear separation of civilian and 
military efforts from a counterinsurgency point of view was that it also indirectly 
undermined the political aspect of the conflict. Military efforts could for periods of 
time create a relative secure environment where other effectors could work on the 
development and good governance side of the mission.243 This presupposed a tight 
coordination of all efforts, and from a counterinsurgency point of view the civilian 
efforts should be leading this work. By relying mainly on the UN and different 
NGOs to perform this side of the mission, Norway effectively forfeited any degree 
of control over this.244 Most NGOs are, and should be, impartial and rely on this as 
their protection in conflict areas. As such, the Norwegian government’s influence 
on how development is done would most likely have been limited even if they had 
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attempted to exert it. This presents another question, that is, whether it was at 
all adapted for a conflict such as Afghanistan. As mentioned in the introduction, 
Norway’s main experience prior to Afghanistan was in UN peacekeeping missions.   
 
Whilst peacekeeping and counterinsurgency have much in common, their 
conceptual difference is nevertheless quite clear. All UN peacekeeping missions 
are conducted on the basis of the three basic principles of peacekeeping; consent 
of the parties, impartiality, and the minimum use of force.245 Since all 
peacekeeping is undertaken to either implement or monitor a cease-fire 
agreement or peace agreement the impartiality of the force is absolutely vital in 
maintaining the consent of the parties. Conversely, in counterinsurgency one has 
already sided with the government. There was no idea or hint of impartiality in 
ISAF. Therefore, it is somewhat difficult to see how even NGOs who operated in 
this type of conflict, funded by the international community, would be perceived 
as impartial. This was also pointed out by the report on development work from 
the Feinstein Centre who points out that in Afghanistan most donors were also 
belligerents, and that the UN attempted to utilize methods based on impartiality 
where no peace agreement was in place.246 It further points to that ‘many NGOs 
work as implementing partners for government programs or, even if they do not, 
are seen as part of the international enterprise that supports the government.’247 
This should hardly come as a surprise in a counterinsurgency such as Afghanistan. If 
you built a school for girls you could claim to be as impartial as you like, but the 
odds were that the Taliban was going to see you as a part of the opposing forces. 
There is very little room for impartiality in such politicized conflicts as 
counterinsurgency.  Norwegian strategy did not take this into account and as will 
be examined later in the thesis, it made any notion of a comprehensive effort very 
difficult by relying heavily on NGOs to perform development, and by separating 
civilian and military efforts.  
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One area where Norway was more in adherence to counterinsurgency theory than 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom was with respect to the overall spending. 
During the whole time span of the mission Norway has spent NOK 11,5 billion on 
the military side of the mission and NOK 8,4 billion for civilian purposes.248 As 
such, the overall spending was more balanced and in line with the 
recommendations of counterinsurgency theory. The main challenge with this 
aspect of the Norwegian mission was not the overall spending, but rather how the 
money was utilized. Unlike the Dutch, which primarily funded approved projects 
inside the Afghan Development Zones (ADZ) in Uruzgan, the Norwegians channeled 
most of the funds to Afghan managed trust funds.249 ADZs were an ISAF creation in 
order to prioritize areas where military action should create a secure environment 
in which reconstruction, governance, and development could take place. The 
Norwegian approach of mainly putting funds directly to the host nation is 
considered good practice in development terms. Kasten Friis argues that this way 
of funding could be defended from a development point of view as it has the 
potential to promote local ownership, longevity and accountability.250 From a 
counterinsurgency perspective, however, the model is not very suitable as it 
undermines a unity of effort. As discussed earlier, a comprehensive approach in 
counterinsurgency demands that security and development are tightly coordinated. 
In the case of Norway, the Norwegian PRT through the ISAF chain of command 
mainly ran the security operations.  The funds for development were mainly run 
though the Afghan government. If Norway had put measures in place to ensure that 
these were tightly coordinated it may have worked well, however, this was not the 
case. Arguably, this model fit Norway well as it promoted a separation of civil and 
military efforts. As Karsten Friis argues, anything but a clear separation also at this 
level ‘would have forced the government to spell out priorities between security, 
development and humanitarian sectors.’251 From the perspective of the Norwegian 
government, this seems to have been more important than an adherence to the 
overall doctrine and strategy of the coalition. Thus, whilst Norwegian spending 
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overall was rather balance, it did not promote a concerted government effort 
where all aspects of the mission were coordinated in the same direction. 
 
The Norwegian decision to clearly separate civilian and military efforts in Faryab 
was completely legitimate from a domestic point of view. The tight coordination 
between military security efforts and civilian development efforts as advocated by 
counterinsurgency theory was highly controversial in NGO circles. Domestically, 
the Norwegian effort in Faryab was rather limited while it is a superpower in 
development terms.  
 
Tactical view 
Due to the limitations put on civil-military cooperation in the strategic guidance 
for Norwegian forces, the level of interaction at the tactical level was 
understandably limited. There were, nevertheless, attempts made to conduct 
development programs on a tactical level early on in the mission. Between 2006-
2008 Faryab province was assessed to be rather benign and without a serious 
threat from the insurgency. This period saw both integrated and more independent 
development programs take place in Faryab. In particular, Norway funded the 
building of schools throughout the province.252 This was by Norwegian funding in 
cooperation with central and provincial Afghan authorities. My research indicates 
no evidence that the locations of the new schools were tightly coordinated with 
security efforts to ensure that schools were built in areas that would be under 
government control in the foreseeable future. When the insurgency in Faryab grew 
in force, this became problematic as many of the schools were built in areas where 
Norwegian and Afghan forces had no opportunity to remain in control. When the 
official report made its evaluation of Norwegian development projects in Faryab, 
the assessment teams were unable to evaluate 40% of the 117 schools. These 
schools were all in areas outside government control and hence too dangerous to 
venture into.253 The most publicised result of this policy was when Norwegian 
forces attacked the town of Khwaya Kinti in 2010. The insurgents’ main stronghold 
in the city was the school, built with Norwegian funds a few years earlier.254 The 
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issue with the Norwegian approach in this instance was not only a lack of 
coordination between development and security; it was also a matter of the 
changing situation on the ground after 2007. Uncertainties are an integral part of 
the nature of war and it was difficult to foresee the increase of violence in 2007 in 
Faryab. In addition, the Norwegian and Afghan forces did not have nearly enough 
forces to secure all the locations where school were built. The core of the problem 
had more to do with the different perceptions of the conflict from a development 
standpoint. Success for the development program was measured by the ‘number of 
schools built, the number of teachers educated and the number of pupils 
enrolled.’255 Factors which should have been considered from a counterinsurgency 
point of view was not taken into account. Whether the school was in a government 
controlled area, that the teaching was in line with government educational 
programs and that the teachers were loyal to the government rather than other 
groupings were not part of the equation. If the conflict is understood as a 
counterinsurgency, a competition for government, these factors are of obvious 
importance. This was, however, not prioritised from the Norwegian side.  
 
Also evaluations from the development sector in Norway have addressed the 
questions of a clear separation of efforts on the tactical level. The official report 
from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) is surprisingly 
negative in its evaluation of the Norwegian approach. Its criticism has two primary 
lines. The first is in relation to how Norwegian funds are used for development in 
Afghanistan. Unlike The Netherlands, who adopted a model where specific projects 
inside the Afghan development zones in Uruzgan were funded, Norway adopted a 
policy of more central funding. In the period between 2001-2010 Norway granted 
5,3 billion NOK to development efforts in Afghanistan. Of these 22% were 
channeled through the UN, 24% through different NGOs, 25% were accounted as 
miscellaneous, and 29% were provided to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust 
Fund (ARTF).256 Whilst a central model for funding could have long-term positive 
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effects, it also proved challenging to make this money have an impact in Faryab 
province.  
 
According to NORAD the local government complained about the lack of earmarked 
funds, as they did not feel ‘that their ownership and capacity were being 
strengthened.’257 It was also pointed out that the close alignment to Afghan plans 
advocated in the Norwegian strategy was not unproblematic, and in some ways an 
illusion. ‘Afghan priorities are still to a large extent defined by the international 
community. Limited participation of Afghans undermine genuine local 
ownership.’258 In other words, the impression of providing Afghan solutions to 
Afghan problems by aligning Norwegian strategy with the Provincial Development 
Plan did not work as intended. Furthermore, the NORAD evaluation questions the 
utility of the strict segregation between military and civilian efforts on the tactical 
level. The report argues, in a ‘humanitarian policy perspective this has been 
positive and has enabled NGO partners to conduct their programs without 
association with the military.’259 However, it also points out that in more practical 
terms on the ground this approach has proved to be problematic. ‘The separation 
of the civilian and military components that was supposed to be accompanied by 
strong coordination, led to a division where the military operate in the insecure 
areas and NGOs in the safer areas.’260 This view is also supported from key PRT 
personnel in both interviews and more public statements. Lt Col Rune Solberg, 
commander of PRT XV, wrote a controversial letter to the editor in one of 
Norway’s biggest newspapers. Solberg argued that Norwegian aid and development 
policy gave the Pashtuns in Faryab a raw deal. Most Pashtuns live in the most 
insecure areas where aid agencies and NGOs did not operate due to security 
challenges. He claimed that ‘the consequences of the Norwegian Model can prove 
to be a continuous growing insurgency, with increasing differences and mistrust 
between the population and the local government in Faryab.’261 Several of the 
other PRT commanders also complained that due to the constraint on civil-military 
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cooperation, they lacked the tools to improve development and governance 
following security operations.262 In this regard, it is also worth noting that the last 
and highlighted conclusion of the NORAD report states that; ‘Norway should 
rethink its strategy and aid programming for future engagement in Afghanistan.’263 
Coming from the Norwegian government’s own development experts this counts as 
a rather clear criticism. 
 
The second report focusing on Faryab province comes out of the Feinstein Center 
at Tufts University. This report is narrower in its approach and studies ‘the 
assumed causal relationship between development aid and stabilization in 
Afghanistan.’264 While the report in general paints a positive view of the Norwegian 
PRT and the efforts done in Faryab, it also highlights the weakness of pursuing a 
strategy so closely aligned with the Afghan authorities. The report shows that none 
of the national programs planned for Ghowrmach district had been implemented 
by 2010.265 There is little reason to doubt that this was the case only here because  
Ghowrmach was selected as one of two top-priority districts in Faryab province. 
 
Overall, Norway pursued a strategy of clear separation between civilian and 
military efforts. This was not only in clear contradiction to what is advocated by 
counterinsurgency theory, but also the strategy of ISAF. The main reasoning for 
this was to not undermine the impartiality of NGOs in conflict areas. Whilst Norway 
had a more balanced funding between civilian and military efforts it lacked 
coordination and unity of effort. On the tactical level there were little direct 
coordination. This was mostly due to the restraint put on Norwegian forces with 
regards to cooperation with civil actors in the province.  
 
The Norwegian approach 
In summary, hardly any aspect of the Norwegian efforts in Faryab province 
between 2006-2010 adhered to counterinsurgency theory. Norway did not develop 
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a coherent strategy for its effort. It did not prioritize resources, nor formulate an 
overall plan for how military force should be used to attain specific political 
objectives. The only clear strategic guidance provided was the ‘Norwegian model’ 
of civil-military cooperation. This prescribed a clear distinction between military 
and civilian efforts. This part of Norwegian strategy came about as a result of 
pressure from an influential COIN lobby, but it also had an ideological background. 
Overall it is a model that seems more adapted to UN peacekeeping missions than 
that of the highly political nature of a counterinsurgency.  This model for civil-
military cooperation also ran contrary to ISAF strategy and counterinsurgency 
theory. It made any comprehensive approach on the ground very difficult to 
achieve and it could even be argued that it made the insurgency worse since most 
aid was provided in the relative safe parts of the province.  
 
Furthermore, Norway did not pursue a population-centric approach in their 
operations in Afghanistan. Given the underdeveloped strategy, there was little 
guidance on how to run the operations for the PRT commanders. On the other 
hand, the PRT commanders still enjoyed substantial freedom to define how 
operations were performed in other aspects of the operation. Poor force ratios and 
a lack of long term planning in particular made Norwegian operations on a tactical 
level more enemy-centric than anything else. Whilst operations several times were 
planned with a population-centric approach, the execution became enemy-centric. 
Most often this was due to an overreliance on host nation security forces and a too 
short hold phase in the operations. 
 
The political level chose counterinsurgency away with regards to a concerted 
government effort on the strategic level. With a clear segregation between 
military and civilian efforts as the one guiding principle, this aspect of 
counterinsurgency was also not followed. Norway did balance the funding of the 
mission better than the Dutch and the British. However, most funds were 
channelled through their Afghan partners without a clear link to the operations in 
Faryab. Therefore, there was a lack of unity of effort where development was 
done in the safest areas of the province and security operations in the most 
volatile.  
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In his work on policy, strategy and doctrine prior to the Great War Jack Snyder 
noted: ‘If new problems do not fit into the categories that the old beliefs 
establish, they will not be well understood.’266 In Snyder’s work this remark was 
made in the context of the changing geo-political, societal, and the technological 
situation for the great powers in the years leading up to World War I. It is also, 
however, rather fitting for Norway’s challenges in Afghanistan. Faryab province 
was a new kind of problem, and from a counterinsurgency perspective it was not 
well understood. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE CASE OF GREAT BRITAIN 
Introduction 
Great Britain was the only of the three nations studied who on officially treated 
the campaign in Afghanistan as a counterinsurgency. However, in the execution of 
the operation there were several aspects where the British deviated from 
population-centric counterinsurgency. Especially initially the British mission was 
characterised by a failure to develop a coherent strategy. A focus on counter-
narcotics as a strategic goal in Helmand caused friction between the strategic and 
tactical level. Furthermore, the British armed forces, especially early in the 
deployment, failed to adhere either to its political guidance or the principles of 
classic counterinsurgency theory.  
 
The decision to put British forces into villages in the north of Helmand was 
effectively a mission-creep. This left British forces to be spread thin and with little 
possibility for conducting effective population-centric operations. However, the 
British were able to adapt and improve their strategy and operations after 2008. 
There are examples of British forces on the tactical level preforming operations 
closely aligned with the theories of counterinsurgency such as Operation Panchai 
Palang in 2009. Lastly, the British mission struggled to create a functioning civil-
military cooperation in Helmand. This was partly caused by different force-
protection rules between civilian and military personnel in Helmand. These 
problems were further aggravated as the British forces, especially in the first two 
years, were spread so thin that they struggled to generate actual security in their 
areas. 
 
The British mission to Helmand has been the cause of more controversy and 
debate, both in media and academics, than the Dutch and Norwegian missions. 
Several officers have left the British Army rather publicly after disagreements on 
how the mission was executed.267 The mission has also been analysed and discussed 
in peer-reviewed journals by scholars such as Theo Farrell, Hew Strachan, and 
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Robert Egnell.268 The House of Commons Defence Committee has conducted three 
hearings regarding the mission. Also several books, both first-hand accounts and 
more research based, has been published on the British mission to Helmand. The 
definitive account of the campaign is the newly published Unwinnable by Theo 
Farrell. Farrell is to my knowledge the only researcher with access to the still 
classified sources regarding the mission in Helmand. Overall Farrell argues that the 
strategic aims for the conflict outreached the means deployed to reach them. 
While the British forces was able to adapt to circumstances on the tactical level he 
argues that ‘the British and Americans were unable to convert these tactical gains 
into strategic success.’269 This chapter will utilize these various sources as well as 
a significant number interviews conducted by the author.   
 
Background and history of COIN  
Of the different countries studied in this thesis Britain stands out in many regards. 
As one on the five veto powers in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), a G8 
member, and a special ally of the United States (US), Britain is far more powerful 
and ambitious on the global stage than Norway and the Netherlands. As a former 
empire Britain also has a much richer counterinsurgency history than Norway and 
the Netherlands. Since the Second World War Britain has been involved in three 
conventional wars (Korea, the Falklands, and Desert Storm). In the same period 
British forces have fought insurgencies in Cyprus, Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Aden, 
Dhofar, and Northern Ireland, to mention a few places.  
The constant demand to rotate forces in and out of Northern Ireland gave British 
forces particular knowledge and experience in the conduct of counterinsurgency 
campaigns during a period where most other NATO armies paid no attention to this 
type of conflict. On the other hand, it was in some ways also a drawback. Robert 
Egnell has argued that ‘British assessments of their own operations in the Iraqi 
south, tended to display a remarkable and, in hindsight, rather inflated self-
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confidence.’270 Egnell partly blames this on a British belief that experience from 
the past will continue to serve them well in the future. 
It can be argued that British pride in this legacy counterinsurgency 
inhibited the serious soul-searching and reform processes that took place 
within the US military as a response to the challenges of the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.271 
Former British officer Patrick Little voices the same concern in an article published 
by the RUSI Journal. Little paints a picture of an Army that encouraged conformity 
and tradition over criticism and innovation, and as a result lacked the ability of 
quickly adapting to changing circumstances. ‘Generations of US and European 
partners have grown up with the notion developed inside the British Army that it 
had more to teach than it had to learn.’272 This attitude was also visible in British 
counterinsurgency doctrine at the time. ‘The experience of numerous “small wars” 
has provided the British Army with a unique insight into this demanding form of 
conflict.’273 The white paper on defence and security from 2003, Delivering 
Security in a Changing World, voices the same sentiments. ‘The Balkans, Sierra 
Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq demonstrate the successful performance of British 
forces in conducting both combat operations and subsequent stabilisation 
operations.’274 
It is undoubtedly true that the British Army has a vast experience from fighting 
numerous insurgencies. To claim a ‘unique insight’ into these conflicts in a 
doctrine, however, contributed to strengthening a notion in the Army that one 
does not have to take studies and training as seriously as one should for these 
specific types of war. An example of this can be found in the rather hotly debated 
article ‘Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations’ by Brigadier Nigel 
Aylwin-Foster from 2005. The article quite bluntly criticizes the performance of US 
forces in Iraq and was first published as part of Seaford House Papers, who 
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publishes the best dissertations from the British Defense Academy online. It was 
later re-published in Military Review, one of the most influential American 
professional military journals. The article in itself argues that the US Army was too 
conventional, too reliant on kinetic force, bureaucratic, and unable to learn and 
adapt to new circumstances.275  
Aylwin-Foster stays clear of directly comparing the US culture and performance to 
the British. He does so only indirectly by referring to John Nagel’s 
Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, where Nagel compares the 
learning cultures of the two armies.276 It was not so much the contents of the 
article that made it controversial; several influential US officers presented the 
same points of view at the time, and strategy changed accordingly during the surge 
in 2006-7.277 The controversial aspect was rather that it was critique of a close 
ally, something that is normally not done as bluntly and publicly as in this article. 
Also, in retrospect, the timing of the article was not the best if one considers the 
massive improvement made in US performance in Iraq in comparison to British 
performance from 2005 and onwards. 
On the other hand, the doctrine also warns that the extensive experience from the 
recent conflict in Northern Ireland ‘tends to constrain military thinking on the 
subject because of its national context.’278 Interestingly enough, several of the 
British officers interviewed for this thesis referred to their experience from 
Northern Ireland when talking about their preparations for deployment to 
Helmand.279  
 
Doctrine, education and training  
Britain had two different doctrines for counterinsurgency operations in place 
during the period studied in this thesis. The first one was published in 2001 and 
                                         
275 Nigel Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations", Military Review, no. 
November-December (2005): 6-10. 
276 Ibid.,  9-10. 
277 Peter D. Feaver, "The Right to Be Right - Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Desicion", 
International Security 35, no. 4 (2011). 
278 British Army, "Part 10 Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines)," Part B, Ch 2, 
p. 1. 
279 UK D, "Personal Interview,"  (2013). 
 107 
was actually the first British counterinsurgency doctrine ever published, despite 
their long tradition in these types of conflicts. An updated version with only minor 
changes was issued in 2007 before a completely revised doctrine, which 
incorporated recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, was issued in 2009. 
2001 doctrine 
The 2001 version of the counterinsurgency doctrine is made up of two different 
parts. Part A deals with theories of insurgency, while part B deals with 
counterinsurgency. The part that deals with insurgency is comprehensive and 
covers a great variety of insurgent theory. It first of all distinguishes between 
different forms of insurgencies, such as anarchist movements, egalitarian 
insurgencies, traditionalist, pluralist, separatist, reformist, and preservationist 
movements.280 The doctrine further argues that while the categorisation of an 
insurgency in itself is not very important, it is important to understand the causes 
and aim of an insurgency.281 This serves to enhance the political aspect of 
counterinsurgency in the British doctrine. In the annex to chapter 1, the 2001 
doctrine provides short historical examples of the different forms of insurgencies. 
This includes the most common forms such as Mao’s theory of protracted war, Che 
Guevara’s FOCO theory, and Marighela’s theories for an urban insurgency. It also 
included what at the time were more esoteric examples such as Abimael Guzman 
and the Shining Path guerrilla in Peru and a section on ‘The dangers of Islam – Real 
and apparent.’282  
 
Overall, and especially considering that it is an Army doctrine, the manual deals 
quite thoroughly with the phenomenon of insurgency. The doctrine is more 
descriptive than normative and seems to provide its audience with an 
understanding of the challenges rather than a set solution to the problems faced 
when countering insurgency.  
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This is also a continuing theme in Part B of the doctrine. The doctrine stands firmly 
in the overall tradition of classic counterinsurgency. The principles of 
counterinsurgency advocated in the doctrine serve as an example of this: 
 
1. Political Primacy and Political Aim 
2. Coordinated Government Machinery 
3. Intelligence and Information 
4. Separating the Insurgent from his Support 
5. Neutralising the Insurgent 
6. Longer Term Post-Insurgency Planning283 
 
The British 2001 doctrine further underlines that ‘they the principles should be 
applied pragmatically and with common sense to suit the circumstances peculiar to 
each campaign.’284 Except for the principle of neutralising the insurgent all these 
principles in themselves fit into the overall framework of classic 
counterinsurgency. This is even clearer when elaborating on general theory of 
counterinsurgency in the introduction to part B, especially on the need for a 
political primacy and the difference between conventional war and 
counterinsurgency operations.  
 
In warfighting soldiers tend to expect that once broad political parameters 
have been established they will be left to decide the best way to achieve 
tactical goals: this is not necessarily the case in COIN and this has important 
implications. 
Since insurgency is principally a political struggle, it may be that the desired 
end of the government falls short of victory in a strictly military context and 
setting. 285 
 
Both these quotes are in line with the reasoning put forward by Thompson, Galula, 
and others writing theories of classic counterinsurgency. The violence is only a 
symptom of the problem in the insurgency. The root and the solution are both of a 
political nature, and military force can hence only support a wider effort to quell 
the insurgency. Even though the doctrine discusses different types of insurgencies 
and ways to counter them the theories of classic counterinsurgency very much 
forms the spine of the doctrine. 
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The strength of discussing several aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency in a 
rather academic fashion might also be a weakness.  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the levels of command are compressed in this type of operations, and 
companies are often the principle unit. While doctrines tend to be descriptive in 
order not to be out-dated when published, they should also set down basic 
guidelines for how to conduct operations.  The field manual does this in an overall 
sense, but when dealing with operational considerations in its chapter 6 it is very 
broad and general. Furthermore, it also deals mainly with intelligence operations 
and organisation of the effort and not with the tactical execution of 
counterinsurgency operations.  The passage providing the most specific guidance 
for how to conduct operations is in chapter 8 in part B, under the heading ‘Military 
operations.’286 The foundation of operations clearly stems from a ‘clear-hold-build’ 
concept even though it does not use this exact phrase. ‘The immediate aim of a 
framework,287 or “oil-slick” operation as it is sometimes called, is to separate the 
insurgents from their supporters, food suppliers and sources of information in the 
designated area.’288  
 
The next steps in this doctrinal prescription describe the consolidation of the 
controlled area and then a gradual expansion of it. This type of operations 
resembles the Brigg’s plan employed in Malaya in the 1950s and also attempts 
made by the French early on in Morocco. While this provides some direction for 
operations on a tactical level it still falls short of manuals such as the US FM 3-24 
Counterinsurgency manual and also the British 2009 counterinsurgency manual. 
 
2009 doctrine 
The next counterinsurgency doctrine published by the British Army came in 2009. 
The British team writing the doctrine was invited by their American allies to 
partake in a joint venture in writing the FM 3-24. However, as the British side were 
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unable to keep the same pace as their US counterparts, this was not to happen.289 
Alexander Alderson, a member of the new doctrine’s working group, also argues 
that there were other reasons for the somewhat late arrival of the new doctrine.  
This apparent reticence to respond was due as much to a general difficulty 
in acknowledging that the campaign was dealing principally with an 
insurgent problem in southern Iraq as it was to an absence of evidence of a 
need for change.290 
Early on in Iraq and Afghanistan there seems to have been a sentiment in the 
British Army that the old lessons, and doctrine, of counterinsurgency would 
continue to serve them well also in these new conflicts. According to Alderson, 
however, this changed around 2005-6 when ‘an emerging requirement to adjust 
doctrine had started to coalesce.’291 Hence work to update the existing manual 
started.  
The 2009 doctrine defines counterinsurgency as ‘those military, law enforcement, 
political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency, 
while addressing the root causes.’292 This definition in itself puts the doctrine close 
to the theory of classic counterinsurgency. It views an insurgency as primarily a 
political struggle that needs to be addressed in a comprehensive manner. 
Furthermore, it also acknowledges the need to address the root causes of the 
insurgency while simultaneously dealing with the symptoms. This is further 
underlined when the manual deals with the basic characteristics of these types of 
conflicts.  
1. Direct military action may be required 
2. Both sides have a political imperative 
3. The population is central to the outcome 
4. The solution is multifaceted.293 
Like most doctrines the FM part 10 is not written for the war, but a war. Hence it 
was not overly focused on the operation in Afghanistan that was on-going when it 
was published. It nevertheless seems clear that many of the lessons identified in 
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Iraq, and early on in Afghanistan, have been incorporated into the doctrine. 
Firstly, it deals with the challenges posed by global insurgencies and the growth of 
religious extremism in the part that deals with insurgency.294 The dangers of 
Islamism were also described in the 2001 version, but not in particular depth. 
Secondly, it emphasises more the complex nature of expeditionary 
counterinsurgency operations fought as part of a coalition. The parts that deal 
with unity of effort and primacy of political purpose underline the need to 
harmonise operations with the host nation and the rest of the coalition. 
 
Policy should be a guide for how a campaign develops which means that 
active political involvement is required throughout planning, preparation, 
execution, and assessment of counterinsurgency operations, and must 
involve the host nation’s government.295 
 
The 2009 doctrine is also more elaborate when it comes to describing how 
counterinsurgency operations should be conducted on a tactical level. It keeps 
with the overall British tradition of an ink-spot approach, but is more in line with 
the US FM 3-24 by adopting an explicit clear-hold-build approach as the tactical 
framework for operations296  
 
The 2009 version of counter-insurgency doctrine emphasises that a clear-hold-build 
approach rests on several assumptions in order to be successful. Firstly, it assumes 
that the operations carried out underpin the host nation’s efforts to address the 
underlying causes of the insurgency. Furthermore, it assumes that the objective of 
all operations is to secure the population and increase the influence of the 
government, and that all direct actions are based on solid intelligence.297  It also 
underlines the need for a favourable force-ratio for the concept to work. 
 
The clearance stage of the operation requires a sufficient number of 
soldiers in order to generate the sort of presence which will reassure the 
population and, crucially, enable control of the situation to be secured. ... 
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If the force is not strong enough in numbers, ..., it will be limited to 
protecting its forward operating bases, and will not be able to create an 
effective presence that can meet its principal responsibility of protecting 
the population.298 
 
As we shall see, this highlights one of the lessons identified between 2006-2008 in 
Helmand. British forces were spread out thin, and due to the relentless pressure 
from the insurgents they were only capable of protecting their own bases and not 
the population. 
Military training and education in counterinsurgency 
All British officers do their basic education at the Royal Military Academy 
Sandhurst (RMAS). Though there are different ways to be commissioned, most 
officer candidates have an undergraduate degree, and is then given a 12-month 
course at the RMAS before graduating. During these months the cadets are to learn 
everything needed to become an officer. The RMAS Department of War Studies 
provides all education in history and military theory, including counterinsurgency. 
The program for the education is described in a folder called Project Wellington.299  
 
The entire course is composed of 16 two-hour seminars ranging from general 
theories of conventional war to counterinsurgency. The part of the course that 
deals with insurgencies and counterinsurgency makes up five of the sixteen 
seminars. In addition to this, two of the exercises the cadets participate in during 
their training are based on counterinsurgency scenarios.  
 
The course is comprehensive, despite its brief duration. It spans the most essential 
literature and doctrines, and if studied and discussed comprehensively it should 
help the cadets prepare for counterinsurgency warfare. The first two seminars of 
the course deal with insurgency. The first seminar is on the nature of insurgencies 
in general, while the second seminar mainly focuses on the challenges of 
contemporary conflicts.300 The next two seminars are general seminars on the 
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theory of counterinsurgency, and the last one is concerned with case studies with 
10-15-minute presentations on different counterinsurgency campaigns.301  
 
Overall, the structure and reading for the course is not the main challenge with 
counterinsurgency teaching at the RMAS. It could be argued that the reading 
should include more critical texts, and perhaps be more prioritised to go in depth 
on fewer case studies, but the course still provides a solid knowledge base. The 
main issue with the course is the time available for cadets to study and digest the 
knowledge the course tries to impart. Instructors at the RMAS describe the cadets’ 
everyday life as very busy. They normally have 8 hours of teaching every day, 
meaning that time for reading is very limited. Hence they have often not had 
sufficient time to read and prepare ahead of the seminars. Furthermore, 
considering that most cadets commissioned in the last decade faced a rotation to 
Iraq or Afghanistan soon after graduation, one might argue that 10 teaching hours 
out of one year is not very much. Especially compared to Norwegian cadets who 
spend 3 months studying counterinsurgency during their three years at the Military 
Academy.  
 
Project Wellington provides a basic understanding of population-centric 
counterinsurgency. It could also spark an interest in further reading and studying 
that will deepen and widen the knowledge of counterinsurgency in their first years 
as serving officers. On the other hand, the relatively short amount of time spent 
on the subject will most likely prevent an intimate knowledge of 
counterinsurgency when the cadets are commissioned.  
 
Summary training and doctrine  
British doctrines and training seen together provide a foundation that should give 
officers a basic understanding of population-centric counterinsurgency theory. It 
also provides guidelines for how these types of operations should be conducted on 
an operational and tactical level. In discussions regarding British doctrine a quote 
attributed to Erwin Rommel often occurs: ‘The British write some of the best 
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doctrine in the world; it is fortunate their officers do not read it.’302 During my 
interviews with British officers for this thesis, surprisingly few of them referred to 
UK doctrinal work during our talks. That is not to say that they had a poor 
understanding of counterinsurgency, quite often their knowledge and 
understanding was impressive, but that one should be careful and not overestimate 
the influence of doctrine when studying the lower echelons of an army.  
The primacy of politics 
The United Kingdom seems to have failed initially in producing a coherent strategy 
for their campaign in Iraq. The approach to the mission almost seems ad-hoc and 
to my knowledge there was not produced any clear strategic guidance before the 
deployment of troops. Several strategic aims for the operation were communicated 
to the forces. However, these proved difficult to operationalise and were not 
always fit for the circumstances on the ground. In particular, the central role of 
counter-narcotics was seen as counterproductive in a counterinsurgency 
environment by the tactical units on the ground. This again led to a lack of trust 
between the tactical and strategic level in the early period of the conflict. 
 
Strategic view 
In conventional war, armed force is used as a means for political ends. In 
counterinsurgency politics is a means in itself, in addition to armed force, due to 
the political nature of insurgencies as discussed in the theory chapter. This means 
that in a counterinsurgency campaign politics should prevail even if it runs counter 
to military needs and logic. Additionally, the aim of the counterinsurgent should 
be to defeat ‘the political subversion, not the guerrillas.’303 In the ideal world 
political process should lead to policy, policy should guide strategy, which again 
should guide the use of force on a tactical level.  
 
Policy should be a guide for how a campaign develops which means that 
active political involvement is required throughout the planning, 
preparation, execution, and assessment of counterinsurgency operations, 
and must involve the host nation’s government.304 
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This puts great demands on the strategic level in these types of conflicts. In order 
to ensure unity of effort from all participating sectors of government the strategy 
must be clear on what the use of force is meant to achieve. Since resources are 
never sufficient it must make clear priorities and then follow up on these. 
Furthermore, the strategy needs to be understood at the tactical level. Strategies 
are in the end realised on the ground at the tactical level. Lastly, if a strategy of 
counterinsurgency is to be ultimately successful it needs to address the underlying 
causes of the insurgency. These can be challenging to identify at the outset of the 
conflict, especially when fighting expeditionary warfare. It is therefore not to be 
expected that these are clear from the outset, but that they remain a focus and 
that efforts are made to identify these as the conflict progress.  
 
The primacy of politics in counterinsurgency was lost on the British prior to the 
deployment of forces to Helmand. A primacy of politics is one of the listed 
principles of counterinsurgency in both British doctrines published in the period 
studied. The 2001 doctrine asserts that counterinsurgency demands a political 
primacy and a clear political aim. It further elaborates that the armed forces can 
‘play an effective part by advising the government of the role, scope and potential 
of the military forces available in any counter-insurgency planning.’305 The 
contribution of the armed forces also needs to be harmonised with other 
government efforts to achieve unity of effort and a true political primacy. The 
doctrine also underlines that in the case of coalition warfare, or if the conflict is 
fought on the territory of an ally, the government needs to ensure British political 
leadership in the theatre to guide the commander. Lastly the manual stresses the 
need to adapt all planning and organisation to the specific circumstances at 
hand.306 All in all the doctrine has a classical view on the idea of primacy of 
politics, and also provides clear guidance on how this should be achieved.  
  
With regards to the overall British strategy for Helmand it does not seem to be as 
well articulated as the Dutch was. In his thesis which studies British strategic 
process in depth Tor-Erik Hanssen identifies no less than eight or nine different 
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political aims for the operation. These included counter-terrorism, NATO/ US 
support, counter-narcotics, development, governance and security. 307 Other 
studies of the British campaign in Helmand has reached similar conclusions.308  
 
While the goal relating to alliance politics were not the most prominent in the 
formal addresses made by Whitehall decision-makers it was unquestionably the 
main underlying reason for British involvement in Afghanistan. Britain had been the 
US’ primary partner in the war on terror since the 9/11 attacks in the US.309 The 
reason to increase the UK footprint in Afghanistan through the expansion of ISAF in 
2005 was also seen in the light of improving UK-US relations which had become 
somewhat strained in Iraq.310 While alliance politics may not have been a stated 
strategic goal for the UK government, but it would indeed be very hard to imagine 
substantial British forces in Afghanistan without an American presence there. Being 
a good ally to the US can thus be said to have been the main underlying goal for 
the British mission, much like it was for Norway. 
 
The strategic aims which initially caused the most tension between the strategic 
and tactical level was that of counter-narcotics. Foreign minister Jack Straw 
stated his ambition was to ‘put counter-narcotics at the heart of all our work in 
Afghanistan.’311 The following part of this chapter will analyse this part of British 
strategy more in depth. 
  
The policy of counter-narcotics 
When Britain deployed forces to Helmand in the summer of 2006 counter-narcotics 
was one of two main strategic purposes for the operation.312 In a speech at the IISS 
in October 2004 Foreign Minister Jack Straw argued that counter-narcotics was one 
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of the key aspects of future British efforts in Afghanistan. His argument had both a 
domestic and an Afghan aspect. Firstly ‘95% of the heroin on our streets originates 
in Afghanistan’s poppy fields, bringing crime and human misery in its wake.’313 As 
far as the Afghan perspective was concerned Straw argued:  
The parallel economy sustained by opium represents half the value again of 
Afghanistan’s non-drugs GDP: it thrives on chaos and lawlessness, and those 
who profit from it have every interest in undermining the rule of law and 
the authority of government.314 
These views were also supported in the Ministry of Defense’s written evidence in 
the first hearings concerning Helmand in the House of Commons Defence 
Committee (HCDC) in 2005-6.  When discussing the overall goals of the operation in 
Helmand it stated: ‘but this military deployment alone will not guarantee success. 
An integrated approach covering security, governance, development and counter-
narcotics is vital.’315 Security, governance, and development were, and remained, 
the main objectives of the NATO led ISAF operation.316 By including counter-
narcotics alongside these three the Ministry of Defence effectively raised the issue 
of counter-narcotics up as one of Britain’s main objectives in Afghanistan. It even 
put counter-narcotics to the very center of the deployment by arguing ‘it is no 
longer terrorism, but the cultivation, processing and distribution of opium products 
that is the greatest threat to Afghan security.’317 In 2006 there was very much a 
sense that the threat of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan had more or less been dealt with, 
and this made it possible to shift the focus to counter-narcotics. The Ministry of 
Defence further argued that counter-narcotics was the main reason for the 
deployment to Helmand province specifically in 2006.   
The UK has chosen to focus its efforts on Helmand Province because we 
believe we can make a difference in supporting the counter-narcotics effort 
and in countering the continuing threat to stability from the residual Taliban 
insurgency, illegally armed groups and criminal activity. The province is in 
the heartland of the narcotics trade, with more opium poppy cultivated 
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there annually than in any other region in Afghanistan.318  
Such an emphasis on counter-narcotics as a strategic goal made sense for Britain in 
a domestic logic. In 2006 Britain was heading the G8 nations’ efforts to counter the 
production and distribution of narcotics. A lead role in a province that was 
assessed by the UN to be ‘on the verge of becoming the world's biggest drug 
supplier’provided an opportunity to tackle the problem at its point of origin.319 
The main problem with the British counter-narcotics policy was not that it did not 
address a real issue, nor that it was not clearly understood at the operational or 
tactical level. The problem was simply that it really did not fit into the logic of 
counterinsurgency operations on the ground in Helmand. A senior officer in the 
first British battle group deployed to Helmand in 2006 commented the counter-
narcotics strategy in an interview when addressing his main concerns before the 
deployment: 
Also, there was this major thing that we were part of the counter-narcotics, 
Opium Eradication Program, which to my mind was crazy, because that was 
just going to take the bread off people’s tables. I mean, every single person 
would fight us. So the idea of having any influence, we’d have lost 
completely. ... there was a debate of how much we should do, and I just 
said I’m not going to do any, because we’re just going to get a whole lot of 
people killed, both on the Afghan side and our side.320 
This view is echoed by Stuart Tootal, the commander of 3 Para, in his book Danger 
Close.  
I was also vexed that part of the UK’s mission was the stated intent of 
eradicating the cultivation of opium poppies. ... Eradication might have 
provided a compelling additional motive for intervention in Helmand, but in 
an agrarian society of dirt-poor farmers, most of the population have little 
alternative to growing opium. ... My concern was that the political 
imperative of eradication ignored the impact it would have on the people 
who grew it.321 
Even though counter-narcotics was one of the key political and strategic purposes 
of the operation in Helmand in 2006, key personnel in the forces on the ground 
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clearly had reservations against pursuing this. It also seems clear that the British 
force in Helmand not only had reservations, but also chose to not get involved in 
the counter-narcotics operation. Accounts from early contingents in Helmand show 
that British forces put great emphasis on not disturbing the growth of the poppy, 
but also reassuring the locals that they were ‘not here for the poppy.’322  
The basic challenge with the counter-narcotics aim on the tactical level was that a 
counterinsurgency campaign is all about getting the population to side with the 
government in the struggle against the insurgents. If British forces took on the job 
of eradicating poppy crops, and thereby directly undermining the most important 
source of income, it would be hard to get any support. On the other hand, 
narcotics economy, being illegal, could not be taxed by the government and 
attracted local warlords and powerbrokers that further undermined the negligible 
government influence in the area. Seen in this light it is hard to imagine that a 
functioning Afghan government and a prospering drug production in Helmand could 
ever co-exist.  
In the case of counter-narcotics, British operations early on in Helmand did not 
adhere to the principle of primacy of politics. Strategy dictated from Whitehall 
clearly emphasized counter-narcotics as a key task, while the tactical level both in 
statements and actions showed clear reservations about carrying this out. While 
there might have been good reasons for doing so, theory and doctrine clearly state 
the importance of a primacy of politics. Following this line of reasoning it is the 
political level that supposedly has the full understanding of the conflict and what 
is needed to win in the long term. Hence the goal of counter-narcotics should have 
been carried out on a tactical level despite the problems it might have caused in 
the short term. Nevertheless, it might be useful for this thesis to pursue the 
problem further and try to find different explanations for the challenges that 
British forces had with this issue early on in the operations in Helmand 
First of all, there seems to be a difference in the understanding of what type, or 
nature, of conflict the British forces are deployed into in 2006. Significant parts of 
the upper echelons in Britain, both in politics and the Armed Forces, seemed to 
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focus on the nation-building and stabilization aspects of the operation. On the 
other hand, members of the battle group, drawn mainly from the 16th Air Assault 
Brigade, seemed convinced that the operations at hand were a classic 
counterinsurgency operation. ‘Both he Gen David Richards and I were convinced 
we’re going into a counterinsurgency environment. PJHQ were not, and they kept 
talking as it’s a Peace Support Operation.’323 While The Permanent Joint 
Headquarters (PJHQ) seemed to believe that Helmand would be a sort of Peace 
Support Operation (PSO), the Ministry of Defense seems to have been somewhat 
more ambiguous about the nature of the deployment. In the hearing preceding the 
deployment the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Adam Ingram, made the 
following comment to a question regarding the expected opposition towards the 
British forces. 
However, to use the Iraq analogy, there is not that measurable level of 
insurgency, there is not a campaign at present but, who knows, there are, 
again, no certainties and no-one has got the wisdom to say with 100% 
certainty how things will develop, but there is no evidence of subdivision or 
disaggregation of the communities such as in the form of important forces in 
large numbers.324 
The comment itself admitted that there were uncertainties about the situation on 
the ground, but the answers from both Ingram as well as the PJHQ during the 
hearing paint a picture of a situation that is expected to be more benign than Iraq, 
but less so than the north of Afghanistan where British forces had run a PRT so far. 
The PJHQ also added that they assessed that ‘consent is high’ among the 
population regarding ISAF presence in the region.325 In the written evidence for the 
same hearing the MoD also describes the mission to be ‘concerned with the 
existing ISAF tasks—reconstruction and counter-insurgency.’326 While it is fully 
understandable that a degree of insecurity regarding the nature of the conflict 
should exist prior to the first deployment into a new province, this can also partly 
explain some of the tension between the tactical and higher levels. In a PSO 
environment, such as seems envisioned by the PJHQ and partly the MoD, one 
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should expect a more benign environment than a fully-fledged counterinsurgency 
operation. In such an environment, without a very active and resolute enemy, a 
strategy of counter-narcotics could arguably make more sense, especially in a long-
term perspective. However, in a counterinsurgency, such an approach initially 
might play significant parts of the population into the hands of the insurgents, and 
hence prove counterproductive, especially in a short-term perspective.  
A second aspect to consider is whether classic counterinsurgency theory and 
contemporary British doctrine does enough to problematize and provide a 
substantial analysis when it comes to the issue of primacy of politics. Both classic 
theory and doctrine state the primacy of politics more or less as a matter of fact. 
Both also presuppose that government strategy always is sound and provides the 
necessary guidance to win the conflict. Galula, in particular, is rather superficial 
on this subject. He reflects the view of Mao by stating that ‘”a revolutionary war is 
20 per cent military action and 80 per cent political” is a formula that reflects the 
truth.’327 This quote is also repeated in both US and UK current counterinsurgency 
doctrines.328 However, Galula’s works on counterinsurgency theory do not reflect 
this view in practice. Most of his book is concerned with the military aspects of 
defeating an insurgency, and does not problematize to any extent the difficulties 
of creating a viable overall strategy. This is somewhat surprising even considering 
his background as an army officer, the problematic relations between French 
politics and the actions of the French army in Algiers should have provided plenty 
of insight on the subject. Both strategic theory and counterinsurgency theory 
clearly argue for a primacy of politics, but counterinsurgency theory is weaker on 
explaining the need for a reciprocal process in the making of strategy. One of the 
more influential writers on strategic theory and civil-military relations of our 
generation, Eliot Cohen, argues in his book Supreme Command that the use of 
military force is most likely to succeed if strategy is developed in close 
cooperation between the political and military leadership.329 Aims and means in 
strategy cannot be considered in complete isolation. In practical terms the aims 
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must adapt to what the means realistically can achieve in the given circumstances. 
If the goal of counter-narcotics is seen in this perspective it is really a question of 
whether British strategy had been properly designed for the specific circumstances 
in Helmand province, and whether the goals put forward were achievable by the 
use of military force.  
In the case of British deployment to Helmand in 2006 there was a clear discrepancy 
between the stated goal of counter-narcotics and the actual operations in Helmand 
in 2006-08. Senior members of the first British battle group had clear reservations 
against the goal; in their opinion, it would undermine the overall 
counterinsurgency effort. Even though counter-narcotics made sense in a domestic 
setting it is hard to see how it would not make the efforts of British forces in 
Helmand very difficult if it was pursued rigorously. Counter-narcotics was later 
dropped as one of the key strategic goals and given less emphasis than in 2006. 
During Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s speech at the Royal College for Defence 
Studies in 2009, counter-terrorism is again put forward as the main strategic 
purpose of the mission. He stated that Britain’s forces in Helmand were 
‘protecting our nation and the rest of the world from threat of global terrorism. 
Fighting there, so that we are safer at home.’330 The theme of counter-narcotics 
was only addressed once, and then as one of the challenges to changing 
Afghanistan’s economy.  
 
The example of counter-narcotics highlights one of the key challenges of the 
concept of a primacy of politics as prescribed by classic counterinsurgency theory. 
Counterinsurgency theory does not problematize the challenges of creating a 
viable strategy that both addresses the key political issues of the conflict, and that 
is achievable through the use of military force. It very much presupposes that 
governments make sound strategic choices from the outset and the task of the 
armed forces is to simply carry these out. As seen in the example of counter-
narcotics this is not always the case. Strategy needs to adapt to the situation on 
the ground while still maintaining the upper hand. As Eliot Cohen argues, this 
requires a constant involvement in the conflict from the bodies that create 
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strategy.  
 
It is up to the statesman to find the right point of view from which to judge 
military action. Usually, though not always, this entails deciding when political 
considerations must override legitimate, even pressing military ones, and this 
trade-off applies in the greatest wars and in far less substantial conflicts as 
well.331 
 
It is too early to conclude whether the decisions made concerning counter-
narcotics in the case of Britain were prudent or not. What seems clear is that there 
were pressing military objections towards the objective, and later developments 
show that the political level partly gave in to these by relegating the goal of 
counter-narcotics to a less significant objective. What it does also show is a 
willingness on the British side to engage in the conflict, and to adjust its strategy 
as the conflict progressed. 
 
Tactical view 
The northern platoon houses 
A state facing an insurgency will never have enough forces to cover all troubled 
areas. One of the tasks of strategy is to prioritise areas of importance where the 
effort should initially be massed. This needs to be done at the political-strategic 
level in order to coordinate and harmonise the efforts of all government agencies 
involved. This part of the case study will examine if British strategy prioritised 
areas, and how British forces adhered to this. It will also discuss if contemporary 
operations pose new challenges to the idea of a primacy of politics compared to 
the classic era.  
 
When British forces deployed to Helmand in the summer of 2006 it was with a 
relatively light footprint. Helmand province covers about 58, 500 square 
kilometres, more than twice the size of Wales, and has a population of about 1,4 
million. Since covering the whole province with only one battle group deployed 
would be impossible, resources were prioritized to the most densely populated 
areas. British forces already had a presence with a PRT inherited from the 
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Americans in Laskhar Gah, and decided to focus on the town of Gereshk, the next 
major town along the Helmand River, in addition to Laskhar Gah.332 Along with 
Camp Bastion these two towns form a triangle on a map, known as the Helmand 
triangle, or just the triangle. This area also overlapped with one of the ADZs. Even 
though the initial grouping of the battle group seemed clear, the specifics of what 
they were to do once in place seemed to be less clear.  
 
In terms of our actual concept of operations it was very loose. ... We’re 
going to try and find the places to secure for civil development, and we’re then 
going to try and provide security in small, discrete areas within the triangle.333 
 
Nevertheless, this initial deployment took the consequences of the limited 
resources that British forces had in Helmand and thus laid the foundations for a 
prioritized effort in the area.  
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Map 3.1 Helmand Province 
 
However, problems with the initial plan occurred early on when the newly 
appointed governor in Helmand, Mohammed Daud, started pressing for British 
troops to reinforce ANA positions further north in Helmand. ‘Even though we 3 
Para had only arrived in limited numbers, there was increasing pressure for us to 
take command of the base Sangin.’334 In addition to Sangin the ANSF forces in 
Musa Qaleh, the district centre of Now Zad, and at the Kajaki dam were also 
seemingly under pressure from the insurgents. Stuart Tootal, the commander of 
the 3 Para, was apprehensive about deploying forces into northern parts of 
Helmand. On the one hand, not supporting the Afghan troops in the north and 
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risking that the insurgents gained full control there could have a very negative 
influence on morale in both the ANSF and the local population. As a senior member 
of the battle group remarked;  
 
First of all, the one thing we have in our mission statement, we were there 
to support the Afghan government. Okay, so if their governor says, “I want 
you to put some forces up into these district centres, ‘cause if you don’t, 
they’ll fall to the Taliban and this’ll be catastrophic,” you can’t really turn 
around and say, “Well, actually no. We don’t really want to do that.”335 
 
Tootal, on the other hand, was worried that scattering his troops into several 
district centres would tie them down in static positions and leave him with very 
little freedom of action. Another worry was their ability to sustain operations over 
time due to the limited number of helicopters available. Tootal and General 
Richards, who would assume command of ISAF shortly after, discussed their 
concerns during a visit by Richards in Helmand.  
 
We talked about his concern that we were in danger of getting overly fixed in 
the district centres. I said I agreed with him and recognized that we were 
deviating from the simple plan of the inkspot development concept that we had 
discussed over a pint in a pub in Wiltshire six months previously. I explained my 
dilemma of meeting increasing commitments with ever-scarcer recourses and 
the paradox of having to establish some permanent presence while still 
retaining sufficient forces with the freedom to manoeuvre.336 
 
According to Tootal General Richards replied: ‘Stuart, your Battle Group is doing 
brilliantly in difficult circumstances. And you, my friend, keep taking the tablets 
and keep doing what you are doing.’337 While this might be good leadership, it did 
not seem to give Tootal much in the way of clear strategic guidance in a complex 
situation.  
The fact that missions change as they proceed and adapt to changing 
circumstances is not new or controversial in any shape or form. The more 
interesting aspect relating to the northern platoon houses strategy is how the 
decision to deploy forces north seems to have been made. The British plan from 
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the outset was, as mentioned above, to focus its efforts inside the Helmand 
triangle. While the rest of the strategy was ambiguous this seemed to be rather 
clear. Commenting on the basis for the deployment to Helmand, Lord Reid argues: 
‘The clear implication was that demands would be placed on us by people such as 
Engineer Daoud, an honest Governor, that ought to be resisted, because they were 
requiring us to do things that were unsustainable.’338 Nevertheless, during the 
hearings in the HCDC Lord Reid also explained that he ‘was briefed about this 
decision to deploy troops north retrospectively and informed by those in 
command that, in military terms, this was an operational decision.’339 The detailed 
deployment of troops during an operation is normally considered a tactical or 
operational decision. However, in this case the re-deployment put British troops 
well outside the Helmand Triangle. It also effectively changed the nature of the 
British involvement in Helmand by spreading an already thin presence even 
thinner.  
It seems that the challenge in this particular case is the coordination between the 
PJHQ and the MoD. Brigadier Butler, the highest-ranking British officer in 
Afghanistan, has afterwards been criticized for the decision of moving troops 
north.340 To put the responsibility on Butler and Tootal would, however, be very 
unfair. Command structures in 2006 were at best unclear, and both were under 
pressure from Afghan authorities in the area.341 Furthermore, Butler explains 
during the HCDC hearings that the PJHQ were fully briefed about the 
developments. 
I did not have the authority to make it decision to deploy north in 
isolation. We had weekly conference calls—video teleconferences, or VTCs— 
with PJHQ. We would discuss, write daily reports, write our weekly 
assessment and we would sit down on the VTC every week to discuss the 
issues.342 
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What happened further up the chain of command was not really for Butler to 
question. One might say that a decision such as this should be put under real 
scrutiny from all levels involved, but formally all Butler needed was for the PJHQ 
to give the go-ahead.  
However, PJHQ was not the only part of British government which was involved in 
the Helmand campaign. To only blame the PJHQ for the decisions to move forces 
into the northern parts of Helmand would be to have a too narrow a perspective. 
As argued earlier these types of conflicts demand a tight political involvement to 
ensure that operations on the ground are done in accordance to the objectives. It 
is hard to conceive that a decision of moving troops to the northern villages of 
Helmand went unnoticed if this was the case. What seems to be clear is that there 
was a dire lack of procedures in place to regulate the civil-military relations on the 
top level at this time. General Nick Parker, former Deputy Commander ISAF, also 
made a point of this during the 2011 hearings. ‘The linkages between Kabul and 
the grand strategic or military strategic decision making in London need to be 
clearer and better understood.’343  
 
One of the challenges concerning a primacy of politics in contemporary operations 
discussed in this chapter is related to the increased complexity of these 
operations. The most pressing question perhaps being; whose politics should have 
primacy? Classic theory was written in an era of colonial warfare where one 
government controlled all aspects of the efforts made to quell the insurgency. In 
Afghanistan there are multiple actors who influence operations and strategy. The 
lead nation in the province, Afghan governments as host nation, the US as the 
major troop contributor, ISAF, and other allies all had agendas that rarely 
correlated. General Richards highlighted this challenge for the House of Commons 
Defence Committee after returning from his posting as Commander International 
Stabilisation Force Afghanistan (COMISAF). 
When asked to compare others in my position people often mention Templar in 
Malaya. Well, he was in charge of a single nation’s campaign there, and 
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basically he ran it; he did not really have to go and ask anybody. I either had to 
ask or to co-ordinate and influence a whole host of actors.344 
In this case it seems that the choice was not between a military or political logic. 
The choice was more which policy of the different ones in play in Afghanistan to 
pursue. UK policy dictated that the troops should be prioritised inside the Helmand 
triangle, while the local Governor, representing Afghan policy, demanded UK 
troops to deploy further north in Helmand. If the British had adhered strictly to 
counterinsurgency theory they should have operated in accordance with UK 
strategy. However, modern conflicts are complex and this area is probably one 
where counterinsurgency theory needs to be revised. Overall the British forces 
cannot be said to have adhered to a primacy of politics in the initial years of the 
Helmand campaign. The decision to deploy forces outside the Helmand triangle 
was contrary to guidelines from the UK strategic level. As we will see further on 
this decision also had wide ramification for the rest of the mission. 
 
 
The population as centre of gravity 
Especially between 2006-08 the United Kingdom were not able to pursue a 
population-centric approach in their operations in Helmand, despite a clear 
population-centric design in the initial deployment. The main cause of this was the 
decision to deploy forces into villages north in Helmand. This decision left British 
force thinly spread over the province with poor local force ratios. Faced with 
aggressive insurgents the British forces were then unable to generate security and 
dominate their different areas of responsibility. Instead of controlling the 
population and forcing the insurgents to react to this the British forces became 
reactive and enemy-centric in their operations. After 2008 this improved 
somewhat. The surge of more British and American troops into Helmand improved 
the force ratios. As shown later in this chapter British forces also became better at 
planning and executing operations with a population-centric focus. 
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Strategic view 
Counterinsurgency is a fight for the right to govern a state. This makes the fight 
for control over the population the perhaps most central aspect in this type of 
warfare. Whoever controls, and exerts influence over, the majority of the 
population over time will often have the best chance of victory. This part of the 
case study will analyse whether British operations in Helmand were mostly 
characterised by an ‘enemy-centric’ or ‘population-centric’ approach. It will start 
by discussing the initial deployment and grouping of forces. This phase sets the 
parameters for the following rotations of forces, as pulling out from areas 
previously occupied is not very common in counterinsurgency operations. 
Furthermore it will, within the same framework, attempt to analyse the purpose 
and conduct of some of the major operations conducted by British forces between 
2006-2010. 
  
The initial deployment of forces 
As discussed above the initial plan for the British deployment was to focus forces 
inside the Helmand triangle.345 The Helmand triangle encompassed the districts of 
Lashkar Gah, Nawa-iBarakzayi, western parts of Nad Ali, and the south-western 
part of Nahri Sarraj. It also included the largest towns in the area; Lashkar Gah 
and Gereshk. These parts of Helmand were by far the most densely populated 
area, about 900,000 of the 1,400,000 inhabitants of Helmand province lived within 
the triangle.346 The basic idea was for the forces to seize control of these areas, 
and then gradually expand their zones of control as the mission proceeded. 
 
While this suggests a population-centric approach from the start of the 
deployment, it also presented some serious challenges for British forces in 2006. 
One of the perhaps biggest challenges was the matter of force-to-population ratio. 
British counterinsurgency doctrine suggests a force to population ratio of 20 
counterinsurgents per 1000 inhabitants.347 This number, although a rough estimate, 
is what is considered necessary in order to sufficiently control a population during 
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an insurgency. If the size of the initial deployment of British forces should have 
been in accordance with this they would have had to deploy 18,000 troops into the 
Helmand triangle in 2006. Hence the 3,700 troops, with only 1,200 personnel in the 
actual battlegroup, were from the outset already very thin on the ground.348  
 
In terms of counterinsurgency theory, the initial British concept of using all of its 
limited resources inside the triangle, which also contained most of Helmand’s 
population, was basically sound.349 ‘priority in respect of security measures should 
be given to the more highly developed areas of the country. These contain the 
greatest number of the population and are more vital to the government ....’350 
Following such a line of reasoning it would be prudent for British forces to follow 
the original concept and deal with the more rural areas of Helmand when the 
situation and resources allowed for it. In a modern context there are also several 
other considerations to make. 
 
 
Tactical view 
Particularly between 2006 and 2008 the British forces struggled to maintain a 
population-centric approach to their operations. Instead of the gradual and 
systematic clearing and holding of areas, British forces were partly forced to fight 
for survival in scattered platoon and company bases throughout Helmand province. 
Operations in this period were often enemy-centric in nature. The main cause of 
this was the platoon-house strategy discussed above in this thesis. The seizure of 
several locations north in Helmand, Musa Quela, Sangin, Kajaki, Now Zad, etc left 
British forces spread dangerously thin. One consequence of this was that force 
ratios were generally too low to maintain any semblance of control in these areas. 
In some of the locations, like Sangin and Musa Quela, the British forces were 
forced to fight for their survival.351 Theo Farrell argues in his article on British 
military adaptation in Helmand that the enemy-centric focus in the early period in 
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Helmand was a result of the forces being ‘under-resourced and under intense 
operational and political pressure.’352  
 
However, it was not only lack of resources which led the initial parts of the 
Helmand campaign in an enemy-centric direction. A lacking ability to adapt 
operations to the circumstances on the ground also played a part. Robert Egnell, 
while discussing the issue of adaptation, mainly blames the military´s lack of 
adaptation to circumstances on the ground.353 Anthony King points to the problem 
of dispersal as the major reason the challenges faced by the British in the early 
years in Helmand.354 Even if these scholars to some extent disagree on the cause 
for British operations to fail initially in Helmand, they all seem to agree that the 
operations in the first part of the mission were characterised by a more enemy-
centric than population-centric approach. The description of many of the 
operations from the numerous accounts of the early deployments also supports 
this. 3 Commando Brigade during Herrick 5 developed a concept called Mobile 
Operations Groups (MOGs). These were an attempt to regain mobility and initiative 
in the campaign in Helmand. A senior Royal Marine officer interviewed by Anthony 
King described the concept in the following manner: 
 
We evolved our tactics quite a lot; it was a case of fixed vs manoeuvre. 
Herrick 4 was fixed; it was platoon houses. We manned them but we sought 
to manoeuvre from them. We developed Mobile Operations Groups (MOGs): 
in Company groups, 200 strong with 13 Vikings, WMiKs, Pinzgauers and 105 
guns. It was a heavy company group package. The logistics were 
independent. It was like a Long Range Desert Patrol. We would probe and 
then strike.355  
It seems like the Commandos were trying to reestablish a war of movement in 
Helmand. To get away from a concept with too many fixed positions. When 
conducting counterinsurgency operations fixed positions plays a key role on the 
tactical level. Units in fixed positions are a precondition in order to secure and 
control the population. While there needs to be a balance between static and 
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mobile operations, the emphasis needs to be put on the static units.356 The 
problem at this point in Helmand were not the fixed positions in itself, but that 
the force ratios in the different positions were unfavorable for counterinsurgency 
operations. 
Instead of actively reducing the number of fixed positions and hence improve local 
force rations the Royal Marines seems to have viewed the conflict in more 
conventional terms. A key part of this were the creation of the mentioned MOGs. 
Operations carried out by these MOGs further reinforce this view. Ewen Southby-
Tailyour wrote the account of Herrick 5 after their return. One of the operations 
given most attention was operation Glacier two, an attack on a Taliban stronghold 
in the vicinity of Garmsir, well south of Lashkar Gah and the Helmand ADZ. The 
stated goal of the operation was to ‘disrupt and harass the Taliban on his own 
ground, to raid and not to occupy, to get in fast and get out fast.’357 The attack 
included a five-hour bombardment of the Taliban fort and a company size assault 
in lightly armored Viking tracked vehicles over the Helmand River frontally to the 
insurgents’ position. The insurgents had, during the bombardment, redeployed to 
other compounds and effectively flanked the attacking commandos, forcing them 
to withdraw with several wounded and one marine killed in the action.358 Several 
other operations carried out in the same offensive spirit is accounted for in the 
book, though none as spectacular as the attack on Jugroom Fort. It is worth 
considering that books like Soutby-Tailyours are not academic accounts or even 
serious work of military history, neither does it pretend to be. Their main object is 
to tell the stories of the soldiers and officers who fought in Helmand. In that 
regard stories like the assault on Jugroom Fort is bound to get more attention than 
more slow-moving and doctrinally sound operations. There is nevertheless no 
reason to doubt the authenticity of the operations described in the book. The 
manuscript was read by several of the participating officers and soldiers, and while 
it is not very critical in style it can be assumed that the contents of the operations 
is correctly described.  
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Operation Glacier Two did not aim to clear a new area for the Royal Marines to 
hold, the British did not have the manpower to hold new areas.359 Instead the aim 
was to disrupt the insurgents and avoid that the Taliban grew too strong in areas 
outside government control. Compared to the Dutch, the British approach to 
disrupt operations seems more disjointed from the hold-build phases of 
counterinsurgency. It is also worth asking what the possible effects of an operation 
such as Glacier Two could have. If successful, the operation would have killed 
some Taliban fighters, destroyed the fort, and some of the insurgents’ materiel. In 
conventional war, this would all be well and good, but such metrics are not very 
useful when fighting an insurgency.360 The core aim for both insurgents and 
counterinsurgents is the control and support of the population. Even if this 
operation was a disrupt operation, and thus not meant to create a permanent 
presence in the area, it is hard to see how it connects to the main part of the 
operation.   
In addition it is worth taking into account how the local population would perceive 
such an operation. Even if the operation was successful they would have witnessed 
security forces use an overwhelming force, including twenty 2,000-pound bombs, 
in order to destroy a local Taliban fort and to kill some of their fighters.361 
Afterwards, the remnants of the Taliban would still be in control of the population, 
and it is even conceivable that they would increase their hold over the area. The 
local insurgents could point to the fact that even though faced with a 
technologically superior enemy they were still the force to be reckoned with in the 
area. Assessments done by the forces also indicate the same. Whenever fighting 
with the Taliban occurred close to populated areas without being followed by a 
permanent security force presence the resentment towards the government grew 
and support for the Taliban grew accordingly.362 In this manner operations meant 
to disrupt the insurgents can in a worst-case end up producing more support among 
to population in favor of the insurgency. 
On the other hand, there are examples of British operations which were conducted 
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much more in line with counterinsurgency theory and doctrine. Especially after 
2008 the emphasis seems to partly shift in favor of a more methodical and 
population-centric approach. This shift was made possible partly by the increase of 
troop numbers in Helmand. The British deployed a second battalion size battle 
group in 2009 and the Americans took over large parts of the southern and western 
parts of the province at the same time.363 Secondly, there was a shift in the focus 
of the operations from kinetic and enemy-centric to a decisively more population-
centric approach. Theo Farrell, to my knowledge the only scholar to be given more 
or less full access by the British Army, argues that this coincided with the 
deployment of 52 Infantry Brigade in the autumn of 2007.364 The 52 Infantry 
Brigade decided that not only a shift in the focus of the operations was necessary, 
but they also identified a need for better long term planning. In-theatre planning, 
done by 52 Infantry Brigade, led to the development of the Helmand Road Map, a 
new and comprehensive plan for the stabilization of the province.365 While this was 
welcome at the time it is worth noting the paradox that one of the changes done 
in the Helmand Road Map was to focus on the central areas of Helmand around 
Lashkar Gah and Gereshk.366 In other words, to focus on the Helmand Triangle as 
the initial strategic guidance ordered.  
Operation Panchai Palang 
Within this new and more permissive environment one operation in particular 
stands out. As an example of the more population-centric approach pursued in 
2009-2010, Operation Panchai Palang will be analysed more in depth in the 
following part of this chapter.  
The Welsh Guards, along with Afghan and other ISAF forces, carried out Operation 
Panchai Palang in the summer of 2009. One part of the operation was the Prince of 
Wales’s Company who cleared and subsequently held the two villages of Zargun 
Kalay and Cha-e Anjir in the Nad-e Ali district to the northwest of Lashkar Gahr. 
This operation is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it is the most doctrinal 
                                         
363 King, "Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British Military Operations in Afghanistan," 331. 
364 Theo Farrell, "Back from the Brink: British Military Adaptation and the Struggle for Helmand, 2006-2011," 
in Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, ed. Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James A Russel (St Redwood: 
Stanford University Press, 2013), 112-13. 
365 Ibid.,  119. 
366 Ibid.,  118. 
 136 
approach to a company-level operation that I have come across during my 
research. While it is not at all representative for all operations carried out by 
British forces in Helmand, it serves as a good example at one end of the spectrum. 
Furthermore, it entails several aspects, which is useful in discussing the utility of 
population-centric counterinsurgency in contemporary operations. 
 
The Nad-e Ali district had proved a challenge for the British forces for quite some 
time. The district centre had been under ISAF control for a length of time while 
the outlying districts, in particular to the north, had proven more difficult to 
control. Its proximity to the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah, and the fact that 
the main supply route (MSR) from Camp Bastion to the battle group HQ in Lashkar 
Gah ran through the district also made it important from an operational point of 
view. At the start of the Welsh Guards’ deployment a Forward Line of Own Troops 
(FLOT) of sorts ran more or less east-west through the village of Zargun Kalay. 
North of this were only some ANP presence with no support from ISAF. The 
northern area, commonly referred to as the Cha-e Anjir triangle or simply CAT, 
was particularly problematic. The villages of Shoval, Cha-e Anjir and Nagalabad 
Kalay all had a permanent Taliban presence and also a substantial drug trade, 
which again provided an economic base for the local and regional Taliban. 
Whenever ISAF forces ventured north of this line they were inevitably engaged by 
the local Taliban forces. 
 
Operation Panchai Palang, or Panthers Claw as it was called in English, was an ISAF 
Regional Command South (RCS) operation launched in June 2009. It aimed ‘to set 
the security conditions for successful presidential elections in Helmand and to 
support an inflow of US troops.’367 The role envisaged for the Welsh Guards early 
on was to clear and hold the entire Cha-e Anjir Triangle. Simultaneously they were 
to block several crossings on the Shamalan Canal in order to cut off any insurgent 
forces who attempted to flee the clear operation further north. However, the 
commander of The Welsh Guards, Colonel Rupert Thornloe, resisted the idea of 
clearing all of the Cha-e Anjir Triangle. He felt that his units were already spread 
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thin and adding that much more ground to his AOO would only make matters 
worse.368 Instead he worked for a less ambitious approach where one company 
would clear and hold only the village of Cha-e Anjir and leave the rest of the Cha-e 
Anjir Triangle for later. Thornloe had his way in this matter and it was decided 
that the Prince of Wales’s Company would be given the mission to clear and hold 
Cha-e Anjir in conjunction with their other tasks for operation Panthers Claw.  
 
Map 3.2: Key areas Operation Panchai Palang 
 
The company was also given an early warning about this operation and was 
henceforth able to shape the battlefield in a favorable way.369 The commander of 
the Prince of Wales’s Company firstly moved a larger part of his company into the 
village of Zargun Kalay while moving a checkpoint in this area. This provided a 
good tactical point of departure for a future move into Cha-e Anjir. Further, he 
directed all operations by his company in the following period towards the villages 
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of Shoval and Nagalabad Kalay.370 This was done as a deliberate deception with 
two purposes. Firstly it was to make the Taliban believe that the next operation 
would be directed towards these villages. Secondly they wanted to avoid the roads 
leading to Cha-e Anjir being seeded with IEDs. ‘So we used these roads hardly 
ever, and we allowed the Taliban to move up and down them, no problem, so they 
were not IEDed.’371 This also meant that the population living between Zargun 
Kalay and Nagalabad Kalay were not prioritized. As the map shows this area 
consisted mainly of scattered compounds and would have demanded a lot of 
resources in order to control. ‘It was crap for the locals, but there were not 
enough of us to care about them that much in the grand scheme of things.’372 In 
order to fulfil the task of securing Cha-e Anjir the Welsh Guards could not 
prioritize everything. By making such priorities they also made the task of clearing 
and holding Char-e Anjir easier for themselves.   
One of the hardest things to do for an infantry company is fighting in built up 
areas. Especially if the enemy is intermingled with civilians, and you are operating 
under strict RoEs, wanting to avoid collateral damage. These types of fights tend 
to carry heavy casualty figures as close quarters fighting negates much of the 
technological advantage held by western troops. Furthermore, if the defender is 
able to seed the roads with IEDs they can seriously hamper the tactical mobility of 
the attacker, thus making him even more vulnerable.  Hence one of the main goals 
for the Prince of Wales’s Company was to avoid a fight for Cha-e Anjir in the clear 
phase of the operation.373  
 
The Welsh Guards achieved this objective. On June 24-25 2009 the Prince of 
Wales’s Company managed to clear and establish initial control over Cha-e Anjir 
‘without firing one shot.’374 The company approached the town on the western of 
the two avenues of approach available for vehicles, went straight into the police 
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station in the western area of the town, and then peeled out to establish a 
perimeter of checkpoints mainly on the north side of the town.  
 
The relative ease with which the British company was able to conduct its clear 
phase rested chiefly on two main preconditions. Firstly, a neighbouring company 
who conducted a feint west of Cha-e Anjir helped the effort. This tied up local 
Taliban reserves and prevented them from reinforcing Cha-e Anjir. Secondly, the 
Prince of Wales’s Company managed to achieve a tactical surprise in the 
operation. The attack was carried out at dawn, which gave the ISAF forces a 
dominant advantage due to better night vision equipment. It also came from a 
different direction than what the Taliban expected. As the company approached 
the town they picked up ICOM chatter from the local Taliban fighters saying: 
‘They’re already here, they’re on the inside, they’re on the inside of the town.’375 
In this case both deception and surprise, two elements often used by insurgents 
against conventional forces, were used with good effect against the insurgents.  
 
Why is operation Panchai Palang especially interesting from a counterinsurgency 
point of view? I will now analyse the operation from a tactical point of view 
utilising the framework set forth in the theory chapter. I will argue that the 
operation closely adhered to population-centric counterinsurgency theories 
concerning a population centric approach and also showed a focus on the primacy 
of politics. The concerted government effort, on the other hand, proved more 
problematic in this operation and still left a lot to be desired. 
 
As described in the theory chapter a primacy of politics on a tactical level mainly 
relates to two issues: was the operation carried out within the framework of the 
overall strategy, and did it involve the host nation in the execution of the 
operation.  
 
The operation fit well into the overall strategy and plan on both an operational 
and strategic level. British forces had, after the initial overstretch, focussed more 
on the central parts of Helmand from 2008 and onwards. This was much helped by 
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the influx of US troops into Helmand, which allowed a more concentrated effort 
from the British side.376 The villages of Zargun Kalay and Cha-e Anjir were also 
both well situated within the Helmand Triangle and the Afghan Development Zone 
for the province. Furthermore, the operation also tied into overall operational 
plans for Helmand. Panchai Palang was to be followed by an even larger operation, 
Moshtarak, which aimed mainly at clearing and holding the major Taliban 
stronghold in Marjha further south in the Province. In order to succeed with this it 
was important to stabilise the more central parts of Helmand first.377 If ISAF and 
ANSF could secure Zargun Kalay and Cha-e Anjir it would thereby relieve some of 
the pressure on Nad-e Ali district centre and more indirectly Lashkar Gah. 
 
While the Prince of Wales’s Company’s part of the operation was mainly carried 
out by ISAF forces it did not mean that ANSF was not involved. Before the 
operation was started a low-key recce of Cha-e Anjir was carried out.378 The main 
objective was to locate a suitable spot for a base for the company and to meet 
with the local police commander. As soon as the company had secured the town 
they initiated a training regime for the local police in order to build trust and to 
enhance their effectiveness. During the hold phase of the operation British forces 
secured the outside perimeter around Cha-e Anjir, and the ANSF was the main 
effort inside the city. While they also did joint work at times, this general division 
of labour proved valuable. Major Giles Harris, commander of the Prince of Wales’s 
Company, wrote in an article on the operation in The Infantryman, an internal 
army journal, after returning from Helmand.  
 
Perhaps the most effective initiative we instigated in order to maximise 
effect in the AO [Area of Operations] was to create mentoring teams which 
would operate alongside ANSF within the town itself whilst we concentrated 
our main manpower in depth.379 
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According to Harris this not only freed up resources and enhanced ANSF resources, 
but also it also ‘raised ANSF profile in the town giving them and the town a sense 
of ownership in any successes.’380 In other words it was an attempt to create the 
first foundations for local ownership and sustainability.  
 
Furthermore, British forces in the town also attempted to strengthen the regional 
powers in the area. One of the first actions was to arrange a shura where the 
governor of Helmand province was present.381 While such meetings generally 
produce few tangible results it does show that British forces at the very least made 
deliberate efforts to increase regional power in the region.  
 
Perhaps most significantly the leadership of the Welsh Guards at both company and 
battalion level seemed in this period to have a clearer idea of what higher 
echelons wanted them to achieve.382 Much of the frustrations with vague strategic 
or poorly chosen strategic goals as described earlier in the case study seemed to 
have been resolved. This can partly be due to experience, but also the changed 
organisation with higher ranking and experienced UK leadership in the region. One 
can argue, based on this case, that one effect of clearer strategic guidance is more 
cohesive operations. In 2006, tactical commanders attempted to sub-optimise their 
operations partly due to lack of clear strategic guidance. This resulted in a mission 
creep which British forces spent the next two years correcting. In 2009, tactical 
commanders operate within the constraints of strategic guidance, and also more in 
line with counterinsurgency theory. While this observation is hardly surprising it 
nevertheless shows how important it is to get the basics right in a 
counterinsurgency operation. 
 
The approach by the Welsh Guards in Cha-e Anjir was an example of a population-
centric approach to counterinsurgency in several aspects. The purpose and 
planning of the operation clearly points towards a focus on securing the population 
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rather than engaging and defeating the insurgents. British forces were also able to 
use force in a manner that supported the overall objective.  
 
As argued in the theory chapter, one of the core ideas of a population-centric 
approach to counterinsurgency is that operations should be directed towards 
securing and controlling the population instead of chasing insurgents. While this 
does not exclude offensive operations, especially during the clear phase, it will in 
most cases entail a more defensive stance. In earlier cases we have seen several 
examples of operations that were enemy-focussed from the outset, and this was 
not the case here.383 There were two main arguments for choosing Cha-e Anjir as 
the town to clear and hold. Firstly it was a densely populated area outside 
government control.  
 
That’s the key why I picked that [Zargun Kalay and Cha-e Anjir]. They were 
geographically important, because they were on crossroads and junctions. 
But they had large, large population areas, with capacity for schools and 
shops. They were areas that, if secure, would grow into strong points for the 
government.384 
 
While terrain cannot be excluded because of the influence it has on military 
operations, the main argument rested on what opportunities would be created 
through control of the population. The company commander in the area further 
reinforced this view. After explaining how his part of the operation tied into the 
RC South plan for Panchai Palang, he argued: ‘Lastly, the population, unlike many 
populations we had operated amongst previously, were ripe for “tipping”.´385 
Tipping in this context refers to the non-committal behaviour often seen among 
local populations during an insurgency or civil wars. As long as it remains unsure 
which part will win, the population tends to keep as many options as possible open 
in order to not end up on the wrong side when the war ends. This is commonly 
referred to as hedging, and getting the population to commit is called tipping. In 
                                         
383 See for example operations Harekate Yolo and Karez in the case of Norway. 
384 UK B, "Personal Interview," 19:30. 
385 Harris, "Fighting the Counterinsurgency Battle at Company Level," 1. 
 143 
this case the intelligence believed that the population in this area could be turned 
to the government side if they were able to secure them from the Taliban.  
 
Another key aspect of this operation was the deployment of Welsh Guards forces 
after the initial clear phase. Instead of massing the entire unit into one base, the 
Prince of Wales’s Company chose to disperse its forces in order to create a 
perimeter around the town. The basic plan was very straightforward and classic:  
 
Create a hard perimeter, push out isolated enemy from the inside, deter 
them from coming back, protect lines of communication and respond 
violently to the enemy when presented, whilst creating a governable safe 
haven inside the perimeter which locals value and others want to be part 
of.386 
 
The operation was thus shaped with its main focus on securing the population, not 
chasing the enemy in further offensive operations. This attitude also influenced 
the force deployment in Cha-e Anjir. In order to keep the population secure the 
Prince of Wales’s Company manned six permanent checkpoints along with the ANSF 
around the town. These were mutually supportive with line-of-sight from one to 
the next in order to prevent insurgents from infiltrating the town. Since the Guards 
expected, and partly wanted, these positions to be the focus of enemy fire they 
were pushed far enough outside of the town so that ricochets would not endanger 
civilians in the city.387  
 
Another factor to take into consideration is the force ratio between 
counterinsurgents and population. Aside from deploying their resources well in 
order to secure the town, the Prince of Wales’s Company also enjoyed a better 
force ratio than early on in the Helmand campaign. Cha-e Anjir was at the start of 
the operation a town of about 1,600 inhabitants. This grew to about 4,000 at the 
end of the tour.388 A company of about 100 soldiers and roughly the same amount 
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of ANSF was still short of the 1:20 force recommendation in the British doctrine, 
and officers in the company argue that they ‘were hugely under-manned.’389 
Nevertheless, since this was part of a gradual expansion out of Nad-e Ali most of 
the areas south of the town were already controlled by ISAF and ANSF, leaving the 
company to mass their resources to the north of the town. This was further 
alleviated by terrain, as Cha-e Anjir has few avenues of approach and the 
surrounding terrain is predominantly flat.  
 
But it was not only favourable circumstances that made the force ratio in Cha-e 
Anjir more manageable, it was also due to deliberate decisions made by the 
commanders on various levels within the Welsh Guards. Due to the experiences 
from other units earlier in the campaign they were conscious of the dangers of 
over-expanding. ‘I was very clear very early that we were going to keep it tight, 
keep it simple, don’t bite off more than we can chew.’390 While such an approach 
is very much in line with counterinsurgency theory, it is worth mentioning that it 
demands tough decisions on the tactical level to make it work. After the initial 
weeks in Cha-e Anjir elders from the outlying districts approached the British 
forces and asked for them to push out their checkpoints and also include their 
areas so they also could benefit from an enhanced security. While this is a very 
good tactical indicator of success in counterinsurgency it would also have been 
dangerous to comply with, as it would have spread the troops out more. After 
consulting with the battalion staff the request was denied.391  
 
The Welsh were, however, not able to counter all threats posed by the Taliban. 
Aware of the limits in their capabilities and resources, the measure of success set 
by the company was that there should be no IEDs or firefights inside the town.392 
The insurgents were only able to set off one IED inside the perimeter after their 
arrival, all other attempts were tipped off by the locals. While dealing with the 
overt threat posed by insurgent is obviously important, counterinsurgency theory 
argues that the less visible, but more dangerous threat posed by subversion and 
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the political organisation of the insurgents should take priority. ‘Unless the 
communist subversive political organization in the towns and villages is broken and 
eliminated, the insurgent guerrilla units will not be defeated.’393 While the Taliban 
were a less organised political movement than the communist insurgents of the 
1950s, their continued presence in the town was clear to the Welsh.394 However, 
they deemed that they had neither the resources nor the competence to address 
the problem. Putting more manpower into the town would necessarily mean 
drawing forces away from the perimeter around the town, thereby potentially 
making it easier for insurgents to rush a checkpoint or infiltrate back. In addition, 
the work of uprooting hidden insurgent presence in a town is normally not 
considered a task a regular infantry company should be able to do, but rather a 
task for intelligence services and Special Forces.   
 
The Prince of Wales’s Company were also able to use force in a manner that 
largely adhered to population-centric counterinsurgency theory. This might seem 
somewhat paradoxical if one examines some of the statistics for the deployment. 
During four months in Cha-e Anjir they registered 140 contacts with the enemy, 
most at short ranges. They also called in about 80 kinetic fire missions, more than 
60 of these were danger close, meaning the ordnance was dropped closer to 
friendly troops than recommended by wartime safety regulations.395 
Counterinsurgency theory, however, is less concerned with the amount of force 
used than the purpose it is used for. In this case force was mainly used as a 
response to Taliban attacks, to secure and protect the population in the town, and 
to prevent the insurgents from gaining access. As far as counterinsurgency theory 
is concerned the distinction lies in the purpose for which force is used. If the main 
effort is to protect the population, and the enemy interferes with this, then use of 
force is instrumental to the overall objective of winning the population to the 
government side. On the other hand, in accordance with population-centric 
counterinsurgency theory a main effort to hunt down the insurgents, without 
securing the population adequately, is seen as counterproductive. 
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One of the dangers of a defensive deployment such as the Welsh Guards chose in 
Cha-e Anjir is that one risks leaving the initiative totally in the hands of the 
insurgents. Since the bulk of the counterinsurgent force is in static positions, the 
insurgents are free to choose the time for their attacks. From a doctrinal point of 
view this is in many ways a desired scenario, where the insurgents are kept away 
from population centres, and at the same time expend resources on attacking 
well-prepared and fortified positions. However, on a tactical level it poses among 
other things challenges to the morale of the troops in particular. It can also 
influence local opinions if the counterinsurgents are seen as inactive and unable to 
carry the fight to the insurgents. The Prince of Wales’s Company came up with 
several creative ways of using force and rudimentary psychological operations to 
work around this. Firstly they made good use of well-prepared ambushes with 
precision-guided munitions, commonly referred to as ‘come-ons.’396 Insurgent 
attacks on Welsh checkpoints from prepared firing-points in outlying compounds 
were almost a daily routine. In order to counter this the company would prepare 
firing orders with precision-guided munitions, often using the GMLRS397, targeting 
known firing points in the area. They would subsequently drive a well-armoured 
vehicle down the road, and as the insurgents opened fire they would obliterate the 
firing points with indirect fire.398 Afterwards they made use of a Taliban tactic and 
patrolled out to nearby firing points leaving night letters. These letters basically 
stated that if these positions were used again they would share the fate of their 
comrades.399  
 
The British were also able to use more inventive and less kinetic psychological 
operations in Cha-e Anjir. The Guards worried how the high number of firefights on 
the outskirts of the city affected the local population. Being unable to prevent the 
skirmishes from happening they decided to at least reassure the population as best 
they could. For this purpose, they utilised their interpreters and loudspeakers 
                                         
396 UK A, "Personal Interview." 
397 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System. An American artillery system, which can fire GPS guided 
munitions. 
398 UK A, "Personal Interview," 07:42 and Harris, "Fighting the Counterinsurgency Battle at Company Level," 
2. 
399 Harnden, Dead Men Risen - the Welsh Guards and the Defining Story of Britain's War in Afghanistan, 495-
98. 
 147 
mounted at the town bazaar. ‘We would broadcast on a speaker into the bazaar as 
the rounds were in the air. [...] He [the interpreter] would then say, “In a couple 
of seconds, you’re going to hear a big bang. That’s the sound of the Taliban being 
killed.’400 While this might seem a bit macabre from the outside, the effect on the 
local populace was good. During the intense fighting on the Election Day members 
of the Prince of Wales’s Company describe how locals listened to the live comment 
of the skirmishes, like it was a game of football, cheering loudly when munitions 
exploded.401 While both unorthodox and low tech this approach, according tothe 
Welsh Guards, helped to alienate the population from the Taliban, and to show 
that the government took steps in securing them.   
  
To summarise, operation Panchai Palang shows that in this case British forces in 
Helmand were, on a tactical level, able to conduct population-centric 
counterinsurgency operations. The operation was well linked into the overall 
strategic and operational framework at the time. It also made good use of and 
cooperated closely with ANSF, especially in the hold phase. The operation 
managed to clear and hold a contested area and generate improved security over 
time. However, one should be careful not to generalise too much from one single 
operation. While the Prince of Wales’s company was able to secure the area over 
time they were never able to fully penetrate local society and deal with issues 
such as political subversion. It would probably be a very tall order for an infantry 
company and would require dedicated special resources present over time. 
Furthermore, the development work in the area suffered due to a continued 
mismatch between civilian and military resources. One of the core tenets of 
counterinsurgency theory is that all efforts need to work in the same direction, 
and it remains doubtful if creating security alone is enough to sway a population to 
the government side. Nevertheless, this operation provides a good example of how 
an infantry company can approach a clear-hold operation in a doctrinal manner. 
A concerted government effort 
The concept of a comprehensive approach was perhaps the single most challenging 
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area for the British with regards to their mission in Helmand. Despite long 
experience and solid doctrinal guidance, they were never able to achieve a unity 
of effort and to effectively coordinate the civil-military efforts in Helmand. This 
was mainly due to a lack of centralised control, both in the shape of a clear overall 
strategy, but also in the mid- and short-term direction of the operations.   
Strategic view 
There is little doubt that the British both understood the importance of and aimed 
for an integrated and comprehensive approach to their mission in Helmand. The 
memorandum from the UK MoD in the 2005-2006 hearings stated that 
‘development and reconstruction are key to our success—crucial because without 
them, military intervention would not necessarily increase stability and 
security.’402 This is echoed in the oral evidence given by Air Marshal Sir Glen 
Thorpy from the PJHQ during the same hearings.403 Given the history of 
participation in numerous counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations this was 
hardly surprising. The importance of a joint civil-military approach was, at least in 
theory, well understood among both uniformed and non-uniformed personnel. 
Hence, before the deployment to Helmand the British made an effort to conduct 
integrated planning. A joint UK plan for Helmand was made in cooperation 
between the Department for International Development (DfiD), the Foreign Office, 
and the PJHQ.404 A unit from the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) was put 
in charge of coordinating the different actors involved in the planning. However, 
the planners were worried that the overall aims set for the campaign were too 
ambitious and would be very hard to accomplish. The plan, which focussed on 
developing ink-spots in the Helmand Triangle, was nevertheless agreed on and set 
in motion. As we know, events on the ground quickly overtook and partly derailed 
the original joint UK plan for Helmand. The effects on this in regard to a 
comprehensive approach will be dealt with in the next part of this chapter. Before 
doing so it is worth asking whether the work done to ensure a concerted 
government effort before deployment was sufficient and in line with 
                                         
402 House of Commons Defence Committee, "The UK Deployment to Afghanistan - Fifth Report of the Session 
2005-06," 44. 
403 Ibid.,  29. 
404 Ferguson, A Million Bullets - the Real Story of the British Army in Afghanistan, 147-48. 
 149 
counterinsurgency theory.  
The British did indeed adhere to Sir Robert Thompson´s somewhat obvious 
principle that ‘the government must have an overall plan’ which covers both the 
military and civilian aspects of the mission.405 However, British planning was 
nowhere near as comprehensive as the Dutch planning ahead of their mission to 
Uruzgan. On the other hand, this could not be expected. The Dutch had more time 
to prepare before the deployment of force, and was not conducting extensive 
operations in Iraq at the same time. It was nevertheless a lot more thorough and 
comprehensive than Norway, who basically trusted ISAF to do the in-theatre 
planning. However, in all forms of warfare it is the execution and not the planning 
which is the most challenging. Circumstances change quickly, and as discussed in 
the theory chapter events on the ground will, and sometimes must, influence the 
overall strategic goals of a campaign. In order for such changes to be made one 
needs to have clear command structures and a clear understanding of who is 
responsible for what. Inter-departmental coordination is difficult in most states on 
a day-to-day basis. These difficulties are multiplied in expeditionary coalition 
warfare. Not only are the interests of different ministers and ministries at play, 
but also those of all the other troop-contributing nations, numerous NGOs, the host 
nation, the local governor, and the local population.  
In this context it is surprising that Britain chose the PCRU to coordinate the efforts 
of the MoD, the Foreign Office, and the PJHQ. While the PCRU surely had 
competent staff it holds no formal authority over any of the bodies it was set to 
coordinate. This issue was also raised during the 2007 hearings on Helmand in the 
HCDC. The head of operations in the PJHQ was asked if the current arrangement 
was satisfactory or if ‘there need to be a sort of elevation of PCRU or a Cabinet 
office minister at Cabinet level coordinating the various government departments 
across Whitehall?’406 Lieutenant General Hougton argued that from his point of 
view the cross-Whitehall coordination worked quite well, and was also improving 
with more experience. While it is not uncommon that serving generals defend 
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government policies in public hearings there is no reason to believe that 
coordination did not function well in Whitehall. The problem, as many of the 
scholars who has studied the Helmand campaign argued, was that it did not work 
well in Helmand.407 Some of the reasons for this originated at the tactical level and 
will be discussed below, but others again could only have been corrected at the 
strategic level. One could argue that more direct involvement from the Cabinet 
level might have created a stronger sense of ownership, causing the issues 
concerning a comprehensive approach to be put higher on the agenda.  
Another challenge with regards to a concerted government effort was the 
imbalance of the mission as a whole. David Galula argued that counterinsurgency 
should be an 80% civilian and 20% military effort.408 Military forces involved in 
counterinsurgency should operate in support of civilian authorities. Operations 
should be conducted where the population can be swayed to support the 
government, or as a minimum, not support the insurgents. Galula feared that if the 
military component was given too many resources compared to the civilian 
component, one could risk that the military would become the lead agency and 
again steer the campaign in a more military direction. If we use British government 
spending as a tool of measurement the numbers are about 10-90 in favour of the 
security forces. Between May 2006 and March 2007 the British government spent 
£102 million on development while the annual military spending in Helmand was 
assessed to be £1 billion.409 Moreover, in terms of staffing, the military component 
in Helmand literally dwarfed the civilian. Of the 3,500 personnel deployed to 
Helmand in 2006 only about 100 were allotted to the PRT, which held the 
responsibility for the development side of the mission.410 Compared to the Dutch 
figures, the total balance is not all that different. The major difference is that the 
Dutch had an integrated campaign plan from the outset of the operation. In 
addition, the civilian component of the Dutch PRT had direct access, and from 
2008 shared the leadership of the Dutch mission with the military commander. It is 
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thus fully possible that cross-coordination worked well in Whitehall, but the odds 
of the civilian component gaining actual influence in Helmand was limited, at least 
in regards to resources. 
In sum, the British laid foundations for a concerted government effort in Helmand. 
It initiated and completed a UK joint plan for Helmand, which emphasised the 
importance of a comprehensive approach for the operation. On the other side the 
civilian side of the operation was vastly under-resourced and -staffed compared to 
the military side. Furthermore, based on the evidence examined for this thesis, 
the top echelons of British government did not take sufficient lead on the 
comprehensive approach in Helmand. Instead, the task of coordinating the 
different actors was delegated to the PCRU which held no formal authority over 
the bodies it was set to coordinate.  
Tactical view 
While foundations for a functioning and integrated approach were laid on the 
strategic level it seems to have been a somewhat different story on the tactical 
level. Several studies of the Helmand campaign are highly critical to the lack of 
development and reconstruction effort in 2006-2007.411  A company commander 
who was deployed to Helmand in 2009 summarized the development effort, in his 
opinion, as: ‘unsatisfactory, under-resourced, unimaginative, lack of commitment 
an no real big, big vision.’412 The criticism raised by the military in particular was 
the lack of support for Quick-Impact Projects (QIPs) or merely the lack of civilian 
development staff in their respective areas. The main cause of the latter seems to 
rest on a combination of different force-protection rules among civilian employees 
and the military personnel and the high intensity of the combat operations in 
Helmand.   
 
 British civilian government officials operate under different force protection rules 
than soldiers. As an example of this, they require shelters with hardened roofs to 
stay relatively safe against rocket and mortar attacks.413 As these are not soldiers, 
                                         
411 Ferguson, A Million Bullets - the Real Story of the British Army in Afghanistan, 174-76 and Egnell, "Lessons 
from Helmand, Afghanistan: What Now for British Counterinsurgency?," 311-12. 
412 UK A, "Personal Interview." 
413 Ferguson, A Million Bullets - the Real Story of the British Army in Afghanistan, 175 and Chin, "Colonial 
Warfare in a Post-Colonial State: British Military Operations in Helmand Province, Afghanistan," 239. 
 152 
and thus not expected to take risks on behalf of their government in the same 
manner, this is not an unreasonable arrangement. It does, however, pose a 
challenge when fighting in conflicts with no clear front lines and a generally high 
threat level. In the beginning of the Helmand mission it was only the base in 
Lashkar-Gah which had sufficient shelters. This again seriously hampered the 
freedom of movement of the civilian development and reconstruction experts 
attached to the PRT. Will Pike, a company commander in 3 Para, noted in his diary 
on 22 May: ‘Not enough on the development side. Have yet to see anyone from an 
NGO, and DfiD don’t go out. Yet this is the development arm that is the route to 
success.’414  
 
The different standards in force protection not only caused practical problems 
with integrating the security and development efforts, it also served to fuel the 
cultural differences between the components. Soldiers often have a low opinion of 
“the soft civilian culture” to begin with. This is often enhanced in conflict area 
where everyone not carrying a rifle is assessed to be a liability by the combat 
troops. This opinion is often also extended to elements of the military organisation 
that mainly spend their time inside the safety of the fortified bases. While the 
troops out in the FOBs lived with the bare minimum of comfort, the civilian 
personnel had more comfortable facilities.415 While none of these arrangements in 
themselves are unreasonable, civil servants do after all not have years of military 
training, they could easily serve to widen the cultural gap between the different 
components of the mission and thereby undermine a sense of a common purpose.  
 
Also during operation Panchai Palang there were challenges with regards to a 
concerted government effort. While security is normally highest up on the needs 
list for towns in areas ravaged by conflict there are also other key issues to address 
if one is to convince the population to side with the government. For Cha-e Anjir 
the list was very much like the rest of Afghanistan: education, better roads, 
electric power, and better medical care.416 As a small infantry company the Prince 
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of Wales’s Company was stretched thin in order to provide security. Aware not to 
raise false expectations they promoted modest goals for development in the area. 
Their key focus was to get the school reopened.417 For any other development work 
they were dependent on help from the PRT or other civic action teams higher up in 
the echelons. According to the people involved on the ground from the military 
side, this did not happen. The description given by a key officer in the Prince of 
Wales’s Company when commenting on development was representative of their 
feelings. ‘I think basically that it was unsatisfactory, under-resourced, 
unimaginative, lack of commitment, and no real, big, big vision.’418 It is 
understandable that someone who invests a lot of effort and takes risks to secure 
an area gets frustrated if they feel that the rest of the organisation is not carrying 
its weight. In a counterinsurgency perspective it is also problematic as armed force 
and security alone are really not able to deliver any viable long-term solutions. 
The criticism raised by parts of the Welsh Guards also mirrors what was noted at 
the formal hearings in the House of Commons Defence Committee in 2007. 419 One 
of the key issues raised in the hearing was that the efforts were hampered because 
‘the threat of violence had meant that civilian workers were reluctant to work 
outside secure areas.’420 This, however, seemed to remain an issue. Arguments 
presented to the Welsh Guards in Cha-e Anjir were that force-protection measures 
were not adequate for civilian staff to work there.421  
  
However, the different force-protection measures cannot alone explain the 
challenges concerning civil-military cooperation on a tactical level. One underlying 
cause are the initial actions and decisions by the British task force in Helmand. As 
Warren Chin points out, the expansion beyond the Helmand Triangle and the ADZ 
into the northern platoon houses expanded and escalated the conflict in a manner 
which was not planned for before the deployment. For the development side of 
the mission to get going, one first had to establish security, but the dispersal of 
the combat troops into fixed positions with poor force ratios lead to constant 
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fighting. During visit of the Secretary of State for Defence, Des Browne, this issue 
became a topic. According to Stuart Tootal he ‘pursued an aggressive line of 
questioning about why we were planning to do strike ops instead of development. 
He also wanted to know why the military were leading operations rather than the 
British civilian government ministries.’422 It seems that Browne was touching on 
one of the very core ideas of counterinsurgency. If one is to succeed, military 
effort needs to be in support, and second to, the overall political effort. According 
to counterinsurgency theory, securing areas for development and increased 
governance is more important than strike operations against insurgents. Tootal 
clearly seems to have been somewhat provoked by the question and replied that 
‘this is Afghanistan and we are in the middle of a vicious counter-insurgency. The 
Taliban are trying to kill my soldiers, which is why we are conducting strike 
operations when resources permit.’423 The overall problem was, as Chin pointed 
out, that most of the positions where the Taliban was trying to kill Tootal´s 
soldiers were in places such as Musa Quala and Sangin, deployed there based on 
decisions made by the British commanders in the theatre. On the other hand, I 
have no evidence of Des Browne, or other senior ministerial level figures, arguing 
for a clear civilian leadership of the mission before deployment. Creating a 
stronger civilian leadership from the outset could have ensured that the military 
operated in support of the development side.  
 
Another frustration among the military forces in Helmand was the apparent lack of 
support for QIPs. Other nations, such as the US, had bestowed the military forces 
with money to conduct their own QIPs in areas deemed unsafe for the civilian 
workers. QIPs were originally an American concept where security forces were 
given money and other resources to enable small and quick-fix projects upon 
arrival in a new area. These would typically include pay for work projects filling in 
Taliban positions and firing points, clearing irrigation ditches, and similar things. 
The main idea was to buy goodwill among the locals and to some extent kick start 
the local economy. Stuart Tootal points out in his book that 3 Para identified over 
30 possible QIPs during their deployment, and that none of these were started 
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when they redeployed.424 Interviews with other officers from support the argument 
made by Tootal in his book. One company commander was so frustrated at the lack 
of development support in his area that he suggested to stop all fighting for one 
day if he was given the money he then saved on ammunition for development 
projects. With the cost of a javelin missile at $150,000 he figured he could do a lot 
in his small area.425  On the other hand, the whole concept of QIPs is debated in 
development circles. One reason rests on the projects often having a short-term 
focus and being without any local ownership. A senior member of the PCRU points 
this out in relation to an example used by Stuart Tootal. In his book he describes 
that a US NGO had provided washing machines to the local hospital in Gereshk. If 
the necessary plumbing was done these could, in his mind, be made operational 
and thus both improve the hygienic standard in the hospital and help the British 
forces win the hearts and minds of the locals.426 For a practical and action oriented 
officer it is hard to understand why DfiD representatives refused to install a small 
amount of plumbing to make this happen. However, as the PCRU representative 
pointed out, the problem was more complex from a development point of view. 
Firstly the hospital lacked a reliable source of electricity. Installing a washing 
machine would also make several women, who made their living washing for the 
hospital, unemployed. Lastly, the hygienic standards of the hospital in Gereshk 
were assessed as quite good, by Afghan standards.427 Such long-term and wider 
consequences of projects are what development experts assess. Most military 
officers do not have that type of training and are also shaped to a different 
mindset. This was also why the job of assessing which projects should be carried 
out was done by the PRT in Helmand and not by the different army formations.  
 
The one area where the British effort in Helmand has really seemed to struggle 
throughout the period covered is civil-military cooperation on a tactical level. The 
intensity of the fighting and the following insecure situation made it difficult to 
deploy the civilian component of the task force into cleared areas. As a result, the 
efforts on the ground were perceived as lacking and inefficient by the British 
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troops. However, the intensity and fighting was partly caused by the decisions to 
deploy the British forces outside the Helmand triangle and the ADZ. A 
concentration of the task force inside the triangle would have led to better local 
force ratios and while there are no certainties it could have made the overall 
situation more favourable. 
The British approach 
Particularly in the initial two years of the operation, the British effort in Helmand 
did not adhere to classic counterinsurgency theory. The United Kingdom failed to 
develop a coherent strategy. The initial focus on counter-narcotics was seen as not 
only counter-productive by the military forces on the ground, but also as an 
example of a lack of proper insight at the strategic level by the British 
commanders. Also the relation to the host-nation caused challenges for the British. 
When the governor of Helmand requested that British forces deployed to villages 
north in Helmand the British forces chose to comply with this and thus expand the 
area of operations defined by the British government. This decision did not only 
leave British security forces dangerously over-stretched in the province. It also had 
negative consequences for other aspects of the mission. Poor force ratios meant 
that they were unable to dominate areas and struggled to generate actual 
security. This again almost forced operations in a reactive and enemy-centric 
direction. The poor security situation also made any development and governance 
work in the disputed areas a tall order.  
 
Fundamental problems in military operations are rarely caused by one single 
mistake or bad decision. Neither is it possible to place the blame on one single 
person or component. As often the case in military operations it was the sum of 
smaller mistakes, or poor judgement, which put the British in the situation they 
found themselves in between 2006-08. The dispersion of forces, as discussed in the 
previous part, was a decision made on the tactical level in violation of the political 
guidance given to the mission. It was also a clear deviation from counterinsurgency 
theory and doctrine in general, particular in the early period. Both the strategic 
and tactical level must take their share of the responsibility for this. However, 
with regards to the overall research question of this thesis: The challenges for the 
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British campaign in Helmand was more a due to failures of strategy and tactics 
than counterinsurgency theory.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS 
Of the three states studied in this thesis, the armed forces of the Netherlands 
adhered most closely to counterinsurgency theories in the conduct of their 
operations. They employed a realistic and pragmatic approach to the conflict. 
Dutch strategy matched the challenges at hand and provided clear guidance for 
the effort. At the same time the strategic level allowed the necessary room for 
adaptation by the forces on the ground. Furthermore, the Dutch managed to 
employ a well-balanced civil-military effort, especially compared to that of Britain 
and Norway, and also managed to maintain good civil-military cooperation 
throughout the operation.  Dutch forces at the tactical level utilised an effects-
based approach (EBO) to their operations. This proved an effective tool for 
creating both a long-term focus as well as a unity of effort between the civilian 
and military components of the Dutch intervention in Afghanistan.  On the other 
hand, whether Dutch force ratios were sufficient to penetrate society to actually 
win the population to the government side is more debatable. It is also possible 
that the effects achieved by the Dutch forces will prove short-lived. One factor 
which to some extent undermined the Dutch efforts in the region was their 
unwillingness to deal with the central power brokers in Uruzgan on an official 
level. 
 
Background and history of counterinsurgency 
As part of the stage III expansion of ISAF, the Netherlands assumed responsibility as 
the lead nation in the province of Uruzgan in southern Afghanistan. The decision 
made by the Dutch government to deploy forces into Uruzgan in 2006 came after 
much scrutiny and debate, a process very different from those in both Britain and 
Norway. In 2010 the Dutch parliament refused to sanction further deployment of 
forces to Uruzgan, thereby ending the Dutch involvement in the province and also 
bringing down the Blakenende IV coalition.428  
 
Uruzgan was by no means the easiest province in 2006. Regarding security, the 
standard of living, and government presence it was ranked among the lowest in 
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Afghanistan. At the same time, it had a significant presence of Taliban who held 
considerable sway over the population.429 Nevertheless, the Dutch effort in 
Uruzgan has been described as one of the few success stories for ISAF.430 
Dutch counterinsurgency history 
As a former colonial power, the Netherlands has a history of counterinsurgency. 
The Netherlands fought against insurgents both in the Dutch East Indies right after 
the Second World War, and during the rebellion in the Aceh province at the turn of 
the last century. Less literature and theory has emerged from these conflicts 
compared to those fought by the British. Nevertheless, there is an ongoing debate 
in the Netherlands whether Dutch counterinsurgency today resembles the 
campaigns fought in the past, and whether there is such a thing as a Dutch 
approach to counterinsurgency.  
 
Sociologist Joseph Soeters seems to be one of the most ardent proponents of a 
Dutch approach. Soeters is a professor at the Netherlands Defence Academy and 
claims that the Dutch approach to counterinsurgency operations is characterised 
by less use of force, a high degree of cultural awareness, and more reliance on 
cunning and guile than brute force to achieve its goals.431  
 
The Dutch are proud of their typical “Dutch approach” or “Dutch touch”. 
This approach amounts to bottom-up, harmoniously, preferably not so 
violently and via cooptation of local power holders and tribal balance, 
seeking for solutions to conflicts.432  
This approach is often contrasted to an Anglo-Saxon way of war that is more 
confrontational, reliant on kinetic force and more enemy-centric than the Dutch.  
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Dutch historian Thijs Brocades Zaalberg is the most outspoken critique of the idea 
of a Dutch approach to counterinsurgency. In an article published in the Journal of 
Strategic Studies, he argues that contemporary Dutch operations are not based on 
the legacy of former colonial campaigns.  
 
During these violent nineteenth and early twentieth-century military 
campaigns on Java, Lombok and Bali, in Aceh, and elsewhere in the 
Indonesian archipelago, large scale punitive campaigns, exemplary force 
and coercion were the rule, not the exception. Those claiming that 
something resembling a ‘hearts-and-minds-approach’ eventually pre- vailed 
during modern imperial expansion in the archipelago ignore decades of 
historical research.433  
 
Zaalberg along the same lines. He stresses that in Iraq the Dutch forces in the Al-
Mutanna province did not employ specificly Dutch solutions, but instead ‘operated 
in line with the British divisional guidelines’434, while in Uruzgan a more permissive 
environment allowed the Dutch to employ less force than their British and 
Canadian neighbours in Helmand and Kandahar.435 Arthur ten Cate, in a lecture at 
a counterinsurgency conference in Amsterdam is more moderated than Zaalberg. 
He points out that it would ՙbe presumptuous to therefore claim this concept as 
typically “Dutch,”՚ but he nevertheless points out that Dutch way of soliving the 
mission differed from other nations.436  
 
The debate on the Dutch approach resembles the parallel debate on the minimum 
use of force tradition in British counterinsurgency. As with the British case, it is 
not a question of ‘either/or’. Dutch operations have been shaped by the 
circumstances from which it was conceived, and by the context in which it was 
fought. While tradition and history to some extent influence units, the 
surroundings they operate in and their specific characteristics tend to exert a 
greater influence. Operations in Uruzgan must necessarily differ from those in 
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Helmand and Kandahar because the challenges they pose are unique in their own 
manner.  
Doctrinal framework 
The Dutch Armed Forces concluded a thorough update of its doctrinal framework 
right after the turn of the century. As part of this a doctrine for counterinsurgency 
operations was published. Dutch counterinsurgency doctrine, just like the British, 
stands firmly in a population-centric tradition. The doctrine is also partly based on 
previous British counterinsurgency doctrines.437  
 
There are several parts of the doctrine that place it in a population-centric 
tradition. Firstly, the doctrine emphasises the political aspect of 
counterinsurgency. When defining counterinsurgency operation the doctrine argues 
that ‘the thus integrated political operation – including the military actions – is 
often prolonged and designed to strip the insurgents of their credibility among the 
population.’438 It continues by arguing that ‘military action against insurgents 
should at most, therefore, be regarded as a means, an ultima ratio, supplementing 
and supporting the other government measures’439, thus underlining both the 
political aspect of the conflict and that a comprehensive effort is needed to defeat 
insurgents. This view is further pursued when it comes to how the doctrine 
envisions that counterinsurgency efforts should be organised. All involved 
departments of government should be involved in order to make a coherent 
strategy for the operation as soon as possible, to ensure unity of effort. 
Furthermore, the government should form ‘a joint military-civil command and 
control structure, in which the military commander is allocated a place alongside 
the representatives of the other components.’440  
 
Secondly, the doctrine argues that the key to winning a counterinsurgency 
campaign is to control and ultimately win the support of the population.  
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In an insurgency in a more traditional sense (insurrection against the 
government), the support of the civilian population for the insurgents 
tends to be the centre of gravity. ... This must, therefore, also be the 
focus of the counterinsurgency operation, which means that the battle will 
not always be conducted in a purely military sense.441 
 
Operations should hence not be directed towards defeating the armed insurgents 
in a military sense, but securing the population and separating these from the 
insurgents.442 
 
The doctrine’s main weakness is that it, like the British 2001 doctrine, is quite 
theoretical and does not provide a very detailed framework for how operations 
should be executed. The concepts of concentric or eccentric approaches to 
operations are clearly related to ink-spot or clear-hold-build approaches, but are 
not as elaborate as these.443 In defence of the doctrine it should also be pointed 
out that it is a doctrine meant for higher staffs and not the lower tactical levels of 
the Netherlands Army.444 
 
The Dutch counterinsurgency doctrine, if used, would provide the Dutch army with 
an updated and solid framework for how to approach and think about 
counterinsurgency operations. While it focuses less on the actual conduct of 
operations, it nevertheless provides clear guidance on important aspects such as 
planning, organisation, main tasks, and the role of intelligence. The doctrine 
stands firmly in a population-centric tradition and was hence well suited to fit into 
the overall ISAF approach to operations by 2006. 
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The primacy of politics 
  
Map 4.1: Map of Uruzgan445 
 
Strategic view 
Of the three nations studied, the Netherlands was most effective at formulating a 
strategy that matched conditions on the ground before deployment. Dutch strategy 
was in many regards realistic and pragmatic, and balanced civil-military efforts in 
both organisation and execution. One of the aspects that set the Netherlands apart 
from Great Britain and Norway in regards to strategy is the strategic process. In 
2001 the Netherlands constitution incorporated its article 100.  
The Government shall inform the States General in advance if the armed 
forces are to be deployed or made available to maintain or promote the 
international legal order. This shall include the provision of humanitarian 
aid in the event of armed conflict.446 
The format in which this presentation is to be made is commonly known as 
Toetsingskader or assessment framework. Article 100 also formalises a set of 
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questions to be debated in parliament before Dutch troops are deployed. There 
are 19 different criteria that should be assessed before a decision is formulated. 
Among these are: 
 There has to be a concrete military assignment, 
 Government assesses whether the political and military goals are 
attainable, 
 There must be a clear command structure, 
 There need to be clear international agreements on the mission and 
the tasks are to be feasible, 
 The Government states the reasons for participation as completely as 
possible, 
 In assessing the feasibility, both the operation as a whole and the 
military feasibility are to be taken into account, 
 The question is not which units have to take their turn, but which 
units are best fit to do the mission, 
 A good exit strategy is needed.447 
 
This procedure seems to form a solid basis for a formulation of strategy before 
deployment of forces. By asking questions that force the government to assess 
feasibility it also makes it assess the aims and means of an operation. At least in 
the case of Uruzgan this led to a process that formulated a clear strategy for the 
deployment of forces which was summarized in the Article 100 letter (Kamerbrief) 
to the Dutch parliament on 22 December 2005.448  
In accordance with the ISAF mandate, the Netherlands detachment will 
focus on promoting stability and security by increasing support for the 
Afghan authorities among the local population and by weakening support for 
the Taliban and related groups. Promoting good governance, an efficient 
police and army and the rule of law, preforming CIMIC and reconstruction 
activities, and promoting reconstruction activities by others are important 
elements of this approach.449 
 
This was a more or less straightforward adoption of ISAF’s strategic and 
operational goals. The main goal was to assist the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in maintaining an increasing their control over 
Uruzgan. In order to do this the effort should focus on a balanced approach in 
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three main areas: security, governance, and development. Although this was not 
stated in the 2005 decision it was later known as the 3D approach in the 
Netherlands. The 3D approach is simply an acronym for Defence, Diplomacy and 
Development. It is originally a Canadian concept used in peacekeeping missions, 
but became synonymous with the Dutch effort in Uruzgan. ‘In the 3D approach 
military, diplomatic and development efforts are connected as much as possible 
and integrated where possible and desirable to achieve its final goal.’450 In this 
regard the Dutch approach – to address all aspects of the conflict, not just the 
military ones – has striking similarities to theories of classic counterinsurgency.  
 
The government must have an overall plan. This plan must cover not just 
the security measures and military operations. It must include all political, 
social, economical, administrative, police and other measures which have 
bearing on the insurgency.451 
 
While Dutch strategy as formulated in 2005 might not have constituted an overall 
plan as Thompson argues plan, there is still an understanding that a concerted 
government effort is needed in order to achieve the goals that are set. It also 
spelled out the strategic goals clearly enough for the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) to 
operationalise this on the ground. 
 
Setting clear goals for what an operation is to achieve is obviously an important 
part of strategic planning. Equally important is creating an organisation that sets 
the premises for reaching these goals. As already shown previously Dutch doctrine 
envisions a tight civil-military cooperation in both planning and execution of the 
operations. To this end the Dutch government formed the Military Operations 
Steering Group (SMO).452 This group was responsible for national guidelines to 
ensure that the mission went in accordance with Dutch strategy, and to ensure 
that the effort was well coordinated between the different sectors of government 
involved.453 The Chief of the Defence Staff and the Director-General Political 
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Affairs of the ministry of Foreign Affairs headed the group.454 In this manner the 
Dutch ensured an organisation where key decision makers regarding the Uruzgan 
mission met frequently and were able to discuss and overcome obstacles before 
they hampered the effort in the operation area. 
 
The organisation of the TFU also promoted a primacy of politics much in line with 
what is advocated by counterinsurgency theory. 
The task force was co-led by a commander and a civilian representative (CIVREP). 
The staff of the TFU also included cultural and development advisors in addition to 
the normal staff of a brigade size headquarter. In principle the commander was in 
charge of military operations while the civilian representative was in charge of the 
reconstruction and governance side of the mission. From August 2008 (TFU V) and 
onwards the civilian representative was also in direct command of the PRT. If the 
two were unable to agree they would raise their difference to the Ministry of 
Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs respectively where a decision would be 
made. None of the TFU commanders I have interviewed found this necessary during 
their deployment. TFU commanders were typically selected from the chief of staff 
level in a Dutch brigade and were rotated every 6 months. The battle group was 
composed from one of the battalions in the same brigade, but was rotated every 4 
months.455 This system meant that some of the TFU commanders for at least two 
months of their deployment had a battle group from a different brigade. According 
to the officers interviewed for this thesis there were both strengths and 
weaknesses with this rotation system. The main advantages were that a four-
month deployment put less strain on both deployed personnel and their families 
back home. Furthermore, during a four-month deployment the personnel is not 
granted leaves and hence the battle group was always at full strength when 
deployed. The main drawback of the four-month system was obviously that one 
does not get to know the area or key partners as well as often is needed in these 
types of operations.456  
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Figure 4.2: Principle organisation of Dutch elements of TFU457 
 
Another aspect in which the Dutch organisation differed from both the British and 
in particular the Norwegian one, was the relatively close integration of military 
personnel and civilians in the leadership of the TFU. Counterinsurgency theory 
suggests that civilians, due to the political nature of the conflicts, should lead 
these types of operations.458 While the Dutch model fell short of a pure civilian 
leadership of operations, it came a lot closer than what British and Norwegian 
models did. One challenge with the dual leadership model was that it presupposed 
a good working relationship between the TFU commander and the CIVREP. While 
this worked seamlessly in some cases, other TFU commanders found it more 
difficult to make it work in the intended manner.459  
 
As discussed in the introduction, a strategy needs to offer something more than 
what the operation is to achieve if it is to provide commanders on the ground with 
meaningful guidance. It should also to formulate a how, something resembling a 
plan.  Without necessarily building a coherent strategic logic Dutch strategy states 
several clear priorities for the TFU.  
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Firstly, Dutch forces were to focus their efforts on the two main towns in Uruzgan; 
the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod.460 Even if the strategy 
directed a clear focus of effort for the Dutch forces, it did not rule out a gradual 
geographical widening of the operations. ‘It is possible that if the security 
situation develops favourably, the Dutch activities will be gradually expanded 
northward.’461 In this regard Dutch strategy resembles the ink-spot approach that 
is often used in classic counterinsurgency. Also, by limiting the effort to as few as 
one base in each of the towns, it did not tie down large numbers of the personnel 
in static guard duties. 
 
Secondly, Dutch strategy put the PRT and not the battle group at the heart of the 
mission. ‘The core of the Dutch taskforce in Uruzgan will be formed of the PRT.’462 
This policy seems to have been born out of the nature of the mission, and was 
clear and consistent in Dutch strategy from 2005 and not adjusted in the 2007 
strategy. The interviewed TFU commanders were also of the view that the role to 
the battle group was to underpin the PRT, hence putting the PRT at the core of the 
mission.463 The balance between reconstruction and combat operations became 
one of the most politically debated points in the Netherlands before the 
deployment of the TFU.’464 This debate was primarily a result of domestic Dutch 
politics where the ‘progressive parties mainly feared a “mission creep” and 
overlap with the American military Operation Enduring Freedom, something that in 
their view could impinge on the Dutch reconstruction activities.’465 Just like in 
Norway, some of the political parties in the Netherlands were sceptical towards 
the US-led war on terror and wanted to distance themselves from this. In the 
Netherlands this was made even more difficult because of the Van Baalen motion 
of 24 November 2005. In order to ensure that Dutch operations were in accordance 
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with international law it suggested that the Dutch should ‘only cooperate with 
countries which respect international humanitarian law and the Geneva 
Conventions.’466 While this did not exclude working with Afghan security forces, it 
made any cooperation with the OEF politically unacceptable in the Netherlands, 
due to the controversy over detainee treatment at Baghram and Guantanamo. 
Seen in this context the emphasis on the PRT in Dutch strategy could be 
interpreted as a way of pacifying the progressive parties in Parliament in order to 
get their consent for the mission.  
 
This view is to some degree supported by Brocades Zaalberg. When discarding any 
notion of a Dutch approach to counterinsurgency, where a more development-
driven approach is a key element, he argues that there is ‘a politically driven 
tendency to present military operations by the Netherlands armed forces as 
separate and different from those of the Americans ....’467 The Dutch strategy 
and response to this uncertainty, on the other hand, seemed balanced and very 
pragmatic. When asked on his opinion on the matter, Colonel Theo Vleugels, 
Commander TFU I, simply answered that ‘we are going to do what is necessary and 
possible.’468 This phrase seemed to catch and was used in various formulations to 
describe the Dutch approach to the operations. It was even included in the 2007 
Kamerbrief where the Dutch Parliament reviewed strategy and extended the 
mission to Uruzgan with another two years. ‘In this regards the Dutch adage 
remains: ”reconstruction where possible, and military action where necessary.”’469 
This not only show a level of pragmatism from the tactical level when dealing with 
ambiguities on the strategic level. The inclusion of phrase used by the first task 
force commander in the following strategic guidance also shows a degree of 
reciprocity between the tactical and strategic level.  
 
While there certainly was an interest in labelling the mission to Uruzgan as 
‘peaceful’ as possible to win the support of the progressive parties, this does not 
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fully explain the focus on the PRT in Dutch strategy. Firstly, this focus is constant 
and unvarying regardless of shifting domestic politics at the time. Secondly, it 
correlates with what Dutch doctrine on counterinsurgency argues. Thirdly, it was 
to the fullest extent possible carried out in the field, and was also supported by 
the commanders of the TFU. Especially the last point would have been difficult to 
envision if it was solely done to keep the more progressive parties in the Dutch 
parliament content. 
 
There are three dimensions to the argument that Dutch strategy for Uruzgan was 
realistic, especially compared to that of Norway. Firstly, Dutch strategy attempted 
to match means and ends, in order to avoid biting off more than they could chew. 
As already discussed, Dutch deployment was initially limited to the two main 
population centres in Uruzgan. These also matched the ADZs formed in the area.470 
The strategy then envisioned an ink-spot approach with a gradual increase of the 
areas under government control. Secondly, and also unlike the Norwegian strategy, 
it is clearly stated that the efforts of the TFU would be opposed by the Taliban; 
‘The reconstruction effort in South Afghanistan is greatly complicated by 
opposing militant forces conducting raids on IOs and NGOs.’471 Finally, it also 
underlined that achieving any tangible results would take effort and time. ‘It is not 
realistic to expect that after two years in Uruzgan security, stability and 
prosperous economic developments will exist without outside help.’472 While 
setting realistic goals that matched the ends of the mission, the Dutch strategy 
became more achievable and easier to implement on the ground from the outset 
than the approaches of either Norway or Britain. 
 
Dutch strategy did not really go into great detail in either building a strict and 
coherent strategic logic, or in providing detailed guidelines for how the strategic 
goals should be reached. However, it did provide a clear framework to start from, 
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it is clear on the overall goals, and prioritises efforts geographically. At the same 
time, it left enough room for adaption so that commanders on the ground could 
adapt to the specific circumstances there. Dutch strategy, with its focus on a 
concerted effort and a balanced civil-military action, had a close resemblance to 
classic counterinsurgency theory. This chapter will progress by examining how the 
operations in Uruzgan adhered to the strategy formulated. 
Priority of the political side of the conflict  
A core aspect of population centric counterinsurgency is that victory is achieved 
through political compromise and settlement rather than through defeating the 
enemy military forces. As discussed in the theory chapter of this thesis this does 
not mean that counterinsurgency forces should not fight the enemy, but that ‘the 
government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the 
guerrillas.’473 This aspect was present in Dutch strategy and behaviour from early 
on in Uruzgan.  
 
From the beginning of the Netherlands’ participation in ISAF, it was 
recognised that the critical success factor of the mission would be less 
about the fight against the insurgents and more about depriving the 
insurgency of the local population’s support and garnering support among 
the local people for the Afghan government.474 
 
If the local population were to support the Afghan government, it was recognised 
that the legitimacy of the local authorities had to be significantly increased. In this 
regard the first steps were taken even before the TFU deployed in mid-2006. One 
of the conditions that were set by the Dutch before accepting responsibility for 
Uruzgan was the removal of the current governor Jan Mohammed Khan. From a 
Dutch point of view there were two main problems with Khan. Firstly, his ‘violent 
and corrupt’ past made him an unwanted partner for any western democracy, 
especially in the Netherlands where the nature of the mission was already 
debated. 475 Secondly, Khan came from the Popolzai tribe, a subgroup of the 
Pashtun tribe. The Popolzai tribe held most of the influential government posts in 
Uruzgan prior to the Dutch deployment despite being one of the smallest tribes in 
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the complex tribal power structure of Uruzgan. As a result of this, and the high 
levels of corruption, the government in Uruzgan had very little legitimacy among 
the population.476 The Dutch focus on governance was made even clearer in the 
2007 Kamerbrief where strategy was adjusted. ‘In the judgment of the 
Netherlands’ government, the success of the mission is primarily dependent on the 
government and provincial administration of Afghanistan gaining legitimacy.’477 
Hence the political aspect was very much at the heart of the campaign in Uruzgan 
from a strategic perspective. 
One challenge the Dutch forces faced in this regard was how to deal with the 
deposed former governor Jan Mohammed Khan. Even though he did not officially 
hold an office, he still held great influence in the province. Among other things, 
the failings of the new governor is partly ascribed to ‘the influence that informal 
leaders, such as Jan Mohammed Khan, were able to exert.’478 The official Dutch 
line on this was to not work with Khan unless he worked under Afghan government 
leadership, and not to attend shuras where he was present.479 This created 
challenges for the forces on the ground when they got involved in tribal matters or 
local politics. Several of the interviewed TFF commanders pointed out that even if 
Khan held no official authority, he still influenced local politics in areas of Uruzgan 
to the extent that nothing was done unless he gave his consent.480 He also had 
considerable military power in the region by de facto controlling the Kandak 
Amniante Uruzgan (KAU), a local militia formally commanded by his cousin 
Matiullah Khan. This militia was one of the main sources of income for Khan as it 
was able to tax travellers on some of the busiest roads in Uruzgan.  
Even though efforts were made to incorporate the KAU into the local police force, 
the Dutch were never able to shift its loyalty from their former commander to 
Afghan authorities. The Dutch final evaluation pointed out that ‘one problem with 
the stringent Dutch policy towards power brokers was that it did not allow the 
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Dutch mission leadership to enter into dialogue with Jan Mohammed Khan and 
Matiulla Khan.’481 Balancing between creating workable local solutions and 
promoting a centralized government is very challenging in a complex conflict like 
Afghanistan. In this case the Dutch seemed to favour a top-down approach, which 
caused challenges for the mission on the ground in many regards. On the other 
hand, other tribes in Uruzgan who previously had been side-lined by Khan 
welcomed this approach. Protected by the Dutch presence these could ‘get 
involved in local governance, [and] the support of such disadvantaged tribes for 
the Taliban gradually, but noticeably started to diminish.’482 However, even if the 
Dutch had some local success with getting a large part of the population alienated 
from the Taliban, this does not necessarily mean that they fell down on the side of 
the central Afghan government. The Ghilzai, one of the largest tribes in Uruzgan, 
‘did not nominate any candidates for positions in Wolesi Jirga (the Afghan house of 
Representatives) because they had no trust in the elections being carried out fairly 
and honestly.’483 Election turnouts have also dropped during the Dutch mission in 
Uruzgan just as in the rest of Afghanistan.484 
 Counter narcotics 
Also when it comes to countering the narcotics production and trade the 
Netherlands adopted a pragmatic and limited goal. The strategic mission 
statement from 2005 clearly stated: ‘ISAF does not have the power to destroy 
crops or to take independent action against drug producers.’485 The goal of the TFU 
was to support the Afghan authorities in their efforts to counter drug production 
problems in Uruzgan. This was further strengthened in the 2007 strategy where an 
increased effort to counter opium production was to be made.486 Among the 
measures taken was the embedding of a team from the US Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DES) who worked with Afghan authorities. In addition, Dutch forces 
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worked specifically in order to make alternative crops available for Afghan farmers 
in the areas under their control.487 While the effort had modest results it is also 
another example where Dutch strategy set realistic and achievable goals for the 
Task Force compared to the British 2006 strategy. 
 
Dutch overall strategy can be criticised for almost being too modest. If you set the 
bar low enough, you ensure that the chance of failure is minimal.488 However, this 
would be an unfair criticism of the Dutch efforts. Dutch forces deployed to 
Uruzgan in 2006 with a balanced, realistic, and pragmatic strategy. It prioritised 
its resources to the most populated areas of the province and envisioned a gradual 
spread out from the areas they controlled. By setting limited goals for what they 
were to achieve they matched means to ends and avoided creating a gap between 
the strategy makers and the Task Force who were to realise the strategy on the 
ground.  Dutch doctrine and strategy, as far as the principle of a primacy of 
politics is concerned, also adhered to theories for classic counterinsurgency. It 
focussed on engaging in local power structures and politics. It prioritised 
governance and development over enemy-centric combat operations. The 
approach was somewhat hampered by principles on how to deal with power 
brokers in the region, but the overall focus was still well within the scope of 
classic counterinsurgency theory. 
 
Tactical view 
The main issue to consider when discussing a primacy of politics on a tactical level 
is the adherence to the overall strategy by the units on the ground. As discussed 
above, the Dutch deployed to Uruzgan with a fairly clear and well-adapted 
strategy. However, this would only have an effect if the units deployed operated in 
accordance with this. In the case of Britain, the failure by the battle group to work 
within the geographical constraints set in the Helmand strategy had long-term 
negative consequences. In the case of the Netherlands the process ahead of the 
deployment of forces seems to have been a lot more rigorous and hence led to a 
clearer picture of what the forces on the ground should focus their efforts on. This 
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again led to a campaign plan which operationalized the strategic goals and 
provided necessary mid- and long-term guidance for the Task Force. 
 
After the deliberations in the Dutch Parliament were concluded, the Operations 
Department in the Dutch Chief of Defence Staff conducted a reconnaissance and 
an initial assessment of the mission. As a result of this it was confirmed that the 
initial focus areas would indeed be the two cities of Deh Rawod and the provincial 
capital of Tarin Kowt. Furthermore it stressed the need not to overextend initially, 
but to get control an establish security in these areas before expanding gradually 
into the valleys beyond the main population centres.489 The Netherlands, unlike 
Great Britain and Norway, does not have a permanent joint headquarters in their 
command structure. Instead the Dutch Chief of Defence has his own operations 
department. In practical terms this effectively merges the military strategic and 
operational levels in the Netherlands into one office. The overall strategic planning 
for the Uruzgan mission this was done in conjunction with the Department of 
Defence and the Chief of the Army Staff.490 In this case one could make an 
argument that the lack of a permanent joint headquarters on the operational level 
in many ways helped to streamline the process. Instead of going through one more 
layer of command structure the Dutch Chief of Defence seems to have been more 
directly involved in the process. In Norway, where the Chief of Defence’s role is 
only to advice the MoD while the operational joint headquarters is responsible for 
the execution of the mission, a less active role was taken by the Chief of Defence. 
 
Another notable aspect of the Dutch approach to their mission in Uruzgan is the 
amount of planning done prior to the deployment. In late December 2005, as soon 
as the core elements of the first TFU staff were in place, they initiated a 
comprehensive planning process based on the strategic inputs given.491 This 
process led to what became known as The Task Force Uruzgan Masterplan.492 This 
Masterplan was in reality a campaign plan that should serve as ‘a guideline for the 
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planning and execution of the mission of ISAF in the province of Uruzgan.’493 The 
main function of the document that ‘based on this Master Plan, priorities can be 
set and OPORDERS/OPLANS (and associated tasks) can be derived, constantly 
providing the big picture.’494 In other words it clarified and operationalized the 
overall strategic goals for the tactical units on the ground. I will argue that the 
work done by the TFU staff in creating long-term plan was of vital importance. It 
played a pivotal role by ensuring that operations on the ground was conducted in 
line with the overall strategy laid down by the Dutch Government. Creating this 
“campaign plan” early on helped to ensure that a clear link existed between the 
strategic goals and operations on the ground. Furthermore, it also promoted a 
long-term perspective on operations and thereby negated the risks of becoming 
event-driven. The need for this structured planning is vital in counterinsurgency as 
it ensures a unity of effort from the strategic level down to the tactical one. The 
link between these two was in the case of the Netherlands provided by this 
Masterplan. As far as I have been able to establish, the Dutch forces in Uruzgan 
also operated within the constraints set by the overall strategy for the mission. 
The initial deployments were focused around Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod in line 
with the strategic guidance.495  
 
 
In regards to ensuring a primacy of politics on the tactical level the organisation of 
the effort in Uruzgan is also worth revisiting. Compared to Great Britain and 
Norway the Dutch had a more integrated civilian-military model at the tactical 
level. During the first deployments, the civilian side of the TFU administration 
consisted of a political advisor, a development advisor, and a cultural advisor. In 
theatre these held an advisory role and the TFU commander had the last word in 
all aspects of the mission.496 In practice, however, the civilian and military parts of 
the mission seem to have been well integrated for the most part. A senior officer 
of the first TFU also expressed his surprise at this during an interview.  
                                         
493 Ibid.,  4. 
494 Ibid. 
495 NL D, "Personal Interview," 24:10 and Government of the Netherlands, "Final Evaluation - Netherlands 
Contribution to ISAF, 2006-2010," 37. 
496 NL D, "Personal Interview," 47:50. 
 177 
 
First I was astonished of how positive the cooperation between the 
departments of defence, foreign affairs, and development was. Even before 
we deployed when we had a lot of discussions with them. It was not 
perfectly synchronised, but I was surprised that it even took place.497 
 
The civilian presence in the TFU staff was further enhanced in 2007 and 2008 with 
two more members of staff. Also in 2008 the CIVREP assumed direct command of 
the Dutch PRT. From 2009 and onwards the CIVREP was further elevated to a 
position of joint command of the TFU alongside the military commander.498 Based 
on the gradual increase in civilian staff over the first couple of years one could ask 
whether it would not have been better to make it more robust from the outset? On 
the other hand, this increase reflects the focus of the Dutch operation. The first 
deployments were more focussed on the military side of the mission. The first 
stage of the mission prioritized training of Afghan security forces and establishing 
control through security in the chosen areas.499 In addition there was a need to 
conduct several assessments of needs before major development work went ahead. 
As security and situational awareness improved, the Dutch forces could pay more 
attention to the development side of the mission. 
 
In a strict sense the Dutch organisation falls somewhat short of the civilian 
leadership in the implementation of classic counterinsurgency.500 However, in 
comparison to the British and the Norwegians they had a much stronger civilian 
presence in their task force. Not only did these provide useful expertise on the 
governance and development side of the mission. The civilians in the TFU staff 
answered to their respective departments, not the Dutch MoD. Hence they 
provided a direct link to the political leadership who controlled the diplomacy and 
development side of the mission.501 In this manner the civilian presence in the TFU 
also influenced the political and strategic level back in The Netherlands and 
provided inputs to the development and diplomacy part of the 3D approach.  
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The population as the centre of gravity 
One of the cornerstones of population-centric counterinsurgency is that the 
population, not the enemy, should be the centre of gravity for the operations. If 
the government forces are to prevail in the long run, they need to separate the 
insurgents from the people. As the insurgents are fluid and difficult to track down, 
counterinsurgency theory advocates that the most efficient way of approaching 
this is by securing and controlling the population. Even though the Dutch never 
officially adopted a counterinsurgency approach both Dutch strategy and 
operations were clearly population-centric. The Dutch choice of a 3D approach as 
the overall framework for their operations, and the manner in which this was 
operationalised led to a population-centric approach in practical terms. 
 
Strategic view 
One area where the Dutch strategy was clearly population-centric was in the 
guidance given for the initial deployment. Sir Robert Thompson argued that in the 
guerrilla phase of the insurgency the government should prioritise the security of 
its base areas.502 Base areas in this context referred to the most populated areas of 
the state, where the main sources of power for a government can be found. In 
Uruzgan province these “bases” were primarily represented by the towns of Tarin 
Kowt and Deh Rawod. These two towns held almost 50% of the 330,000 inhabitants 
living in Uruzgan.503 The article 100 letter of 2005 stated: ‘The Dutch forces will 
deploy into two of the four available bases from operation Enduring Freedom in 
the province of Uruzgan. One in the capitol of Tarin Kowt and in Deh Rawod.’504 
The PRT was based in Tarin Kowt, the provincial capital, along with the 
headquarter for the TFU and the battle group. The battle group, consisting of 
three manoeuvre companies, was deployed with one company in Tarin Kowt and 
one company in Deh Rawod. The last company could be used to surge either of the 
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two towns, or to conduct operations alone or in conjunction with the others.505 
Thus the deployment of the forces gave the Dutch operations a good point of 
departure for conducting population centric operations. 
 
However, a mere deployment of forces to the most densely populated areas is not 
enough to argue that Dutch strategy and operations adhered to a population-
centric approach to counterinsurgency. Another important aspect in this is the 
overall focus of the operations. As counterinsurgency was controversial in The 
Netherlands the strategic guidance given did not specify that this was a 
counterinsurgency operation. The only publicly available strategic guidance, which 
points in the direction of a population centric approach, was in the 2005 
kamerbrief. Here the Balkende government stated: ‘For a successful Dutch military 
action it is important to win the support of the population for their own 
presence.’506 Yet this statement refers to the local population’s support for the 
presence of the Dutch forces, not their support for GiROA. In this case the choice 
of a 3D approach indirectly created the necessary foundations for a population-
centric approach. As noted above, the 3D approach emphasizes a tight cooperation 
between the defense, development and diplomacy components of a stabilization 
mission. These three factors, while somewhat different in wording, were in reality 
identical to the three main lines of operations for ISAFs counterinsurgency 
approach: security, development and governance.  
 
Placing the Dutch PRT in lead, not only with regards to the development and 
diplomacy missions, but the mission as a whole, negated the risk of the military 
component becoming enemy-centric in its operations. In order of the development 
and diplomacy components of the mission to play their part the military 
component had to focus security operations in the same areas. Since there is no 
point in conducting diplomacy or governance and development outside populated 
areas Dutch operations became population-centric as a consequence. This was 
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further strengthened by the focus created by the ADZs which overlapped with the 
most populated areas.507 While Dutch strategy was not explicitly population-
centric, and indeed not officially focused on counterinsurgency at all, it 
nevertheless adhered closely to the theories of counterinsurgency, albeit in an 
unstated fashion. 
 
Tactical view 
The Dutch were not only able to generate a clearer strategic framework than the 
other states studied in this thesis. They also proved more apt at conducting 
operations at a tactical level that were useful within the scope of the strategy. 
While not necessarily preforming operations within the framework laid out by 
counterinsurgency theory, they managed, on the whole, to maintain a population-
centric approach to operations also on a tactical level. A major reason for this was 
the initial design of operations laid down by the TFU I in the summer of 2006.  
 
As far as the overall tactical design is concerned the Dutch chose a rather novel 
approach compared to the British and the Norwegians. The overall approach to the 
operation as stated by the masterplan was shaped by the theory of effects based 
operations (EBO).508 This doctrinal concept needs some explanation in order to 
understand the Dutch case properly. While EBO comes in different shapes and 
forms it normally operates from three cornerstones or fundamentals: Firstly, it 
emphasises that one should have a comprehensive view of means employed, both 
civilian and military. Secondly, it believes in analysing the enemy as a system of 
systems. Thirdly, it stresses that ‘all actions carried out must be justifiable on the 
basis of their contribution to the achievement of the desired effect.’509 In 
doctrinal expressions of the concept it is often presented as a way of thinking, 
combined with a more prescriptive method of how to conduct operational 
planning. 
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EBO was first introduced into military doctrine in the US in the 1980s. Initially the 
theories received most attention and was mainly developed in air-power circles.510 
In particular the works of John A. Warden III received a lot of attention. Warden 
designed the initial air campaign for the 1991 Gulf War, and later published 
extensively on how his ideas should be adopted in order to achieve success when 
employing military force. The overall argument posted by proponents of EBO was 
that traditionally armed forces emphasised more ‘the actions themselves, 
attacking the targets, than […] the results.’511 
 
Despite the popularity achieved by the EBO concept, in particular after the Gulf 
War, the concept also had its critics. While serving as US Joint Forces Commander 
General Mattis publicly removed the concept from joint US planning. Mattis argued 
that ‘the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the 
joint force and among our multinational partners.’512 Mattis concedes that EBO has 
enhanced parts of military planning, in particular processes related to targeting, 
and operations against what he refers to as ‘closed systems.’513 On the other hand, 
Mattis is critical of its application in contemporary operations where the concept 
‘goes against the very nature of war to the point that it expands confusion and 
inflates a sense of predictability far beyond that which it can be expected to 
deliver.’514  
 
Critics of EBO often point to Israel’s failed campaign against Hezbollah in 2006 as a 
buttress for their argument. Prior to this war the Israeli Defence Force had 
adopted an EBO-inspired doctrine. Critical evaluations of the war pointed towards 
this, among other factors, when attempting to explain the lacklustre performance 
of the Israeli forces in this war.  
 
The Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and Systemic Operational Design (SOD) – 
inspired doctrine that vigorously embraced air power at the expense of a 
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classic ground maneuver campaign was certainly a major factor in the IDF’s 
disappointing performance.515 
 
It is perhaps not all that surprising that Matthews and Mattis are critical of EBO. 
Matthews writes for a US Army institution and Mattis served his entire career as a 
US Marine. EBO, on the other hand, has traditionally held more sway in air power 
doctrines. The analysis of the 2006 war in Lebanon presented by Mattis and 
Matthews has also been challenged. Dag Henriksen, a lieutenant colonel and 
professor at the Norwegian Air Force Academy, argues that the criticism was to a 
large extent based on false premises. According to Henriksen, the main problem 
for Israel in 2006 was a lack of strategy, and not a doctrinal issue. ‘The absence of 
a clearly identified military strategy for war or of one’s objectives reduces the 
relevance of the concept of EBO – or indeed, of any military concept.’516 Henriksen 
based his argument on both interviews with key Israeli officers and the official 
evaluation report published by the Israeli government. 
 
While EBO remains a debated concept it is still part of many NATO members’ 
doctrines. Both British and Norwegian doctrines that were valid in the period 
studied here cover EBO as one viable approach to operational planning. Both these 
argue that EBO is in particular suited in complex environments presented by 
modern conflicts.517 A British joint doctrine note from 2005 argues that: 
 
In employing a common, effects-based way of thinking at all levels, as well 
as appropriate collaborative processes focused on properly identified long-
term outcomes, military forces can maximise their contribution to crisis 
prevention and resolution.518 
 
One thing that makes EBO more applicable for counterinsurgency compared to the 
manoeuvre theory which dominates most high-intensity doctrines lies in their 
relation to time. In manoeuvre theory the key to success is the ability to make 
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decisions and to maintain a higher operational tempo than our opponent.519 In a 
manoeuvre dominated environment a 60% solution applied with vigour now is 
better than an 80% solution applied in an hour. In EBO, on the other hand, it is 
regarded as more important to ensure that actions produce the desired effects 
than to maintain a higher operational tempo.520  
 
In this manner an EBO approach is more relevant in a counterinsurgency 
environment, as such operations have a lower operational tempo. These operations 
are not decided by flamboyant armoured breakthroughs or similar decisive military 
operations. It is rather the slow pace of combined efforts, often with military 
forces in the supporting role, that proves decisive. In a counterinsurgency 
environment it is more important to avoid mistakes than to maintain a high tempo. 
A high tempo is important in conventional and symmetrical fight where getting on 
the inside of an opponent’s decision cycle often leads to success. However, the 
hard part of counterinsurgency is not to win the conventional battles and 
skirmishes, it is more of a marathon than a sprint. Hence an EBO approach could 
be useful in this manner. 
 
As far as the evidence examined in this thesis is concerned, the Dutch forces in 
Uruzgan showed that an effects-based approach not only made a close civil-
military coordination possible. They were also able to utilise the concept in order 
to conduct population-centric counterinsurgency operations that were largely in 
line with counterinsurgency theory. This mainly rests on three arguments. Firstly, 
an effects-based approach helped to focus operations. Secondly, an effects-based 
approach made a close civil-military cooperation possible, thus indirectly shaping 
operations into a more population-centric approach. Lastly, it helped Dutch forces 
with prioritizing in terms of force ratios. 
 
One challenge in counterinsurgency operations is to ensure that efforts lead 
toward the desired end state, and to get all resources to pull in the same 
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direction. Kinetic measurements, such as body counts, number of contacts, and 
IEDs found, are often misleading or even counterproductive.521 However, most 
armies are trained for high-intensity warfare and are thus calibrated towards this. 
In such operations kinetic measurements are often the bread and butter of the 
military intelligence on a tactical level. Indicators such as the number of destroyed 
enemy vehicles, number of prisoners, and distance advanced towards a set target 
are commonplace during training for most officers. This is a part of the challenge 
of using conventional forces for counterinsurgency, as discussed by Galula.522 The 
effects-based approach by the Dutch in Uruzgan helped them to overcome this 
challenge.  The initial Dutch masterplan listed 23 desired effects to be achieved. 
These underpinned the overall goals of governance, security, development, and a 
credible task-force. In the first 2006 version of the plan these were listed with line 
indicators showing their perceived interconnection. Of the 23 effects listed, only 
two, the elimination of opposing military forces (OMF) and illegally armed groups 
(IAG), were focussed on the enemy in the area. These were also assessed to be 
underpinned by other, and less enemy-centric, effects. 
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Figure 4.3 Overall effects to be achieved in Uruzgan523 
 
Furthermore, the TFU decided to continually assess their approach towards these 
effects in order to guide operations in the right direction. In order to achieve this, 
they employed a quite rigorous assessment tool. ‘We had this battle rhythm where 
every day we evaluated and asked; what did we achieve today? What did we want 
to achieve and what did we achieve?”524 This process was illustrated in the first 
masterplan. The planning cycles is here illustrated as part of the Boyd inspired 
observe-orient-decide-act loop, more commonly known as the OODA loop in 
military circles. It shows how reporting is fed into the operational assessment of 
effects. These lead to briefs which gives input, along with the commander’s 
guidance (guidance C) to the decision making process (DMP). The decision making 
process leads to new plans and orders which gives tasks to sub-units, and then the 
whole process is repeated.  The TFU had different effects assessment meetings 
where both short and long term effects of operations were analysed.525 By using an 
effects-based approach combined with a clear plan for assessments the Dutch 
created a potentially effective tool to measure their effects. Effects measurement 
is extremely difficult in conventional operations, and even more so in low-intensity 
conflicts. Whether the Dutch approach to this worked or not is outside the scope of 
this thesis. What is relevant in our case is that the Dutch had a conscious approach 
in linking aims and performance. They also created the tools and processes to deal 
with this aspect of their operations. 
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Figure 4.4 The effects planning cycle526 
 
 
Both Norwegian and British planning and focus tended to shift from one 
deployment to the next. This was not so much the case with the Dutch in Uruzgan. 
Many Dutch orders from early on in the deployment were either missing or on 
corrupted hard drives. However, it was still possible to clearly trace the effects-
based approach in the orders issued almost two years after the initial deployment. 
OPLAN 005 Haquida served as the framework order for TFU 4. This OPLAN provided 
an overall assessment of the situation, and gives general guidance for operations 
the following six months. The first point under “Commander’s intent” covers the 
desired effects the operation aims for. ‘In accordance with the guidance 
documents as referenced, this operation is based on several effects to be achieved 
within the mission in Uruzgan, on all three lines of operation.’527 The oplan goes on 
to describe the different effects in more detail. It highlights the need for ‘the 
insurgents to be separated from the population, both physically as mentally’ 
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alongside numerous other effects.528 This approach appears to remain consistent 
throughout the operation in Uruzgan.  
 
The OPLAN for the battlegroup in TFU 3 had a clear effects-based and population-
centric approach in its design. The commander’s intent, where the commander 
highlights his overall priority for the operation, stated: ‘The people of AFG 
[Afghanistan] are our Centre of Gravity. […] Instead of fighting all the OMF I want 
to make them irrelevant by taking away the support of the people.’529 Later 
framework orders from the TFU also remain unswerving in this approach.530 
Focusing on what effects to achieve, rather than what tasks to preform, aided the 
Dutch forces in Uruzgan to maintain a focus on the population rather than the 
enemy. This focus remained consistent throughout the deployment.  
 
Secondly, an effects-based approach indirectly guided operations towards a 
population-centric approach by promoting a closer civil-military cooperation. As 
shown above, the analysis of effects to be achieved in order to succeed underlined 
that civilian and military efforts had to be closely aligned. As an example, the TFU 
saw the provision of basic services as one way to increase the support for GIRoA, 
and thus diminish the support for the Taliban. Similarly, the elimination of the 
physical capability of the OMF would strengthen the development side of the 
operation.531 However, the most important aspect of this visualization of the 
effects was that it showed clearly that an enemy-centric approach to the problem 
would not solve the mission. In addition, an inclusion of the civilian efforts in the 
overall plan invariably directed operations towards the population, as such efforts 
would be of little use if employed directly towards the opposing forces. Also from 
early on, the leadership of the first TFU encouraged and worked towards a closely 
integrated approach.532 This was not alone driven by an effects-based approach, 
but this approach provided a useful tool for that purpose. 
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Lastly, as shown earlier in this thesis, counterinsurgency theory argues that the 
government must prioritise its efforts in order to be successful. The effects-based 
approach employed by the Dutch aided the TFU in prioritizing recourses.  As all of 
the effects identified could not be achieved simultaneously, the 2006 masterplan 
also clearly prioritized the early efforts of the TFU. The five initially selected 
effects were:  
1. Population supports Afghan Authorities and ISAF 
2. ANA operational 
3. Police operational 
4. Movement of others in the area controlled 
5. Force protection established.533 
 
While not all of these effects are directly focussed on the population, they still 
promoted more of a population-centric approach than an enemy-centric approach. 
In particular, the emphasis on movement control gave guidance which led to a 
population centric approach. Especially when combined with the overall 
deployment of forces into the most populated areas it led the main effort towards 
the population and away from the enemy as suggested by counterinsurgency 
theory.  
 
Regarding the Dutch use of effects-based operations in Uruzgan it is worth 
revisiting some of the criticism raised against the concept. General Mattis, in his 
criticism of EBO, claimed that: 
 
 We must return clarity to our planning processes and operational 
concepts, especially if we want to break down cross-governmental barriers. 
This clarity will better enable us to link “ends” to policy, strategy, 
campaigns, and operations through clear “ways” and “means.” The use of 
“effects” has confused what previously was a well-designed and 
straightforward process for determining “ends.”534 
 
 
There is little evidence in the three cases studied in this thesis that Mattis’ claim 
holds a universal truth. Of the three nations studied here the Dutch were best able 
to link ends, ways, and means all the way from the political level down to tactical 
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operations. At the same time, the Dutch were the only nation who adopted an 
effects-based approach. I do not argue that the use of an effects-based approach 
was the sole reason for this, but in my opinion it was certainly more helpful than 
disruptive in this regard.  
 
Clear-hold-build approach 
Just as the British and the Norwegians, the Dutch used the clear-hold-build 
approach on the tactical level in Uruzgan. The Dutch managed to utilise this in a 
pragmatic and also inventive manner in guiding operations and also as an 
assessment tool.  
 
For the first year of the deployment the concept of clear-hold-build is not that 
visible in the Dutch operations in Uruzgan. It is not mentioned in the 2006 
masterplan and many of the OPORDERs and FRAGOs from that period are missing in 
the archives. In addition, the Dutch deployed most of their forces into the two 
biggest towns in Uruzgan in 2006, and thus had little need for clearing more areas. 
Initially they focussed on controlling the areas where they were deployed. In 2006 
the Dutch battlegroup, which had three infantry companies, was deployed with 
one company more or less permanently in Tarin Kowt and one in Deh Rawod. The 
last company served as a the commander’s freedom of action.535 However, unlike 
the very classic approach by the Prince of Wales Company in Cha-e-Anjr the Dutch 
initially adopted a less rigid tactical concept more akin to the swarm tactics of the 
US Marine Corps.536 Swarm tactics is a concept that has emerged in recent decades 
as an alternative to the traditional organisation of military units and operations. 
While it takes many forms, the core of the concept is to operate in small groups 
who converge, or swarm, on targets when it is deemed desirable.537 In order for 
such a concept to work one must avoid having too many of one’s forces tied down 
in permanent positions. All permanent positions need guarding, resupply, staffing, 
and construction work. Every permanent position of a unit ties up personnel in 
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these static duties and simultaneously reduces the number of boots on the ground. 
In brief, the Dutch aimed to avoid getting bogged down like the British got in 
Helmand with their platoon house strategy in 2006.538 
 
The challenge with swarm tactics as employed by the Dutch was to establish 
control over the areas where one does not have permanent presence.  
  
As I have said, this is a competition for control, and the side that best 
establishes a resilient, full-spectrum system of control that can affect 
security, rule of law, and economic activity at the local level is most likely 
to prevail.539 
 
If we accept the premise that counterinsurgency is a competition for governance 
and the population is the centre of gravity, is it possible to succeed with only an 
intermittent presence? The Dutch lines of operation were definitely in line with 
the recommendations of Kilcullen. But a key premise in population centric 
counterinsurgency is that support follows control.540 While the Dutch were largely 
successful in keeping Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod under control, the outlining areas 
proved more challenging. Geographically, the main populated part of Uruzgan is 
shaped like a lopsided V. In the bottom lies the capital of Tarin Kowt. West, 
through the Tanghi Valley lies Deh Rawod and to the north east, up the Baluchi 
valley, lies Chora. These valleys have villages and compounds along the green zone 
near the rivers. Initially the plan for the Dutch was to conduct an ink-spot strategy 
where influence was gradually spread out from the major cities.541 As a part of this 
the whole Baluchi valley was cleared by Dutch and Australian troops during 
Operation Perth in July 2006. However, it became clear that there was no quick-fix 
to the security situation and the Baluchi Valley proved particularly challenging.  
 
A final assessment of the Dutch efforts in Uruzgan reveals that Operation Perth had 
to be repeated at least three times before ANA and ISAF forces were able to exert 
even partial control of the area. The report highlighted the lack of an integrated 
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approach as one of the reasons for this. ‘The necessity of repeat operations in the 
Baluchi Valley highlighted the importance of an integrated approach.’542 However, 
as also pointed out by the Dutch evaluation, the main challenge with the initial 
operations was not just the lack of an integrated approach. It was the lack of 
permanent presence of security forces after the “clear” phase of the operation 
was concluded.543 Insurgents typically avoid decisive actions with government 
forces and then trickle back into the areas after these have left and remain the 
effective rulers of the area. Alternatively, insurgents will fight the security forces 
when these return to the area. If the insurgents resist the security forces’ entries 
into the area, the population will often view this as a case of repetitive raiding 
when government forces tries to regain control.544   
 
What is more, the population will not give up any valuable information without 
some certainty that the insurgents will not son regain control of the area. This 
dynamic was also observed in the British case during Operation Panchai Palang. It 
was only after the British forces had held the village for almost two months that a 
marked increase in intelligence from the locals was noticeable.545 Thus a 
permanent presence is a necessity for an integrated approach. One cannot do the 
hold and build phases without necessary security forces to keep the insurgents 
from disrupting the work. At the same time clear operations without the hold and 
build phases are also inefficient.546 Based on the evidence examined in the Dutch 
case this is one point where counterinsurgency theory remains valid. It 
furthermore underlies the difficulty of succeeding with such operations. The Dutch 
evaluation claims that the area was stabilised in late 2008.547 However, based on 
evidence in the Dutch archives this seems somewhat exaggerated. The stated 
mission of Operation Mani Ghar in early May 2009 was to: 
 
Commence CLEAR OPs [operations], partnered with ANA, to NEUTRALIZE INS 
[insurgents] influence within KAKARAK and to project and expand the 
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TFU/ANSF security footprint and deepen the clear with focus on 
KAKARAK.548  
 
The village Kakarak is in the Baluchi Valley about five kilometres north of the 
provincial capital Tarin Kowt. Also the 2010 campaign plan assessed that the clear 
phase of the Baluchi Valley was still not completed. When describing the situation 
in the area it stated:  
 
Although clearing operations have been conducted and efforts has been 
made to reach the Clear phase, the area is currently still in the Shape-phase 
due to the lack of permanent ANA/CF presence and the local 
atmospherics.549 
 
The main challenge at this point was not that the Dutch conducted repetitive clear 
operations without leaving a government foothold in the area. Several operations 
since 2008, including Mani Ghar, included the construction of patrol bases in the 
Baluchi Valley with a permanent ANSF presence. The challenge seems rather to be 
that these were too dispersed to saturate the area and control the population 
sufficiently to tip them over to the side of the government. As pointed out in the 
2010 Uruzgan campaign plan: ‘the performance of the ANA and CF [Coalition 
Forces] on security is good, but isolated. Around the PBs [Patrol bases], the area is 
more permissive than in other parts of the valley.’550  
 
This challenge should not have come as a surprise to the Dutch. Sir Robert 
Thompson emphasised in his work the need to link newly cleared areas to areas 
under government control. ‘The area [to clear] itself should be selected as an 
extension of an area already securely held.’551 This challenge is also discussed in 
the Dutch counterinsurgency doctrine. When debating operational designs for a 
counterinsurgency campaign the doctrine describes two principally different 
approaches. A concentric method, where the government forces work from the 
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outside and inwards, and an eccentric method which is the opposite.552 In relation 
to the areas surrounding the bases the doctrine argues: 
 
A constant presence in such areas often requires too many assets in relation 
to the success factors for the operation as a whole. If that is the case, it will 
not be possible to connect the various base areas with each other. Such 
areas must, however, be cleared as thoroughly as possible of insurgents and 
must remain clear.553 
 
The problem with this is that without a permanent presence after areas are 
cleared it is virtually impossible to keep the insurgents out of the area. Since the 
Dutch experience in Uruzgan is mirrored by the that of the Norwegians in Faryab 
and the British in Helmand it seems safe to say that this is generic. Based on the 
evidence examined in this paper the advice of Sir Robert Thompson seems to still 
be valid. The best way to safeguard isolated government outposts is to only clear 
new areas adjacent to areas that are already secured in the manner done by 
British forces during Operation Panchai Palang. 
Disruption of insurgents in periphery 
Even if the government forces only gradually expand from areas already under 
control it still leaves the challenge of how to deal with areas outside of 
government control. The basic rationale for a clear-hold-build approach is that the 
government does not have enough forces to cover the entire area affected by the 
insurgency. If they had enough forces, there would not be a need for a clear-hold-
build approach in the first place. This logic dictates that forces are prioritised to 
secure the areas already under control. Insurgents outside these areas are largely 
left in peace as long as they do not interfere with the secured areas. However, if 
the government lets the insurgents completely alone in areas they do not control, 
one risks the insurgents growing too strong to be dealt with later or that they will 
launch operations which greatly disturb the efforts inside government-held areas. 
The challenge for the counterinsurgent is to prioritise the efforts in areas under 
government control while not totally letting up the pressure on the insurgents in 
the periphery. Despite the challenges described above, the Dutch forces managed 
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this balancing act better than their Norwegian and British counterparts. The main 
reason for this was that they had a clearer understanding and division between 
clear and disruption554 operations. They were also, to a large extent, efficient in 
linking these operations together in a manner which underpinned the overall goal 
of the operation.  Before going into the details it is useful to briefly clarify the 
distinction between the two forms of operations.  
 
Clear operations aim at removing the overt part of an insurgency from an area to 
create a favourable situation for a hold and build phase. Disrupt operations aim at 
degrading the insurgents’ force build-up and preventing them from growing to 
strong, and avoiding unwanted influence on areas under government control.555 As 
these two tasks have very different aims they should also be conducted in different 
ways. The biggest difference lies in their relation to the population. Clear 
operations are conducted to prepare for the later hold and build phases. These are 
most often conducted in populated areas, and the troops should interact with the 
civilian population at early stages. This often include key-leader engagement, 
tribal mapping, quick-impact projects and rental of compounds or lands for 
permanent positions.556  
 
While conducting disrupt operations, on the other hand, the troops have no 
intention to stay permanently in the area. This should affect how the troops 
conduct the operation. Preferably it should be conducted away from populated 
areas to minimize the risk for collateral damage. If this is not possible one should 
minimize the interaction between the local population and the government troops, 
mainly because it is not very productive.  The population in contested areas does 
not normally provide any useful intelligence or other information without being 
sure that the government forces have become the dominant force in the area.557 
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This makes information gathering, key-leader engagements and similar activities in 
disruption operations ineffective, or counterproductive.  
 
Dutch forces in Uruzgan generally managed to utilize the two different forms of 
operations the way counterinsurgency theory intended. The framework order for 
TFU-5 (August 2008-January 2009) makes a clear distinction between disrupt and 
clear tasks. During this phase of the overall operation the Dutch forces were in the 
hold phase in the most populated areas of Uruzgan, but the surrounding areas had 
little or no permanent ISAF or ANSF presence. When describing the aim of the six-
month deployment is states: 
 
As security is considered essential for stability, efforts still need to be 
invested in denying INS presence and influence in the ADZ, as well as 
disrupting INS in areas that are of influence to the ADZ’s.558 
 
The efforts to disrupt the insurgents were thus not stand-alone operations, but 
effectively tied into the overall operation which was centred on securing the 
population in the held areas. Operation Now Ghar 2, Operation Zier Tufaan, and 
Operation Zanbori are all examples of Dutch operations where units are tasked to 
disrupt insurgent activities in areas surrounding focus areas. Operation Now Ghar 2 
was carried out by TFU-4 in April 2008. The main area of the operation was around 
the village of Khurma, north of Tarin Kowt. The entire phase A of the operation 
was focused on locating and disrupting insurgent activity in the area.559 In a later 
stage, when the main effort was concentrated in the valley, a separate operation 
box named Rotterdam was established to the west of the main objective.560 The 
mission for the forces in operation box Rotterdam was to conduct ‘disrupt ops IOT 
[in order to] neutralise indicated locations and objects to prevent for further INS 
[insurgents] ops [operations].’561 The purpose of this part of the operation was not 
to defeat an insurgency by killing off the insurgents, but to create conditions for 
success for the other forces who were the main effort of the operation as a whole.  
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A similar pattern can be observed in Operation Zier Tufaan. This was conducted in 
May 2008, also by the TFU-4. The operation was conducted in the three different 
focus areas in Uruzgan province: Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawod, and Chora. Arguably the 
key task of the operation was to construct a new patrol base for ANA in the Baluchi 
Valley.562 As part of this operation all of the three involved companies were given 
disrupt tasks to perform in the periphery of the focus areas. A company was to 
‘Disrupt INS [insurgent] presence and activities […] and prevent for INS movement 
from the south.’563 Likewise B and C companies were to ‘disrupt INS [insurgent] 
and destroy C2 [command and control] nodes/ weapon caches’ north of Tarin Kowt 
and in the vicinity of Chora.564 Again these operations were not stand-alone 
efforts. They were either tied in with the holding operations in Tarin Kowt and Deh 
Rawod, or part of creating a more favourable situation for the construction of the 
patrol base for ANA.  
 
Also Operation Zanbori was carried out in August 2009 shows the Dutch approach 
to disruption of the insurgents in the area. The operation as a whole focussed on 
the area north of Chora. The intelligence assessment prior to the operation was 
that the insurgents would attempt to re-establish a presence in areas north of 
Chora ahead of the elections.565 The operations order clearly states that the main 
effort of the operations in this area was to ‘deepen the effects inside the AOs 
[Areas of Operation] instead of expanding the ADZs.’566 However, the Dutch 
battlegroup also underlined that in order to achieve this they had to conduct 
offensive operations against the insurgents in order to retain the initiative in the 
area. When describing the overall method of the operation the order clearly states 
that in order to keep the focus area stable they would have to conduct operations 
with the aim of ’degrading INS influence within the ADZs and minimizing external 
INS influences on the ADZs.’567 The offensive operations against the insurgents 
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were thus not isolated actions, but closely connected with the main effort for this 
task force.568 
 
As shown above the aim of the disrupt operations was not to defeat the insurgents 
militarily, but to reduce the insurgents’ ability to influence the work done in the 
development zones after these areas were cleared. The order of the factors is in 
this case not irrelevant. While some of the operations carried out by the Dutch 
forces, such as Operation Zanbori, resemble those done by the Norwegians, there 
is yet a marked difference. Operation Zanbori, and the other operations analysed 
above, are offensive operations in relation to a hold operation in an adjacent area. 
The main effort as a whole is to secure the population in the controlled areas and 
the offensive operations are carried out in order to limit the influence by the 
insurgents on these. The operations carried out by the Norwegian forces were 
more isolated actions and as a result they were more enemy-centric in nature. This 
ability to execute disrupt operations in combination with the clear-hold phases 
both sets the Dutch apart from the Norwegians, and also aligns the Dutch 
operations closely with counterinsurgency theory and doctrine.  
 
The final point concerning the Dutch operations in Uruzgan pertains to the role of 
doctrine as a guide for operations. One of my underlying assumptions when 
starting my work on this project was that the Dutch performed better than the 
Norwegian forces because the Dutch armed forces had an updated and modern 
counterinsurgency doctrine in place. Norway, on the other hand, had no national 
doctrine for counterinsurgency. However, the assumption of an available and well 
adapted national doctrine proved to be false. None of the Dutch officers 
interviewed for this study referred to the Dutch doctrine in relation to how they 
thought about their operations specifically, or when discussing counterinsurgency 
in general. While this shows that the role of a national doctrine might not be as 
central as I had imagined initially, it does not mean that the role of doctrine in 
general is unimportant. All of the Dutch officers interviewed showed a good 
theoretical grasp of counterinsurgency. Furthermore, several of the officers 
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referred to the doctrines of allies, in particular the US Army/ Marine Corps FM 3-24 
and the British Army counterinsurgency doctrine.569 
A concerted government effort 
Overall, the Dutch efforts in Uruzgan was characterised by a high degree of civil-
military cooperation in line with what is recommended by counterinsurgency 
theory. This was mainly a result of the strategic choice to focus on a 3D approach, 
clear strategic guidance and involvement, and an organisation of the effort which 
enabled a close civil-military cooperation. 
 
Strategic view 
From the outset of the mission the Dutch employed a comprehensive view on the 
conflict.570 However, the term 3D approach, which is often associated with the 
Dutch effort in Uruzgan, was not explicitly used in the 2005 Kamerbrief.571 
Nevertheless, the Kamerbrief is very balanced in its approach and focuses equally 
on the defence, diplomatic and development aspects of the mission.572 In the 2007 
reaffirmation of the mission the government statement refers directly to the three 
strands of the Uruzgan operation: defence, diplomacy, and development.573 As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter the 3D approach was a Canadian variety of 
comprehensive approach used in nation-building missions. The 3D approach does 
not have roots in any doctrinal development, nor is there any substantial body of 
theory behind the concept. Just as integrated missions, whole of government 
approach, or comprehensive approach, the 3D approach is based on the premise 
that military force alone will not be enough to stabilise countries torn by 
insurgencies or civil war.574 With regards to its focus on the need for a close civil-
military cooperation the 3D approach is very similar to counterinsurgency 
theory.575 The selection of the 3D approach for the Dutch was in this sense 
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important. Just like in Norway, counterinsurgency was not very much in fashion in 
the Netherlands in 2006. Counterinsurgency brought back ghosts from their past as 
a colonial power, and was also associated with the US invasion and following 
occupation of Iraq.576 The 3D approach, even though closely resembling 
counterinsurgency in overall approach, thus represented an uncontroversial 
alternative which enabled the Dutch to approach the mission in the manner they 
did.577 
 
The choice of a 3D approach also set the conditions for a close cooperation 
between the different departments involved in the mission in Uruzgan. The 
ministries for defence and development and the foreign office worked closely from 
early on in the planning phase. The Kamerbrief on 22 December 2005, which 
outlines the main aspects of Dutch initial policy and strategy, was signed by all 
three ministers. Furthermore, a cross-departmental working group was established 
to oversee the operations at the strategic level.578 This group met weekly on a high 
level, while staff from the different ministries met on a daily basis as the mission 
progressed. While this inter-departmental cooperation was important in order to 
ensure a concerted government effort for the Dutch in Uruzgan it also indirectly 
served a different purpose: it ensured a continual involvement from the political 
and strategic level in the mission in Uruzgan.  
 
The overall organisation, and the integration of civil-military staff at the TFU 
level, has already been covered in the introduction to this chapter. Another 
important aspect of counterinsurgency concerning this topic is the organisation of 
the battlespace. In conventional war battlespace is divided and organised to avoid 
friendly fire and lessen the need for coordination. In counterinsurgency the 
challenge is rather to secure a unity of effort between the different actors in the 
area. The Dutch ensured this by overlapping the focus areas for the security forces 
with the ADZs where the development efforts would be prioritized.579 
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Counterinsurgency theory stresses the need to overlap the boundaries of the 
government forces with the existing boundaries of the local government.580 This is 
to avoid unclear responsibilities and ensure a unity of effort between civil and 
military efforts. If a company commander was given the responsibility of a district 
it was easier to coordinate his actions with the mayor and chief of police of the 
same province instead of dealing with several districts. However, this way of 
organising an effort in many ways presupposes a functioning local government.  
 
Most contemporary counterinsurgency efforts are expeditionary. In many modern 
conflicts the security forces, such as the Dutch in this case, does not represent the 
central authorities directly. Furthermore, in many of the cases local governments 
are either weak or virtually non-existent. In Uruzgan there was not much local 
government for the Dutch forces to cooperate with from the outset. In 2006 it was 
assessed that only 20% of the government positions in Uruzgan were filled.581 Based 
on this it can be argued that it was more important to overlap the focus areas of 
the security forces with the ADZs in order to achieve a unity of effort between the 
military and the development effort than to base the deployment on existing 
structures of local government. These two different approaches need not be 
mutually exclusive, and in practical terms the ADZs were focussed on the main 
population centres in Uruzgan anyway.  It is, however, worth keeping in mind that 
most contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns are expeditionary. Hence it is 
important to build local structures which can function when the international 
forces leave. In this regard it is advisable to use existing boundaries as much as 
possible.  
 
 
Tactical view 
Functioning civil-military cooperation on a tactical level is often difficult to 
establish. Cultures and interests differ between departments and these often 
influence the execution of a mission. Especially in the case of Norway, but also for 
the British these frictions tended to become even worse because the strategic 
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guidance diverged, or was unclear, which allowed the efforts to go in different 
directions. In the case of the Netherlands the strategic goals were, as covered 
initially in this chapter, clearer from the outset, but the situation was nevertheless 
far from ideal. Even the official evaluation admits that while the overall strategy 
focussed on the importance of a close civil-military cooperation, there was still 
little integrated civil-military planning ahead of deployment.  
 
During the initial stage of the mission, the approach was not entirely 
comprehensive, however, especially not in The Hague. For instance, before 
the beginning of the mission, there was no interdepartmental mission 
design, i.e. a plan, agreed and coordinated by the various ministries, for the 
elaboration of the Article 100 objectives and the implementation of the 
mission.582  
 
However, the command team of the first TFU partly alleviated this. Contrary to 
the civilian members of the TFU staff the military component of the TFU had a six-
month period to plan their mission. Thus in June 2006 the Masterplan, which 
mainly covers the military side of the mission, was more or less ready. When the 
development advisor was teamed up with the rest of the staff only two days prior 
to deployment, he was handed the Masterplan. Not  ‘to influence his assessment,’ 
but with a request that the same terms of reference were used.583 While it was a 
good intention by the military staff of the TFU not to influence the development 
assessment it is hard to imagine that it did not. The plan for the military 
operations were already in place, and it would be hard for a single development 
advisor to change this around in two days if he deemed this necessary. On the 
other hand, the advantage of the military side of the planning being done already 
was that the development side could base their planning on this product. In the 
Dutch case this was beneficial since the military planning had taken the 
development side of the operation into consideration from the outset. The 2006 
masterplan was clear that the civilian side of the mission was vital even though 
security operations were prioritized for the first deployments. An example of this 
is that 10 of the 22 identified effects to be achieved in order to have mission 
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success in the 2006 masterplan were “civilian” effects.584 Furthermore, as the 
emphasis early on was on security operations, it also provided more time to 
integrate and prepare the development side of the mission.   
 
Furthermore, the Dutch military component in general showed a greater 
willingness to incorporate the civilian side of the mission compared to the British 
and the Norwegians. None of the Dutch officers interviewed was unwarrantedly 
critical of the civilian part of the mission. In the cases where they provided 
criticism it was balanced and would also contain self-criticism. Several of the 
Dutch officers interviewed pointed out that the civilian staff were both competent 
and of invaluable help in understanding and shaping the development and 
governance side of the mission.585 While this should not be given too much 
emphasis it is still important in order to get a functioning civil-military 
cooperation. Cultural differences between the civilian and military staff are often 
one of the great hindrances for good cooperation. If the senior military staff shows 
a positive attitude towards the civilian component of the mission, it could make 
the cooperation easier for both parts. The relatively good cooperation between the 
military and civilian components of the TFU is also reflected in the van der Linj 
report from 2011 as well. He points to the fact that the Dutch Army had started 
work on better civil-military cooperation years before the Uruzgan mission.586 
Studies of the Dutch 3D approach point out that the cooperation worked well in 
particular on TFU staff level, while there was less integration on the tactical 
level.587 One of the reasons for the lack of a completely integrated approach at a 
tactical level is recognisable from the case of Norway. The question of a 
humanitarian space was debated both before and during the mission.588 As 
discussed in the theory chapter of this thesis, NGOs working in conflict areas rely 
on their impartiality for security. If NGOs work too closely with counterinsurgents 
this impartiality would, in their opinion, be undermined and then leave them 
vulnerable for insurgent attacks. In the Dutch case there was a principal division of 
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tasks where the military component would provide security, and the civilian 
component provided development.589 Van der Lïjn also points out that there was a 
direct correlation regarding the cooperation between the Dutch PRT and NGOs and 
the increased footprint of the civilian component from 2008 and onwards.590  
 
From a counterinsurgency point of view, the Dutch solution is probably what could 
be aimed for in modern conflicts. The theories of Galula, Thompson, and their like 
were all written well before the advent of NGOs as a major actor in conflict areas. 
The civilian component in their time was formed by government officials or 
representatives of the colonial administration and consequently fellow employees 
of the government. Nevertheless, in Uruzgan the Dutch were able to achieve a high 
degree of unity of effort between the civilian and military component, especially 
in the latter stages of the mission. This was done through a clear massing of 
resources in the ADZs where the civilian and military efforts were focused, and 
where the military planners incorporated the civilian side into the overall 
planning. Furthermore, the military forces focussed on creating security and thus a 
favourable environment for development to take place. Hence it was not an 
integrated effort on the tactical level, and based on the Dutch case it is probably 
fitting to ask whether it really needs to be. The paramount issue is that the overall 
planning done by the lead HQ in a province, whether this is on the operational or 
tactical level, integrates both the civilian and military aspects of the mission. The 
execution itself does not necessarily have to be integrated at the same level as 
long as both parties work towards the same goals. 
The Dutch approach 
The Dutch largely adhered to population-centric counterinsurgency theory. This 
despite never referring to their efforts in Uruzgan as a counterinsurgency effort. 
The Dutch developed a coherent, well suited and realistic strategy. The strategic 
guidance geographically prioritised Dutch efforts in Uruzgan. By pursuing a 3D 
approach, it also laid the foundations for a functioning civil-military cooperation at 
the tactical level. It also created an inter-departmental committee to oversee and 
control the operations from the strategic level. By doing so it not only provided a 
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forum for continual guidance from the strategic level, it also promoted ownership 
and interest in the mission. The main reason why the Dutch proved better at 
formulating a clear strategy compared to Norway and Britain seems to be 
procedural. Article 100 in the Dutch constitution forces the Dutch parliament to 
undergo a process which, when preformed rigorously, will produce the necessary 
elements of strategy. In the case of Uruzgan the Dutch government, by use of the 
article 100, produced a strategy which matched end and means, made clear 
priorities, and at the same time left enough flexibility for the tactical level to 
adopt to circumstances on the ground. 
 
Similarly, the Dutch never officially pursued a population-centric approach. Dutch 
operations were nevertheless characterised more by a population-centric than an 
enemy-centric approach. The clear priority of the civilian components of the 
mission, and the task of the military component to create security in relation to 
these, helped shaping the Dutch operation in a population-centric direction. Also 
the creation of ADZs around the most populated areas of the province aided the 
Dutch in maintaining a clear focus on the population rather than the enemy during 
their campaign. At the tactical level the TFU used EBO as a doctrinal approach to 
their operations. While EBO is not an integral part of counterinsurgency theory the 
Dutch case shows how it could be an effective planning tool to create a unity of 
effort in counterinsurgency operations.  
 
The Dutch also stood out in terms of creating a concerted government effort in 
Uruzgan. From the outset there was a small, but vital civilian presence in the TFU. 
From 2008 and onwards the Dutch PRT was under civilian command and the 
leadership of the TFU was shared. The ADZs provided a focal point for both 
security operations and development programs.  
 
The question of whether there is a Dutch way of counterinsurgency is beyond the 
parameters of this thesis. However, particularly compared to the Norwegians and 
the British, the Dutch stand out for the seriousness with which they planned the 
deployment of their military forces. They fashioned comprehensive procedures for 
the creation of strategy in Parliament. The main purpose of the article 100 is to 
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create better parliamentary control.  But a vital consequence of this legislation 
was the creation of a robust strategy for intervention in Afghanistan. Of the three 
national cases, the Dutch military alone forged a long-term campaign plan.  The 
end-product was both a strategy and an execution on the tactical level that both 
largely adhered to the theories of population-centric counterinsurgency. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis set out to examine the underlying premise of the most common 
criticism made of counterinsurgency doctrine based on experiences from 
Afghanistan. In order to achieve this the overall research questions were: 
First, how did Norwegian, British, and Dutch operations in 
Afghanistan between 2006-10 adhere to classic 
counterinsurgency theory?  
Second, why did their approaches differ?  
 
All these three states were lead nations in provinces during the period studied. In 
the theory chapter this study analysed and discussed the theories of population-
centric counterinsurgency. It argued that this theory is characterised by three 
factors: a primacy of politics, the population as a centre of gravity and a 
concerted government effort. Each of the three case studies has analysed how 
these three states adhered to these factor from both a strategic and tactical point 
of view. It was hard to find any evidence that Norway at all adhered to 
counterinsurgency theory during the period studied. Great Britain adhered to the 
theories of counterinsurgency in some aspects and periods of the mission. Overall 
only the Netherlands can be said to have largely adhered to counterinsurgency 
theories in their approach to the campaign in Afghanistan. In this conclusion I will 
address how each of these case studies relates to the overall research question. 
 
The Dutch 
The Netherlands is in many ways the paradox of this thesis. On the strategic level 
they never officially pursued the mission in Afghanistan as a counterinsurgency. 
Nevertheless, they were the only national case that in practical terms adhered the 
most closely to counterinsurgency theory. Only the Netherlands developed a 
coherent strategy prior to deployment. The article 100 of the Dutch constitution 
demands that any deployment of Dutch forces outside Dutch territories or in 
support of NATO article 5 operations must be debated and approved in parliament. 
This procedure includes specific questions related to the political aims, if these 
are achievable with military means and if the aims and means are balanced. The 
end product of this procedure is the basic components of a strategy.  
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Given the Netherland’s history as a former colonial power, the doctrine of 
counterinsurgency was not deemed as a viable political option. The Dutch instead 
pursued a 3D approach which emphasis a close cooperation between defence, 
development and diplomacy. However, this approach left enough room for 
adaptation on the ground for the Dutch to pursue what in practical terms was an 
approach which closely adhered to population-centric counterinsurgency. The 
Dutch also engaged with the political level in Uruzgan province ahead of their 
deployment. This helped to clarify expectations and prepare the ground ahead of 
the deployment of the task force. According to counterinsurgency theory, a 
coherent strategy is a prerequisite for success. But this is of little help if there is 
not a clear link between the strategy and the operations on the ground. In the case 
of the Netherlands, this link was ensured by the planning done by the first task 
force. Ahead of the deployment they developed a thorough and stringent campaign 
plan, the Masterplan for the Dutch mission to Uruzgan. This plan not only 
integrated strategic goals into tactical tasks. It also incorporated the development 
and political side of the mission into the plan. In this manner the Dutch laid an 
important foundation for a unity of effort in the mission from early on.  
 
On the strategic level the Dutch also pursued a population-centric approach. The 
initial deployment was centred on the two major cities in Uruzgan, Tarin Kowt and 
Deh Rawod. However, this was not driven out of a counterinsurgency logic. The 
Dutch strategic level put the PRT and its development task at the heart of the 
mission. Since development was mostly done in the most populated areas initially, 
the focus became population-centric as a matter of course. On the tactical level 
TFU applied the concept of effects-based operations as the foundation for the 
planning. Through a thorough analysis of the operational environment it identified 
the key effects which had to be achieved in order to solve the mission. Through 
this work they put the groundwork for a population-centric approach on the 
tactical level. As the force ratios in Uruzgan were also stretched, the Dutch 
adopted a more mobile concept than what is generally recommended by 
counterinsurgency theory. As time went on they conducted clear and hold 
operations in the prioritised areas. The need for permanent presence of security 
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forces after the clear operations were also well highlighted in the Dutch case. The 
Baluchi Valley was in particular problematic as the Dutch had to conduct repeated 
clear operations in the area. Only when sufficient forces were left in the area to 
support the local security forces were the insurgents forced out on a more 
permanent basis. In the adjacent areas they conducted disrupt operations to avoid 
that the insurgents could recover here.  
 
As a consequence of the overall 3D approach, the Dutch were also able to 
integrate civilian and military efforts well during their mission. The Dutch also 
deployed more civilian staff and eventually put civilian leadership of the PRT in 
effect. They ensured that the focus areas for the security operations overlapped 
the ADZs where the main effort of the development work would happen. Through 
this they ensured a certain control over the development projects done while 
conducting security operations in the same area. On the tactical level the TFU 
integrated the civilian side into the long-term planning. The level of cooperation 
between the civilian and military side of the mission was also overall good. 
 
In On War Clausewitz argued: ‘War is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and 
winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts. It is a serious means to a serious 
end […].’591 This quote is in many ways a fitting summary of the Dutch approach to 
the mission in Afghanistan, they seem to have taken all aspects of the operation 
seriously. They did not design their mission as a counterinsurgency effort. The 
execution nevertheless closely adhered to counterinsurgency theory. 
 
 
The British 
Britain deployed their forces into Helmand with an incoherent and poorly 
articulated strategy. The strategic goal of counter-narcotics proved particularly 
problematic. Leading officers in the first task force was convinced that any 
counter-narcotics operations would only serve to fuel the insurgency in Helmand. 
While the goal was logical from a domestic point of view it reduced the trust the 
task force had in their politicians understanding of the conflict. The United 
                                         
591 Clausewitz, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 98. 
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Kingdom also struggled to supervise the mission on the ground. The Helmand 
Triangle was defined as the area where British forces should operate by the 
strategic level. Yet one third of the manoeuvre force was relocated outside the 
Helmand Triangle before six months had passed.  
Tootal and Butler were pressured by the Afghan authorities to support Afghan 
forces further north in Helmand. They deemed this to be a tactical decision and 
the MoD was only informed after the operation was executed. While the main part 
of the responsibility for the latter decision rests with the commanders on the 
ground one might still expect the strategic level to carry out a more thorough 
oversight of the operations. This move of British forces outside the Helmand 
triangle into villages further north in Helmand also had negative aspects for other 
parts of the mission. It also serves to exemplify a profound challenge in 
contemporary counterinsurgency: there are many political agendas at play in the 
same operation. The British forces in theatre had to decide whether to follow 
political guidance from the MoD and Whitehall or support Afghan authorities. In 
such a complex environment military forces need clear strategic guidance in order 
to navigate safely.  
 
The initial deployment of British forces can be argued to have been population-
centric. The Helmand Triangle encompassed most of Helmand’s population with 
Gereshk and Lashkar Gah as the most important cities. The overall idea was to 
apply an ink-spot strategy where development and influence would expand from 
these areas. With what was effectively only one infantry battalion on the ground 
the British forces was from the outset spread rather thinly. When the movement of 
troops to the outlying villages to the north took place this situation was made even 
worse. The result was that British troops had such poor local force ratios that they 
were unable to dominate their areas. Without the ability to be the primary 
security provider in their areas the foundation for a population-centric approach 
was also greatly diminished. This created a perceived need to reduce the influence 
of insurgents that, at a crucial phase in the British deployment, led to a more 
enemy-centric approach. Later in the mission, when the British and the US 
deployed more troops into Helmand, this approach evolved towards the more 
population-centric focus prescribed in classis counterinsurgency doctrine. In 
 210 
Operation Panchai Palang the British forces were able to adapt and pursue 
population-centric operations on the tactical level. The hold phase conducted in 
Operation Panchai Palang demonstrated that British forces understood the 
importance of securing the population. It also resulted in inventive and effective 
tactics when the Taliban harassed the Welsh troops securing Cha-e Anjir.  
 
With regards to a concerted government effort, the British struggled throughout 
the period in question. The importance a concerted effort was understood at the 
strategic level. Efforts were made at integrated planning and to staff the PRT with 
qualified civilian staff to advise in development work. On the tactical level, this 
coordination never fully materialised. The security situation in Helmand presented 
powerful obstacles to development that were never overcome. The deployment of 
British platoons into isolated villages throughout the province compounded these 
obstacles. Different force-protection rules for civilian staff meant civilians were 
largely unable to work in tandem with the security forces. This led to predictable 
frustrations among the military personnel. Even though the importance of a tight 
civil-military cooperation seems to have been understood at the strategic level, 
these issues went largely unresolved.  
 
Overall the British approach to the campaign in Helmand adhered to 
counterinsurgency theory only partially and primarily in particular in the latter 
stages of the period in question. 
 
The Norwegians 
Norway did not formulate a strategy for their efforts in Faryab until 2009. The 
initial Norwegian perspective was that Norway’s forces were detached to ISAF. The 
coalition was expected to provide strategic and operational guidance. But in 
coalition operations this rarely happens. There is a general apprehensiveness about 
giving clear missions and guidance to the defence forces of member nations. 
Moreover, the one dimension where the 2009 strategy provided clear direction 
concerned the separation of civil and military efforts.  This clearly broke with both 
ISAF strategy and counterinsurgency theory. Where counterinsurgency theory 
underlines the importance of a close civil-military co-operation, the “Norwegian 
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model” for civil-military cooperation emphasised a segregation of the two efforts. 
Prominent politicians and the NGO lobby in Norway were worried that a close 
affiliation with security forces would undermine the impartiality and thus the 
security of NGOs in conflict zones. On the strategic level, therefore Norway 
decided to adhere to the principle of impartiality for NGOs at the expense of a 
concerted government effort as advocated by counterinsurgency theory. 
 
It has also been hard to find any evidence of the Norwegian intervention employing 
a population-centric approach to the conflict. The lack of clear strategic guidance 
gave the initial Norwegian PRT commanders great freedom of action. Unlike the 
Dutch there was not produced a long-term plan for Faryab in the initial stages. 
When the situation gradually worsened in Faryab in 2007 the Norwegian PRT seems 
to have been more dictated by circumstances as it did not have a long-term 
perspective on their operations. Poor force-ratios also made prolonged hold-build 
operations difficult to achieve. As a result, Norwegian operations were more 
characterised by a clear-return to base or repetitive raiding pattern than a 
population-centric approach. 
 
 
Norway was also unable to generate a concerted government effort in Faryab. The 
main reason for this was the decision to separate its military and civilian efforts. 
Interestingly, Norway was the only one of the three states studied in this thesis 
that came close to balancing their spending on the military and civilian efforts. But 
this was not evidence of a concerted government effort. Most of the civilian 
spending was channelled through Afghan authorities and trust funds. It was thus 
not directly linked to the efforts of the security forces in Faryab in any way.  
 
Overall it has been difficulty to find any evidence that Norway adhered to 
counterinsurgency theory during its campaign in Faryab. In some ways - the 
segregation of civil and military efforts for example - this was a conscious decision 
taken at the strategic level. The Norwegian case also highlights the challenges with 
a primacy of politics in contemporary operations. The importance of NGOs, both 
directly and indirectly, was not a consideration when Galula and Thompson 
developed their theories. In the Norwegian case, in particular, NGOs played an 
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important role in imbuing the conflict with a political character that had no 
precedent in the history of counterinsurgency. To developed a unified strategy in 
such a context while still adhering to classic counterinsurgency proved impossible.  
Recommendations for further research 
The work on this thesis has provided several ideas for further research on this 
topic. In this part, I will briefly outline three of these.  
 
Firstly, the use of EBO in counterinsurgency should be explored more in depth. As 
discussed in the chapter covering The Netherlands the EBO concept was largely 
declared dead by general Mattis in 2008. While it is still present some doctrines, in 
particular for NATO airpower, it has lost much of its past appeal in military circles. 
The Dutch case, however, showed that it could be used as an effective tool to 
create a unity of effort between the civilian and military components of a mission. 
On the other hand, it might be the case that this was more due to specific Dutch 
circumstances than the concept itself. It would thus be interesting to examine if 
this has been the case in other missions as well. 
 
Secondly, the concept of EBO and unity of effort should also be explored more in 
depth from the civilian component’s point of view. In order to address the unity of 
effort challenges of counterinsurgency operations one should also do more 
comparative research on the new UN peacekeeping missions. Most NATO members 
still maintain a conceptual difference between peacekeeping and 
counterinsurgency, and it is probably prudent to continue this. However, if one 
examines the modern and robust UN operations, such as the operations in Congo, 
Mali, Central African Republic, and Sudan, the degree of impartiality is at best 
very limited. In all of these operations, certain factions, which are deemed as 
hostile, has been targeted directly by UN peacekeeping forces. In this manner the 
de facto conduct of the new robust peacekeeping missions are conceptually very 
close to counterinsurgency. In this regard, it could be fruitful to both compare the 
new peacekeeping with counterinsurgency in general, as well as comparing the 
UN’s integrated missions approach to NATO’s comprehensive approach. As the UN 
traditionally has been better at cooperation with NGOs in their missions the latter 
could in particular be interesting. 
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The last recommendation for further research has relates to the actual conduct of 
counterinsurgency operations for armed forces. The main object of study in this 
thesis was the theories and doctrines of counterinsurgency. The conduct of 
operations was studied within the framework of theory. However, many of the 
officers at platoon and company level interviewed for this thesis pointed to the 
actual day-to-day running of operations as the main challenge they faced. Many of 
these understood the theories of counterinsurgency. They knew, theoretically, 
that securing the population was key and that their troops had to take risks on 
behalf of the civilian population in their area. The most difficult, they argued, was 
to convince their NCOs and soldiers to actually do the job in a way which 
conformed to doctrine and theory. It hence had more to do with leadership than 
military theory. While there has been written many accounts and studies of 
leadership in general I believe that officers and soldiers could benefit from further 
studies on the challenges of leadership in modern counterinsurgency operations.   
 
 
In summary 
The argument that the Afghan case demonstrates that classic counterinsurgency 
theory is outmoded is only partially correct. Of the three states studied in this 
thesis only, the Netherlands adhered to the theories of counterinsurgency in the 
execution of the mission. Great Britain did so only partially and only towards the 
latter stages of the period under study. It is difficult, moreover, to identify any 
aspects of the Norwegian mission in Faryab that adhered to counterinsurgency 
theory. The Afghan case therefore does not provide sufficient evidence to support 
the case that counterinsurgency theory is no longer useful.  
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Glossary 
 
ADZ: Afghan Development Zone 
ANA: Afghan National Army 
ANP: Afghan National Police 
COMISAF: Commander International Security Assistance Force 
CIVREP: Civilian representative (Dutch Task Force Uruzgan) 
FM: Field Manual 
GIRoA: Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
HCDC: House of Commons Defence Committee 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
IAG: Illegally Armed Groups 
IED: Improvised Explosive Device 
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force 
ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces 
FOB: Forward Operating Base 
FOH: Permanent Joint Headquarters (Norway) 
FRAGO: Fragmentary Order 
PJHQ: Permanent Joint Headquarters (Britain) 
PSO: Peace Support Operation 
PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team 
MoD: Ministry of Defense  
MOG: Mobile Operations Group 
MSR: Main Supply Route 
NORAD: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
OPLAN: Operational plan 
OMF: Opposing Military Forces 
RMAS: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst 
TFU: Task Force Uruzgan 
TU: Task-unit (Norway) 
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